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Autonomous System (AS) Isolation under Randomized BGP Session Attacks with RFD Exploitation

Published

Author(s)

Kotikalapudi Sriram, Douglas Montgomery, Oliver Borchert, Okhee Kim, D. Richard Kuhn

Abstract

BGP peering session attacks are known to drive routes into route flap damping (RFD) suppression states and thus cause isolations between autonomous systems (ASes) and destinations. We present a detailed study of the impact of BGP peering session attacks and the resulting exploitation of RFD that cause network-wide routing disruptions. Analytical results provide insights into the nature of the problem and impact of the attacks. Detailed simulation results using SSFNet BGP framework complement the analytical results and provide many useful insights.
Proceedings Title
International Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2006
Conference Dates
April 23-29, 2006
Conference Location
Barcelona, SP

Citation

Sriram, K. , Montgomery, D. , Borchert, O. , Kim, O. and Kuhn, D. (2006), Autonomous System (AS) Isolation under Randomized BGP Session Attacks with RFD Exploitation, International Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2006, Barcelona, SP (Accessed October 10, 2024)

Issues

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Created March 31, 2006, Updated October 12, 2021