On the Differential Security of the HFEv- Signature Primitive

Published

February 4, 2016

Author(s)

Ryann Cartor, Ryan Gipson, Daniel Smith-Tone, Jeremy Vates

Abstract

Multivariate Public Key Cryptography (MPKC) is one of the most attractive post-quantum options for digital signatures in a wide array of applications. The history of multivariate signature schemes is tumultuous, however, and solid security arguments are required to inspire faith in the schemes and to verify their security against yet undiscovered attacks. The effectiveness of "differential attacks" on various fi eld-based systems has prompted the investigation of the resistance of schemes against differential adversaries. Due to its prominence in the area and the recent optimization of its parameters, we prove the security of HFEv^- against differential adversaries. We investigate the newly suggested parameters and conclude that the proposed scheme is secure against all known attacks and against any differential adversary.

Proceedings Title

PQCrypto 2016: The Seventh International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography

Volume

9606

Conference Dates

February 24-26, 2016

Conference Location

Fukuoka, JP

Pub Type

Conferences

Download Paper

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29360-8_11

Local Download

Keywords

Multivariate Cryptography, HFEv-, Discrete Differential, MinRank, Q-rank

Citation

Cartor, R. , Gipson, R. , Smith-Tone, D. and Vates, J. (2016), On the Differential Security of the HFEv^- Signature Primitive, PQCrypto 2016: The Seventh International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography, Fukuoka, JP, [online], https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29360-8_11, https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=926102 (Accessed May 10, 2024)