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Search Publications by: Andrew Regenscheid (Fed)

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Displaying 26 - 34 of 34

BIOS Protection Guidelines

April 29, 2011
Author(s)
David Cooper, William Polk, Andrew Regenscheid, Murugiah Souppaya
This document provides guidelines for preventing the unauthorized modification of Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) firmware on PC client systems. Unauthorized modification of BIOS firmware by malicious software constitutes a significant threat because of

Security Considerations for Remote Electronic UOCAVA Voting

February 21, 2011
Author(s)
Nelson Hastings, Rene Peralta, Stefan Popoveniuc, Andrew Regenscheid
This whitepaper for the Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC) identifies desirable security properties of remote electronic voting systems, potential benefits and threats to these systems, and current and emerging technical approaches for

Performance Requirements for End-to-End Verifiable Elections

August 9, 2010
Author(s)
Stefan Popoveniuc, John M. Kelsey, Andrew Regenscheid, Poorvi Vora
The term end-to-end verifiability has been used over the past several years to describe multiple voting system proposals. The term has, however, never been formally defined. As a result, its meaning tends to change from voting system to voting system. We

Sigma Ballots

July 21, 2010
Author(s)
Stefan Popoveniuc, Andrew Regenscheid
We present Sigma ballots, a new type of ballot to be used in secure elections. Sigma ballots use the random order of candidates introduced by Pret a Voter, combined with the confirmation codes of Scantegrity II. These ballots can be produces by a DRE

Attacking Paper-Based E2E Voting Systems

February 1, 2010
Author(s)
John M. Kelsey, Andrew R. Regenscheid, Tal Moran, David Chaum
In this paper, we develop methods for constructing vote-buying/coercion attacks on end-to-end voting systems, and describe vote-buying/coercion attacks on three end-to-end voting systems: Punchscan, Pret-a-Voter, and Threeballot. We also demonstrate a

Status Report on the First Round of the SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition

September 23, 2009
Author(s)
Andrew R. Regenscheid, Ray A. Perlner, Shu-jen H. Chang, John M. Kelsey, Mridul Nandi, Souradyuti Paul
The National Institute of Standards and Technology is in the process of selecting a new cryptographic hash algorithm through a public competition. The new hash algorithm will be referred to as SHA-3 and will complement the SHA-2 hash algorithms currently

A Threat Analysis on UOCAVA Voting Systems

December 19, 2008
Author(s)
Andrew R. Regenscheid, Nelson E. Hastings
This report contains the results of NIST s research into technologies to improve the voting process for United States citizens living overseas. It splits the overseas voting process into three stages: voter registration and ballot request, blank ballot
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