John M. Kelsey, Andrew R. Regenscheid, Tal Moran, David Chaum
In this paper, we develop methods for constructing vote-buying/coercion attacks on end-to-end voting systems, and describe vote-buying/coercion attacks on three end-to-end voting systems: Punchscan, Pret-a-Voter, and Threeballot. We also demonstrate a different attack on Punchscan, which could permit corrupt election officials to change votes without detection in some cases. Additionally, we consider some generic attacks on end-to-end voting systems.
Towards Trustworthy Elections: New Directions in Electronic Voting
, Regenscheid, A.
, Moran, T.
and Chaum, D.
Attacking Paper-Based E2E Voting Systems, Towards Trustworthy Elections: New Directions in Electronic Voting, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, , [online], https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_23
(Accessed September 17, 2021)