Towards a Metric for Communication Network Vulnerability to Attacks: A Game Theoretic Approach

Published

May 25, 2012

Author(s)

Assane Gueye, Vladimir V. Marbukh, Jean C. Walrand

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a quantification of the vulnerability of a communication network when links are subject to failures due to the actions of a strategic adversary. We model the adversarial nature of the problem as a 2-player game between an attacker who wants to disrupt the communication and a network manager who tries to avoid such disruption. We use previously proposed models for the value of a network to derive payoffs of the players and propose the network’s expected loss-in-value as a metric for vulnerability. In the process, we generalize the notion of betweenness centrality. The analysis of the Nash equilibria reveals the existence of subsets of links that are more critical than the others. We characterize these critical subsets of links and compare them for the different network value models. The comparison shows that critical subsets depend both on the value model and on the connectivity of the network.

Volume

105

Conference Dates

May 24-26, 2012

Conference Location

Vancouver

Conference Title

GAMENETS 2012, 3rd International Conference on Game Theory for Networks

Pub Type

Conferences

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DOI Link

Keywords

Communication Network Security, Vulnerability Metric, Game Theory

Citation

Gueye, A. , Marbukh, V. and Walrand, J. (2012), Towards a Metric for Communication Network Vulnerability to Attacks: A Game Theoretic Approach, GAMENETS 2012, 3rd International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, Vancouver, -1, [online], https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_20 (Accessed April 26, 2024)