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Constant-Round Group Key Exchange from the Ring-LWE Assumption
Published
Author(s)
Daniel C. Apon, Dana Dachman-Soled, Huijing Gong, Jonathan Katz
Abstract
Group key-exchange protocols allow a set of N parties to agree on a shared, secret key by communicating over a public network. A number of solutions to this problem have been proposed over the years, mostly based on variants of Diffie-Hellman (two-party) key exchange; to the best of our knowledge, however, there has been almost no work looking at candidate post-quantum group key-exchange protocols. Here, we propose a constant-round, scalable protocol for unauthenticated group key exchange (i.e., with security against a passive eavesdropper) based on the hardness of the Ring-LWE problem. By applying the Katz-Yung compiler using any post-quantum signature scheme, we obtain a (scalable) protocol for authenticated group key exchange with post-quantum security. Our protocol is constructed by generalizing the Burmester-Desmedt protocol to the Ring-LWE setting, which requires addressing several technical challenges.
Proceedings Title
The Tenth International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography
Apon, D.
, Dachman-Soled, D.
, Gong, H.
and Katz, J.
(2019),
Constant-Round Group Key Exchange from the Ring-LWE Assumption, The Tenth International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography, Chongqing, -1, [online], https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25510-7_11
(Accessed October 10, 2025)