Attacking Paper-Based E2E Voting Systems

Published: February 01, 2010


John M. Kelsey, Andrew R. Regenscheid, Tal Moran, David Chaum


In this paper, we develop methods for constructing vote-buying/coercion attacks on end-to-end voting systems, and describe vote-buying/coercion attacks on three end-to-end voting systems: Punchscan, Pret-a-Voter, and Threeballot. We also demonstrate a different attack on Punchscan, which could permit corrupt election officials to change votes without detection in some cases. Additionally, we consider some generic attacks on end-to-end voting systems.
Citation: Towards Trustworthy Elections: New Directions in Electronic Voting
Volume: 6000
Publisher Info: Springer-Verlag, Berlin,
Pub Type: Book Chapters


voting, end-to-end voting schemes, cryptographic voting schemes, coercion attacks
Created February 01, 2010, Updated November 10, 2018