, , , William C. Barker
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the default routing protocol to route traffic among internet domains. While BGP performs adequately in identifying viable paths that reflect local routing policies and preferences to destinations, the lack of built-in security allows the protocol to be exploited by route hijacking. Route hijacking occurs when an entity accidentally or maliciously alters an intended route. Such attacks can (1) deny access to internet services, (2) detour internet traffic to permit eavesdropping and to facilitate on-path attacks on end points (sites), (3) misdeliver internet network traffic to malicious end points, (4) undermine internet protocol (IP) address-based reputation and filtering systems, and (5) cause routing instability in the internet. This document describes a security platform that demonstrates how to improve the security of inter-domain routing traffic exchange. The platform provides route origin validation (ROV) by using the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) in a manner that mitigates some misconfigurations and malicious attacks associated with route hijacking. The example solutions and architectures presented here are based upon standards-based, open-source, and commercially available products.
Special Publication (NIST SP) - 1800-14
AS, autonomous systems, BGP, Border Gateway Protocol, DDoS, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, internet service provider, ISP, Regional Internet Registry, Resource Public Key Infrastructure, RIR, ROA, route hijack, route origin authorization, route origin validation, routing domain, ROV, RPKI