A Game-Theoretic Framework for Network Security Vulnerability Assessment and Mitigation

Published

November 5, 2012

Author(s)

Assane Gueye, Vladimir V. Marbukh

Abstract

In this paper we propose and discuss a game-theoretic framework for (a) evaluating security vulnerability, (b) quantifying the corresponding Pareto optimal vulnerability/cost tradeo®, and (c) identifying the optimal operating point on this Pareto optimal frontier. We discuss our framework in the context of a °ow-level model of Supply-Demand (S-D) network where we assume a sophisticated attacker attempting to disrupt the network °ow. The vulnerability metric is determined by the Nash equilibrium payoff of the corresponding game. The vulnerability/cost tradeoff is derived by assuming that the "network" can reduce the security vulnerability at the cost of using more expensive flows and the optimal operating point is determined by the "network" preferences with respect to vulnerability and cost. We illustrate the proposed framework on examples through numerical investigations.

Proceedings Title

GameSec 2012, the third Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security

Conference Dates

November 5-6, 2012

Conference Location

Budapest

Conference Title

GameSec

Pub Type

Conferences

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Keywords

Network Security Vulnerability, Network Security Cost, Vulnerability/Cost Tradeoff, Game Theoretic Model

Citation

Gueye, A. and Marbukh, V. (2012), A Game-Theoretic Framework for Network Security Vulnerability Assessment and Mitigation, GameSec 2012, the third Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, Budapest, -1, [online], https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=912263 (Accessed December 11, 2024)