Rosenberg, D.
, Harrington, J.
, Rice, P.
, Hiskett, P.
, Peterson, C.
, Hughes, R.
, Nordholt, J.
, Lita, A.
and Nam, S.
(2007),
Long distance decoy state quantum key distribution in optical fiber, Physical Review Letters, [online], https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=32497
(Accessed December 12, 2024)
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Long distance decoy state quantum key distribution in optical fiber
Published
Author(s)
Danna Rosenberg, Jim A. Harrington, Patrick R. Rice, Philip A. Hiskett, Charles G. Peterson, Richard J. Hughes, Jane E. Nordholt, ,
Abstract
The theoretical existence of photon-number-splitting attacks creates a security loophole for most quantum key distribution (QKD) demonstrations that use a highly attenuated laser source. Using ultralow-noise, high-efficiency transition-edge sensor photodetectors, we have implemented the first version of a decoy-state protocol that incorporates finite statistics without the use of Gaussian approximations in a one-way QKD system, enabling the creation of secure keys immune to photon-number-splitting attacks and highly resistant to Trojan horse attacks over 107 km of optical fiber.Citation
Physical Review Letters
Volume
98
Issue
(1)
Pub Type
Journals
Download Paper
Keywords
quantum information, quantum key distribution, single photon detector, transition-edge sensor
Citation
Issues
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Created January 4, 2007, Updated October 12, 2021