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Quantifying the post-quantum security-margin of popular block ciphers
Published
Author(s)
Yi-Kai Liu, Brittanney Amento-Adelmann, Markus Grassl, Brandon Langenberg, Eddie Schoute, Rainer Steinwandt
Abstract
Mounting an exhaustive key search against a block cipher with Grover's algorithm requires the implementation of the target cipher on a quantum computer. We report quantum circuits and resource bounds for various block ciphers with different design characteristics: MARS, SERPENT, Simon, and Speck. Our results give some insight into what a "Grover-resilient" block cipher might look like.
Liu, Y.
, Amento-Adelmann, B.
, Grassl, M.
, Langenberg, B.
, Schoute, E.
and Steinwandt, R.
(2018),
Quantifying the post-quantum security-margin of popular block ciphers, IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, [online], https://doi.org/10.4230/DagRep.7.10.1, https://eprint.iacr.org/
(Accessed October 8, 2025)