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Long distance decoy state quantum key distribution in optical fiber



Danna Rosenberg, Jim A. Harrington, Patrick R. Rice, Philip A. Hiskett, Charles G. Peterson, Richard J. Hughes, Jane E. Nordholt, Adriana Lita, Sae Woo Nam


The theoretical existence of photon-number-splitting attacks creates a security loophole for most quantum key distribution (QKD) demonstrations that use a highly attenuated laser source. Using ultralow-noise, high-efficiency transition-edge sensor photodetectors, we have implemented the first version of a decoy-state protocol that incorporates finite statistics without the use of Gaussian approximations in a one-way QKD system, enabling the creation of secure keys immune to photon-number-splitting attacks and highly resistant to Trojan horse attacks over 107 km of optical fiber.
Physical Review Letters


quantum information, quantum key distribution, single photon detector, transition-edge sensor


Rosenberg, D. , Harrington, J. , Rice, P. , Hiskett, P. , Peterson, C. , Hughes, R. , Nordholt, J. , Lita, A. and Nam, S. (2007), Long distance decoy state quantum key distribution in optical fiber, Physical Review Letters, [online], (Accessed April 19, 2024)
Created January 4, 2007, Updated October 12, 2021