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|Author(s):||John M. Kelsey; Andrew R. Regenscheid; Tal Moran; David Chaum;|
|Title:||Attacking Paper-Based E2E Voting Systems|
|Published:||February 01, 2010|
|Abstract:||In this paper, we develop methods for constructing vote-buying/coercion attacks on end-to-end voting systems, and describe vote-buying/coercion attacks on three end-to-end voting systems: Punchscan, Pret-a-Voter, and Threeballot. We also demonstrate a different attack on Punchscan, which could permit corrupt election officials to change votes without detection in some cases. Additionally, we consider some generic attacks on end-to-end voting systems.|
|Citation:||Towards Trustworthy Elections: New Directions in Electronic Voting|
|Pages:||pp. 370 - 387|
|Keywords:||voting, end-to-end voting schemes, cryptographic voting schemes, coercion attacks|
|Research Areas:||Information Technology|
|DOI:||http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_23 (Note: May link to a non-U.S. Government webpage)|
|PDF version:||Click here to retrieve PDF version of paper (682KB)|