Gatlin, J.
, Belikovetsky, S.
, Elovici, Y.
, Skjellum, A.
, Lubell, J.
, Witherell, P.
and Yampolskiy, M.
(2021),
Encryption is Futile: Reconstructing 3D-Printed Models using the Power Side-Channel, RAID '21: 24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses, San Sebastian, ES, [online], https://doi.org/10.1145/3471621.3471850
(Accessed April 25, 2024)
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Encryption is Futile: Reconstructing 3D-Printed Models using the Power Side-Channel
Published
Author(s)
Jacob Gatlin, Sofia Belikovetsky, Yuval Elovici, Anthony Skjellum, , , Mark Yampolskiy
Abstract
Outsourced Additive Manufacturing (AM) exposes sensitive design data to external malicious actors. Even with end-to-end encryption between the design owner and 3D-printer, side-channel attacks can be used to bypass cyber-security measures and obtain the underlying design. In this paper, we develop a method based on the power side-channel that enables accurate design reconstruction in the face of full encryption measures without any prior knowledge of the design. Our evaluation on a Fused Deposition Modeling (FDM) 3D Printer has shown 99 % accuracy in reconstruction, a significant improvement on the state of the art. This approach demonstrates the futility of pure cyber-security measures applied to Additive Manufacturing.Proceedings Title
RAID '21: 24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses
Conference Dates
October 6-8, 2021
Conference Location
San Sebastian, ES
Pub Type
Conferences
Download Paper
Keywords
additive manufacturing, side-channel, security, cybersecurity framework, fused deposition modeling, FDM
Citation
Created October 6, 2021, Updated October 14, 2021