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Attacking Paper-Based E2E Voting Systems

Published

Author(s)

John M. Kelsey, Andrew R. Regenscheid, Tal Moran, David Chaum

Abstract

In this paper, we develop methods for constructing vote-buying/coercion attacks on end-to-end voting systems, and describe vote-buying/coercion attacks on three end-to-end voting systems: Punchscan, Pret-a-Voter, and Threeballot. We also demonstrate a different attack on Punchscan, which could permit corrupt election officials to change votes without detection in some cases. Additionally, we consider some generic attacks on end-to-end voting systems.
Citation
Towards Trustworthy Elections: New Directions in Electronic Voting
Volume
6000
Publisher Info
Springer-Verlag, Berlin,

Keywords

voting, end-to-end voting schemes, cryptographic voting schemes, coercion attacks

Citation

Kelsey, J. , Regenscheid, A. , Moran, T. and Chaum, D. (2010), Attacking Paper-Based E2E Voting Systems, Towards Trustworthy Elections: New Directions in Electronic Voting, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, , [online], https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_23 (Accessed October 16, 2025)

Issues

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Created February 1, 2010, Updated November 10, 2018
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