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Quantifying the post-quantum security-margin of popular block ciphers

Published

Author(s)

Yi-Kai Liu, Brittanney Amento-Adelmann, Markus Grassl, Brandon Langenberg, Eddie Schoute, Rainer Steinwandt

Abstract

Mounting an exhaustive key search against a block cipher with Grover's algorithm requires the implementation of the target cipher on a quantum computer. We report quantum circuits and resource bounds for various block ciphers with different design characteristics: MARS, SERPENT, Simon, and Speck. Our results give some insight into what a "Grover-resilient" block cipher might look like.
Citation
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
Volume
7
Issue
10

Keywords

Cryptography, quantum computing, block ciphers, quantum algorithms

Citation

Liu, Y. , Amento-Adelmann, B. , Grassl, M. , Langenberg, B. , Schoute, E. and Steinwandt, R. (2018), Quantifying the post-quantum security-margin of popular block ciphers, IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, [online], https://doi.org/10.4230/DagRep.7.10.1, https://eprint.iacr.org/ (Accessed October 8, 2025)

Issues

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Created March 27, 2018, Updated May 15, 2020
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