

Best Practice Recommendations for Evaluative Forensic DNA Testimony

*Human Forensic Biology Subcommittee
Biology Scientific Area Committee
Organization of Scientific Area Committees (OSAC) for Forensic Science*





Draft OSAC Proposed Standard

OSAC 2022-S-0024 Best Practice Recommendations for Evaluative Forensic DNA Testimony

Prepared by
Human Forensic Biology Subcommittee
Version: 1.0
January 2022

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1 Foreword

2 This document provides guidelines for best testimony practices in Forensic Biology. Its aim is to present
3 recommendations based on a recognized framework for casework assessment and interpretation (CAI)
4 [Cook et al., 1998 CAI], which ensures the following desired qualities [ENFSI Guidelines 2015, Assoc.
5 For. Sci. Providers 2009]:

- 6 ● Balance: The consideration of at least two propositions on the key issues and establishing the
7 relevant background information as it relates to each proposition, as understood by the expert,
8 avoids the evaluation to be one-sided (i.e., only taking into account one party's views) or biased.
- 9 ● Logic: The assessment of the probability of the evidence given each proposition and the relevant
10 background information prevents the expert from making statements about the probabilities of the
11 propositions which would be usurping the role of the judge or jury.
- 12 ● Robustness: The use of sound knowledge, accepted tests and examinations, verified databases,
13 and applicable published studies increases the quality of the expert's testimony.
- 14 ● Transparency: The application of a recognized framework in the expert's case notes will show
15 the foundation and thought process used so that the expert will be able to demonstrate how the
16 opinion was developed.

17 This framework promotes a logical approach for evaluating the forensic scientist's findings, and is based
18 on the Four Principles of Evidence Evaluation [Evetts and Weir, 1998, Evetts 2015]:

- 19 1. To evaluate the uncertainty of any given proposition, it is necessary to also consider at least one
20 alternate proposition (i.e., propositions are dealt with in pairs).
- 21 2. Scientific evaluation of the evidence is based on the question 'What is the probability of
22 observing the evidence if the proposition were true?' for each of the competing propositions. In
23 mathematical terms, this is written as $Pr(E|H)$, where Pr is "probability", E is "evidence", | is
24 "given", and H is the proposition.
- 25 3. Scientific evaluation of the evidence depends not only on each of the competing propositions, but
26 also on the framework of case circumstances within which the evidence is to be evaluated. This
27 expands the probabilities to $Pr(E|H,I)$, where I is the relevant case-specific information.

28 It is logically meaningless to suggest that any evidence has value in itself as support for any particular
29 proposition in isolation. Its value depends entirely upon its ability to discriminate between one
30 proposition and an alternative proposition. This leads us to the fourth principle [Evetts 2015]:

- 31 4. The value of the evidence is the ratio of two probabilities of the evidence given each of two
32 alternate propositions within the case context. Mathematically, this will read:

$$\frac{Pr(E|H_1, I)}{Pr(E|H_2, I)}$$

33

34 and is termed the Likelihood Ratio or LR.

35 The scientist is the best person to help the jury understand the evidence by performing this task, given
36 their insight into the issues at hand. Transferring these responsibilities to the jury or Court increases the
37 risks of misunderstanding and for inappropriate conclusions to be made.

38 Application of the approach in the witness box requires a working knowledge of the four principles and a
39 robust and educated response to questions so that the value of the evidence is conveyed in a balanced, fair
40 and meaningful way, and inappropriate questions, such as “Is XX possible?”, are effectively rebutted.
41 Any comment on XX by the expert is a comment on the ultimate issue, and that is reserved for the jury.

42 This document is organized according to the Hierarchy of Propositions framework, which consists of the
43 following levels: sub-sub-source, sub-source, source, activity, and crime or offence level [Cook et al.,
44 1998 hierarchy, Evett et al., 2002, Gittelsohn et al., 2016]. As the expert’s evaluation moves up the
45 hierarchy of propositions (e.g., from sub-source to activity), the expert is communicating more expert
46 knowledge of relevance to the court. In order to do this effectively, the scientist will incorporate data or
47 personal knowledge, for example regarding body fluid attribution, DNA transfer and persistence and
48 background levels of DNA as well as contamination—different levels in the hierarchy require considering
49 separate factors and data. It is appropriate for the scientists to assist, where possible, in this way because
50 the decision maker at court (jury or sometimes judge) does not have this specialized knowledge.

51 A high priority for this subcommittee was to include explicit guidance for testimony with regard to
52 activity level propositions; that is, testimony that considers factors such as DNA transfer, persistence, and
53 recovery. This is an area for which no real guidance currently exists in the United States. In cases where
54 the activity is the issue, scientists will assess the value of the results (i.e., assign the probability of the
55 results) given at least two competing propositions. We recognize that best practice would be to include
56 the evaluation of DNA evidence given activity level propositions in the initial laboratory report. However,
57 currently very few laboratories are doing this, yet questions regarding activity level propositions show up
58 routinely in trials. The goal of this document is to address this immediate need for testimony guidance.

59 This document will not address offence level propositions in any fashion, as it is rare for forensic
60 scientists to add value by the use of their specialized knowledge when considering this level of
61 propositions.

62 The Recommendations (Section 4) are presented in four subsections:

- 63 4.1. Communication of results given sub-sub-source level propositions
- 64 4.2. Communication of results given sub-source level propositions
- 65 4.3. Communication of results given source level propositions
- 66 4.4. Communication of results given activity level propositions.

67 Each of these subsections was written to provide a complete, standalone list of recommendations for the
68 given level, so that each one can be read by itself without reference to the other subsections.

69 The adherence to these guidelines will ensure that the forensic scientist’s testimony is logically and
70 scientifically sound without usurping the role of the judge or jury. Adopting them will improve the
71 quality, accuracy and consistency of communicating results across practitioners, and lead to an increase in
72 quality by providing added value to the Court. The document provides the theoretical background behind

73 the approach, real world guidelines for best testimony practices, and some working examples of how this
74 might be applied. The practice could also be applied to statement writing.

75 All hyperlinks and web addresses shown in this document are current as of the publication date of this
76 standard.

77

78 **Keywords:** *forensic DNA testimony, communication, likelihood ratio, activity level, hierarchy*
79 *of propositions*

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90 **1 Scope**

91 This document describes best practices for the communication of biological results and opinions in the
92 field of Forensic Biology. It addresses testimony given sub-sub-source, sub-source, source, and activity
93 level propositions. This document will not consider the highest level of the Hierarchy of Propositions
94 (crime level).

95
96 This document does not give guidance on how to obtain findings (DNA results/statistics) or form
97 opinions (how or when to have an opinion that evidence supports a proposition or that the findings are
98 neutral for a given pair of propositions). Rather, the purpose is to focus on best practices for the
99 communication of findings and opinions in the role of an expert witness.

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101 **2 Normative References**

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144

145 3 Terms and Definitions

146 Bayesian/logical framework

147 A framework based on (the odds form of) Bayes' Theorem, which is a mathematical idealization of the
148 belief about a set of propositions is updated based on the (value of the) evidence. This is a framework
149 used to evaluate evidence or results given two different propositions summarizing the point of view of the
150 parties as understood in the case. The value of the evidence is given by the expert in the form of a
151 Likelihood Ratio (LR). The focus of the LR is always on the evidence, not on the proposition. The value
152 of evidence (LR) presented by the expert can then be combined with the other non-expert evidence to
153 update the decision maker's beliefs in the proposition. The odds form of Bayes' theorem is:
154
155

$$\underbrace{\frac{Pr(H_1|E, I)}{Pr(H_2|E, I)}}_{\text{Posterior odds}} = \underbrace{\frac{Pr(E|H_1, I)}{Pr(E|H_2, I)}}_{\text{Likelihood Ratio}} \times \underbrace{\frac{Pr(H_1|I)}{Pr(H_2|I)}}_{\text{Prior odds}}$$

161 Bayesian Networks

162 Bayesian Networks are a marriage between graph theory and probability theory. They provide a tool for
163 describing (potentially complex) dependencies between variables whose value is uncertain; thus may be
164 used to calculate an LR given activity level propositions.
165

166 Case Assessment and Interpretation (CAI) model

167 The CAI model is a framework for structuring forensic examinations and reporting results. It allows
168 scientists to formulate examination strategies, record their expectations of the probability of various
169 outcomes prior to analysis, and then compare the expected and observed results. The process of assigning
170 probabilities given the activities before knowing the results ensures that scientists are not influenced by
171 what they have obtained (i.e., avoiding post hoc rationalization).

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Explanation

In the context of a forensic science evaluation, explanations are generated after the forensic findings have been obtained. While an explanation has the potential to account for particular observations, it does not qualify as a formal proposition because - often - it may be a statement of the obvious, speculative, or fanciful.

Hierarchy of propositions

The Hierarchy of propositions is a framework to help address different questions of relevance to the trier of fact. In the context of criminal proceedings, propositions can be classified into broad categories (or, hierarchical levels):

- ‘sub-sub-source level’¹ for propositions about the source (i.e., person) of a part (i.e., major or minor contribution) of the DNA profile.
- ‘sub-source level’² for propositions about the source (i.e., person) of the DNA
- ‘source level’ for propositions about the source (i.e., person or item) from which the trace material originated (e.g., propositions addressing who is the source of the body fluid)
- ‘activity level’ for propositions about an activity or a happening (e.g., propositions addressing how or when the DNA was transferred)
- ‘offence level’ for propositions that refer to the commission of a criminal offence

Likelihood ratio (LR)

In the context of evidence interpretation: The probability of the evidence under one proposition divided by the probability of the evidence under an alternative, mutually exclusive proposition. The magnitude of its value expresses the weight of the evidence.

Note: The likelihood ratio can be numerical or qualitative (especially for LR given activity level propositions). While the individual probabilities associated with the evidence given each proposition are useful, the full value of the LR comes from comparing the probabilities of the results given different propositions, because the value of the results depends entirely upon its ability to discriminate between one proposition and another.

Nature of the biological fluid

The question regarding the type of material (e.g., blood, semen, saliva) will be defined as questions about the nature of the material. Source questions will be defined as questions regarding from which person the body material/DNA came from.

Possible

Any non-zero probability. There is no distinction between high or low probability when using possible in relation to opinion testimony. The fact that something (i.e. the evidentiary result) is “possible” is not useful in determining whether or not the evidence supports one proposition or another. It is always desirable to put things in terms of probability, and best to compare probabilities of the findings given two competing propositions.

Posterior probability

In the Bayesian framework, this is the jury’s probability of the propositions taking into account all the elements of the case, including the forensic results presented by the expert (e.g., the DNA evidence).

¹ sub-sub-source only has relevance or meaning in the interpretation of DNA mixture evidence.

² sub-source only has relevance or meaning in the interpretation of DNA evidence.

219 **Prior probability**

220 In the Bayesian framework, this is the jury’s probability of the propositions taking into account all the
221 elements of the case, excluding the forensic results presented by the expert (e.g., the DNA evidence).

222
223 **Probability**

224 Probability is a measurement device for uncertainty. In the Bayesian framework, it serves the purpose of
225 expressing an individual’s personal degree of beliefs about uncertain propositions conditional on the
226 status of information of the subject who assesses it. Probability informed by relevant/appropriate data
227 (e.g., scientific publications, in-house experiments, experience, or knowledge). Probability is governed by
228 several axiomatic laws that constitute a fundamental framework for inductive logic. There are several
229 schools of thought on the definition of probability; however, it is important to understand that the laws
230 of probabilities hold, regardless of the definition.

231
232 **Propositions**

233 Propositions are statements that are either true or false, and that can be affirmed or denied. There is no
234 requirement that any proposition must be “true” for assigning an LR. Propositions should be formulated
235 in pairs (e.g., views put forward by the parties to the cases) given a background of task-relevant case
236 information and assumptions. Propositions should be amenable to a reasoned assignment of credibility by
237 a judicial body. A basic criterion for propositions is that they should be formulated in such a way that it is
238 reasonable for the scientist to address a question of the form: ‘what is the probability of the observations
239 given this proposition within the framework of circumstances?’

240 Propositions should be distinguished from explanations that do not have the aforementioned properties.
241 Propositions should be based on case information and the issue where forensic science can help, not on
242 the biological results.

243
244 **Transfer and persistence**

245 Transfer is the mechanism that allows the movement of evidence (e.g. DNA) from its origin (source) to
246 wherever it is recovered in the context of the case (e.g., primary, secondary).

247 Persistence pertains to the ability of the material to remain where it was deposited prior to its recovery by
248 the forensic scientist. However, often the probability of recovery given the evidence was transferred and
249 persisted is of more relevance. This is critical for any discussion in the context of activity level of
250 propositions.

251
252 **Transposed conditional**

253 In forensic science this often refers to any statement from the scientist about the probability of the
254 proposition given the evidence (incorrect) rather than the probability of the evidence given the proposition
255 (correct). Formally, this is stating the probability of A given B (i.e., $\Pr(A|B)$) as the probability of B given
256 A (i.e., $\Pr(B|A)$), or vice versa. This is commonly referred to as the “prosecutor’s fallacy”.

257
258 **4. Recommendations**

259
260 4.1 Communication of results given sub-sub-source level propositions

261 4.1.2. The expert should not communicate at this level if the person who is the source of this DNA is not
262 the issue of interest to the court or/and if the issue is the activity that led to the DNA.

263 4.1.3 The use of the terms specific to this level, such as “major contributor” and “minor contributor”,
264 should be defined by laboratory protocols.

- 265 4.1.4 It is recommended to reserve the use of “major” and “minor” terms for cases where the issue of
266 interest may move to the activity level.
- 267 4.1.5 The expert should follow the four principles of evidence evaluation [Evetts and Weir 1998, Evetts
268 2015]:
- 269 4.1.5.1 The expert should take into consideration at least one alternative proposition, so that the
270 evaluation considers a pair of propositions.
- 271 4.1.5.2 The expert should only make statements about the probability of the evidence given a proposition
272 [Thompson and Schumann, 1987]. The expert must avoid making any statement about the probability of a
273 proposition given the evidence (i.e., transposing the conditional) [Aitken et al., 2010, ENFSI Guidelines
274 2015, Evetts 1995, Robertson et al., 2016, Evetts and Weir, 1998, Evetts 2015, Assoc. For. Sci. Providers
275 2009]. Equally, the expert must avoid giving any statement on the probabilities of the propositions
276 themselves.
- 277 4.1.5.2.1 The expert should be aware that most hypothetical questions are asking for an opinion about the
278 proposition (or explanation), not about the evidence.
- 279 4.1.5.2.2 The expert must avoid transposing a conditional when answering direct questions from one of
280 the parties as well as when considering both propositions.
- 281 4.1.5.3 The evaluation should take place in a framework of task-relevant case circumstances. This means
282 that the probabilities are conditional upon the information and data specific to the specimen/case [ENFSI
283 Guidelines 2015, Evetts and Weir 1998, Evetts 2015, Robertson et al., 2016, Gill et al., 2020].
- 284 4.1.5.3.1 Information should be directly task-relevant to the evaluation of the evidence [Evetts and Weir,
285 1998, Evetts 2015, National Commission on Forensic Science].
- 286 4.1.5.3.2 The information relied upon to form the opinion of the expert should be disclosed and clearly
287 communicated.
- 288 4.1.5.4. Probabilities of the evidence given a proposition should be evaluated in pairs (i.e., the probability
289 of the evidence given the main proposition and the probability of the evidence given the alternative
290 proposition) in order to give a likelihood ratio (LR). This ratio is the value of the forensic results and
291 expresses the strength of the evidence [ENFSI Guidelines 2015, Evetts and Weir 1998, Gill et al., 2020,
292 Evetts 2015, Robertson et al., 2016, Aitken et al., 2010].
- 293 4.1.6 Probabilities and ratios of probabilities should be used when communicating the value of the
294 evidence [ENFSI Guidelines 2015, Evetts and Weir 1998, Assoc. For. Sci. Providers 2009, Aitken et al.,
295 2010, Evetts 2015, Robertson et al., 2016, Gill et al., 2020].
- 296 4.1.6.1 These probabilities may be explicitly calculated (e.g., published model for genotype probabilities)
297 or they may be assigned notional (personal) probabilities based on published research data, data derived
298 from internal laboratory studies and/or from casework experience (e.g., any published research data on
299 transfer and persistence studies used to inform the expert opinion in a case) [Assoc. For. Sci. Providers
300 2009, ENFSI Guidelines 2015, Taroni 2018].
- 301 4.1.6.2 The LR may be communicated numerically (1 million times more likely) or using a qualitative
302 verbal statement (much more likely, somewhat more likely) after assignment of the numerical LR [ENFSI
303 Guidelines 2015, Assoc. For. Sci. Providers 2009, Gill et al., 2020].

- 304 4.2 Communication of results given sub-source level propositions
- 305 4.2.1 The expert should use caution when communicating at this level if the POI agrees it is their DNA,
306 such as in a question of consent, or if the source of the DNA is not disputed (as there is only one
307 proposition and not two). If the person from whom the DNA originated is not contested, then there is no
308 uncertainty on who is the source of the DNA, thus the calculation given sub-source level propositions is
309 not meaningful. A sub-source statistic could easily be misunderstood in the context of the activities [Gill
310 et al., 2020, ENFSI Guidelines 2015, Robertson et al., 2016].
- 311 4.2.2 The expert should follow the four principles of evidence evaluation [Evetts and Weir 1998, Evetts
312 2015]:
- 313 4.2.2.1 The expert should take into consideration at least one alternative proposition, so that the
314 evaluation considers a pair of propositions.
- 315 4.2.2.2 The expert should only make statements about the probability of the evidence given a proposition
316 [Thompson and Schumann, 1987]. The expert must avoid making any statement about the probability of a
317 proposition given the evidence (i.e., transposing the conditional) [Aitken et al., 2010, ENFSI Guidelines
318 2015, Evetts 1995, Robertson et al., 2016, Evetts and Weir, 1998, Evetts 2015, Assoc. For. Sci. Providers
319 2009]. Equally, the expert must avoid giving any statement on the probabilities of the propositions
320 themselves.
- 321 4.2.2.2.1 The expert should not make any statement about the POI being the source of the DNA unless or
322 until the source of the DNA is no longer in dispute.
- 323 4.2.2.2.2 The expert should be aware that most hypothetical questions are asking for an opinion about the
324 proposition (or explanation), not about the evidence.
- 325 4.2.2.2.3 The expert must avoid transposing a conditional when answering direct questions from one of
326 the parties as well as when considering both propositions.
- 327 4.2.2.3 The evaluation should take place in a framework of task-relevant case circumstances. This means
328 that the probabilities are conditional upon the information and data specific to the specimen/case [ENFSI
329 Guidelines 2015, Evetts and Weir 1998, Evetts 2015, Robertson et al., 2016, Gill et al., 2020].
- 330 4.2.2.3.1 Information should be directly task-relevant to the evaluation of the evidence [Evetts and Weir,
331 1998, Evetts 2015, National Commission on Forensic Science].
- 332 4.2.2.3.2 The information relied upon to form the opinion of the expert should be disclosed and clearly
333 communicated.
- 334 4.2.2.4. Probabilities of the evidence given a proposition should be evaluated in pairs (i.e., the probability
335 of the evidence given the main proposition and the probability of the evidence given the alternative
336 proposition) in order to give a likelihood ratio (LR). This ratio is the value of the forensic results and
337 expresses the strength of the evidence [ENFSI Guidelines 2015, Evetts and Weir 1998, Gill et al., 2020,
338 Evetts 2015, Robertson et al., 2016, Aitken et al., 2010].
- 339 4.2.3 Probabilities and ratios of probabilities should be used when communicating the value of the
340 evidence [ENFSI Guidelines 2015, Evetts and Weir 1998, Assoc. For. Sci. Providers 2009, Aitken et al.,
341 2010, Evetts 2015, Robertson et al., 2016, Gill et al., 2020].

342 4.2.3.1 These probabilities may be explicitly calculated (e.g., published model for genotype probabilities)
343 or they may be assigned notional (personal) probabilities based on published research data, data derived
344 from internal laboratory studies and/or from casework experience (e.g., any published research data on
345 transfer and persistence studies used to inform the expert opinion in a case) [Assoc. For. Sci. Providers
346 2009, ENFSI Guidelines 2015, Taroni 2018].

347 4.2.3.2 An RMP should be expressed as a probability. In practical terms, this probability communicates
348 the rarity of an event.

349 4.2.3.3 The LR may be communicated numerically (1 million times more likely) or using a qualitative
350 verbal statement (much more likely, somewhat more likely) after assignment of the numerical LR [ENFSI
351 Guidelines 2015, Assoc. For. Sci. Providers 2009, Gill et al., 2020].

352 4.3 Communication of results given source level propositions

353 4.3.1 These propositions are adequate if there is no issue about the nature of the biological material, (i.e.,
354 not disputed) or if the substrate is obvious (e.g., hair root, tooth, bone) [Evetts et al., 2002, Gill et al.,
355 2020].

356 4.3.2 The assumption that the nature of the material is either known or not in dispute (e.g., the DNA came
357 from the blood) and its scientific basis need to be disclosed. This should be framed as an expert opinion
358 given the presumptive nature of many body fluid tests (e.g., serology, mRNA, appearance, case
359 information).

360 4.3.3 When there is uncertainty about the nature of the biological material, no definitive statements should
361 be used. In these circumstances it would be inappropriate to use source level propositions. Depending on
362 the issue, sub-source or activity level propositions should be used.

363 4.3.3.1 Probabilities or ratios of probabilities may be used to communicate the serology findings. This is
364 an independent exercise and will not alter the LR given sub-source level propositions. It would be a
365 process by which the expert is able to convey their confidence regarding the likely biological material
366 tested given all of the laboratory tests available to them.

367 4.3.3.1.1 The expert should be transparent in this opinion. When the expert has an opinion based on that
368 “testing, the expert should assertively state this opinion, as this opinion will most likely be required to
369 move to higher levels of the hierarchy of propositions.

370 4.3.3.2 When uncertainty precludes the expert from an opinion that distinguishes among body (fluid)
371 sources, the expert may still answer inquiries about other levels of the hierarchy but must be transparent
372 with the limitations due to the uncertainty in body source identification.

373 4.3.4 Depending on the case, when a mixed DNA profile is obtained, assigning a person’s DNA to a
374 particular fluid may become difficult. Considerations must also be made for mixed biological material
375 (e.g., semen and saliva).

376 4.3.5 If the nature of the biological material (i.e., specific biological fluid(s)) is of interest to the court, the
377 expert should not communicate only the value of the DNA profile comparisons (sub-source level
378 propositions). This avoids the translation of the LR given sub-source propositions to that of a higher level.
379 It would be incorrect to apply an LR of 1 million given sub-source propositions to the LR consisting of
380 the probability of the evidence if it is blood divided by the probability of the evidence if it is some other
381 biological material.

- 382 4.3.6 If the issue of interest to the court regards the nature of the biological material, activity level
383 propositions are generally more suited as they also account for presence of this material for reasons
384 unconnected to the facts in dispute.
- 385 4.3.7 The expert should follow the four principles of evidence evaluation [Evetts and Weir 1998, Evett
386 2015]:
387
- 388 4.3.7.1 The expert should take into consideration at least one alternative proposition, so that the
389 evaluation considers a pair of propositions.
- 390 4.3.7.2 The expert should only make statements about the probability of the evidence given a proposition
391 [Thompson and Schumann, 1987]. The expert must avoid making any statement about the probability of a
392 proposition given the evidence (i.e., transposing the conditional) [Aitken et al., 2010, ENFSI Guidelines
393 2015, Evett 1995, Robertson et al., 2016, Evett and Weir, 1998, Evett 2015, Assoc. For. Sci. Providers
394 2009]. Equally, the expert must avoid giving any statement on the probabilities of the propositions
395 themselves.
- 396 4.3.7.2.1 The expert should be aware that most hypothetical questions are asking for an opinion about the
397 proposition (or explanation), not about the evidence.
- 398 4.3.7.2.2 The expert must avoid transposing a conditional when answering direct questions from one of
399 the parties as well as when considering both propositions.
- 400 4.3.7.3 The evaluation should take place in a framework of task-relevant case circumstances. This means
401 that the probabilities are conditional upon the information and data specific to the specimen/case [ENFSI
402 Guidelines 2015, Evett and Weir 1998, Evett 2015, Robertson et al., 2016, Gill et al., 2020].
- 403 4.3.7.3.1 Information should be directly task-relevant to the evaluation of the evidence [Evetts and Weir,
404 1998, Evett 2015, National Commission on Forensic Science].
- 405 4.3.7.3.2 The information relied upon to form the opinion of the expert should be disclosed and clearly
406 communicated.
- 407 4.3.7.4. Probabilities of the evidence given a proposition should be evaluated in pairs (i.e., the probability
408 of the evidence given the main proposition and the probability of the evidence given the alternative
409 proposition) in order to give a likelihood ratio (LR). This ratio is the value of the forensic results and
410 expresses the strength of the evidence [ENFSI Guidelines 2015, Evett and Weir 1998, Gill et al., 2020,
411 Evett 2015, Robertson et al., 2016, Aitken et al., 2010].
- 412 4.3.8 Probabilities and ratios of probabilities should be used when communicating the value of the
413 evidence [ENFSI Guidelines 2015, Evett and Weir 1998, Assoc. For. Sci. Providers 2009, Aitken et al.,
414 2010, Evett 2015, Robertson et al., 2016, Gill et al., 2020].
- 415 4.3.8.1 These probabilities may be explicitly calculated (e.g., published model for genotype probabilities)
416 or they may be assigned notional (personal) probabilities based on published research data, data derived
417 from internal laboratory studies and/or from casework experience (e.g., any published research data on
418 transfer and persistence studies used to inform the expert opinion in a case) [Assoc. For. Sci. Providers
419 2009, ENFSI Guidelines 2015, Taroni 2018].

- 420 4.3.8.2 The LR may be communicated numerically (1 million times more likely) or using a qualitative
421 verbal statement (much more likely, somewhat more likely) after assignment of the numerical LR [ENFSI
422 Guidelines 2015, Assoc. For. Sci. Providers 2009, Gill et al., 2020].
- 423 4.4 Communication of results given activity level propositions
- 424 4.4.1 Laboratories should establish policies regarding testimony given activity level propositions when
425 this is of interest to the court. It is best to have previously reported any relevant opinions in writing as
426 well, however guidance on the determination and reporting of these opinions is outside the scope of this
427 document.
- 428 4.4.2 The expert should follow the four principles of evidence evaluation [Evetts and Weir 1998, Evetts
429 2015]:
- 430 4.4.2.1 The expert should take into consideration at least one alternative proposition, so that the
431 evaluation considers a pair of propositions.
- 432 4.4.2.1.1 Propositions should be based on case information and the issue where forensic science can help,
433 not on the biological results [Evetts et al., 2000, Gill et al., 2020].
- 434 4.4.2.1.2 Propositions are best formulated prior to the start of examination based on the information
435 available at that time [Evetts et al., 2000, Gittelsohn et al., 2016, Gill et al., 2020].
- 436 4.4.2.1.2.1 At a minimum, the expert should record their expectations of results if each of the propositions
437 were true based on the available relevant case information.
- 438 4.4.2.1.2.2 Tools such as the CAI framework [Cook et al. (1998) CAI paper] and/or Bayesian networks
439 may be useful in communicating the thought process that leads to the expert's statement [Gill et al.,
440 2020].
- 441 4.4.2.1.3 The expert needs to be aware of the various transfer steps that may occur as a part of an activity
442 proposition (e.g., primary, secondary). However, transfer in and of itself is not an activity, and the term
443 "transfer" should not be a part of the proposition.
- 444 4.4.2.1.4 One proposition should align with the prosecution's version of events.
- 445 4.4.2.1.5 The alternative proposition should represent an alternative version of events as understood by
446 the expert.
- 447 4.4.2.1.5.1 In an adversarial judicial system, the defense is not required to offer any information or theory
448 of the case. The expert should always keep this in mind, especially when the questions regard the activity
449 that led to the presence of the DNA.
- 450 4.4.2.1.5.2 When no specific alternative is available from the defense, the expert should adopt a
451 reasonable proxy proposition based on the case information in order to fully evaluate the evidence
452 [Gittelsohn et al., 2016, ENFSI Guidelines 2015, Assoc. For. Sci. Providers 2009].
- 453 4.4.2.1.6 The expert should communicate that if a proposition(s) changes, the value of the evidence will
454 change [ENFSI Guidelines 2015]. If the change of a proposition has a large effect on the LR, such as the
455 evidence now has an LR of 1, it is crucial that the expert makes this known to the court.

- 456 4.4.2.2 The expert should only make statements about the probability of the evidence given a proposition
457 [Thompson and Schumann, 1987]. The expert must avoid making any statement about the probability of a
458 proposition given the evidence (i.e., transposing the conditional) [Aitken et al., 2010, ENFSI Guidelines
459 2015, Evett 1995, Robertson et al., 2016, Evett and Weir, 1998, Evett 2015, Assoc. For. Sci. Providers
460 2009]. Equally, the expert must avoid giving any statement on the probabilities of the propositions
461 themselves.
- 462 4.4.2.2.1 The expert should be aware that most hypothetical questions are asking for an opinion about the
463 proposition (or explanation), not about the evidence.
- 464 4.4.2.2.2 The expert must avoid transposing a conditional when answering direct questions from one of
465 the parties as well as when considering both propositions.
- 466 4.4.2.3 The evaluation should take place in a framework of task-relevant case circumstances. This means
467 that the probabilities are conditional upon the information and data specific to the specimen/case [ENFSI
468 Guidelines 2015, Evett and Weir 1998, Evett 2015, Robertson et al., 2016, Gill et al., 2020].
- 469 4.4.2.3.1 Information should be directly task-relevant to the evaluation of the evidence [Evett and Weir,
470 1998, Evett 2015, National Commission on Forensic Science]. In this case, this means that the expert
471 should only consider information that is relevant to the evaluation of the evidence given activity level
472 propositions.
- 473 4.4.2.3.2 The information relied upon to form the opinion of the expert should be disclosed and clearly
474 communicated.
- 475 4.4.2.4. Probabilities of the evidence given a proposition should be evaluated in pairs (i.e., the probability
476 of the evidence given the main proposition and the probability of the evidence given the alternative
477 proposition) in order to give a likelihood ratio (LR). This ratio is the value of the forensic results and
478 expresses the strength of the evidence [ENFSI Guidelines 2015, Evett and Weir 1998, Gill et al., 2020,
479 Evett 2015, Robertson et al., 2016, Aitken et al., 2010].
- 480 4.4.3 Probabilities and ratios of probabilities should be used when communicating the value of the
481 evidence [ENFSI Guidelines 2015, Evett and Weir 1998, Assoc. For. Sci. Providers 2009, Aitken et al.,
482 2010, Evett 2015, Robertson et al., 2016, Gill et al., 2020].
- 483 4.4.3.1 These probabilities may be explicitly calculated (e.g., published model for genotype probabilities)
484 or they may be assigned notional (personal) probabilities based on published research data, data derived
485 from internal laboratory studies and/or from casework experience (e.g., any published research data on
486 transfer and persistence studies used to inform the expert opinion in a case) [Assoc. For. Sci. Providers
487 2009, ENFSI Guidelines 2015, Taroni 2018].
- 488 4.4.3.2 The LR may be communicated numerically (1 million times more likely) or using a qualitative
489 verbal statement (much more likely, somewhat more likely) after assignment of the numerical LR [ENFSI
490 Guidelines 2015, Assoc. For. Sci. Providers 2009, Gill et al., 2020].
- 491 4.4.4 Hypothetical questions are often posed in court. The expert should consider/remember the following
492 when choosing how to answer these questions.
- 493 4.4.4.1 A hypothetical question is often findings-based rather than case-information based. However, in
494 the absence of any other proposition, it may be reasonable to adopt this scenario as one of the
495 propositions for the likelihood ratio.

496 4.4.4.2 If a hypothetical question is posed in the form of “Is this possible?”, the expert should
497 communicate that the value of evidence is based on comparing probabilities of the results given
498 competing propositions and not possibilities, and then give an answer in terms of relative probabilities.
499 [Aitken et al., 2010, Evett 2015].

500 4.4.4.3 The expert should be cautious of hypothetical questions asking for the expert to provide an
501 alternative explanation of the data (i.e., speculation) or making a comment on the probability of the
502 hypothetical (proxy) proposition (i.e, transposing the conditional).

503 4.4.4.3.1 The expert must avoid giving any opinion on the probability of the activity. In this context, the
504 term “activity” may include questions about direct/indirect transfer or about the same activities at
505 different times [Gill et al., 2020].

506 4.4.4.4 If the hypothetical question is based on case information, the expert should try to give the value of
507 the evidence given that new proposition. However, there may be propositions (hypothetical questions)
508 where the expert has no information that informs an opinion about the value of the evidence. The expert
509 should communicate that he/she is unable to form an opinion about the value of the evidence given that
510 set of propositions or request additional time to properly consider it.

511 4.4.4.5 The expert should be prepared for multiple hypothetical questions.

512

513

514

Annex A

Recommendations – Supporting Information

515

516

517 4.1 Sub-sub-source level propositions address “Who is the major or minor contributor?”. An example of
518 a sub-sub-source proposition pair would be: “Mr. A is the major contributor to the DNA mixture” and
519 “some unknown person is the major contributor to the DNA mixture”.

520 4.1.4 The terms “major” and “minor” may translate into issues of activity rather than who contributed the
521 most/least DNA. Consider a digital penetration case where a major female profile and a minor male
522 profile is obtained from the male suspect finger swabs. The finding of a major female profile could be
523 considered strong support if digital penetration occurred rather than casual contact. In this circumstance,
524 the expert should keep in mind that this information is useful for discriminating activity level propositions
525 rather than only for discriminating sub-sub-source level propositions. A sub-sub-source level evaluation
526 leaves the jury the task of evaluating the evidence (i.e., the major profile) without proper guidance unless
527 the expert also evaluates the evidence using activity level propositions.

528

529 4.1.5.1 It is logically meaningless to suggest that any evidence has value in itself as support for any
530 particular proposition in isolation. The value of the evidence depends entirely upon the ability to
531 discriminate between one proposition and another. Therefore, the expert should evaluate the evidence
532 given at least two different mutually exclusive propositions that are exhaustive in the context of the case.
533 The propositions should be based on task-relevant information such as timelines, alleged activities, and
534 characteristics of the stain/targeted area. Task-relevant information does not include information such as
535 prior convictions or allegations, and evidence from other forensic disciplines.

536

537 4.1.5.2 The transposed conditional is any statement by the expert about the probability of the proposition
538 (disputed fact) given the evidence rather than the probability of the evidence, or findings, given the
539 proposition. Other terms for this include the prosecutor’s fallacy, source probability error, the ultimate
540 issue fallacy, and the false positive fallacy. The transposed conditional can occur when considering one

541 probability or the ratio of two probabilities. Mathematically, the transposed conditional involves making
542 statements about $\Pr(H | E)$ rather than $\Pr(E | H)$. Equally problematic are statements regarding the
543 probability of the proposition. That is, statements about $\Pr(H)$ rather than statements about $\Pr(E|H)$.
544

545 Examples of the transposed conditional include:

- 546 A. "It is 800 billion times more likely that the DNA originated from Suspect than from an unknown
547 individual."
- 548 B. "Given these results (suspect's matching the major DNA profile on the knife) my opinion is that
549 shaking hands is unlikely."
- 550 C. "It is unlikely that shaking hands placed the suspect's DNA on the knife."
- 551 D. "There is only a 1 in 1 million chance that someone else is the source of the DNA profile."
- 552 E. "Based on the scientific results, the biological material is probably blood."
- 553 F. "Given the results of the presumptive test, it is unlikely that this DNA was deposited one year
554 ago."

556 An example of an ambiguous statement would be:

- 557 G. "Shaking hands is unlikely to result in the suspect's DNA on the knife."

558

559 The corrected statements would be:

- 560 A. The **DNA profile** is 800 billion times more likely **if** the DNA originated from Suspect **than if** it
561 originated from an unknown individual.
- 562 B. The **DNA profile** is less likely **if** the suspect had shaken hands with the true offender **than if** the
563 suspect held the knife.
- 564 C. The presence of the DNA on the knife (that matches the profile of the suspect) is less likely **if** the
565 suspect had shaken hands with the true offender **than if** the suspect held the knife.
- 566 D. The probability of the evidence is 1 in 1 million **if** someone unrelated to the suspect is the source
567 of the DNA.
- 568 E. The scientific results are more likely **if** the biological material is blood **than if** the biological
569 material originated from some other body fluid or tissue.
- 570 F. The results of the presumptive test are unlikely **if** the DNA was deposited one year ago.
- 571 G. The presence of the DNA on the knife (that matches the profile of the suspect) is less likely **if** the
572 suspect had shaken hands with the true offender **than if** the suspect held the knife.

573

574 Another correct phrasing is: "The evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that the stain came from
575 Smith", which is cited in [Evetts 1995] and further explained: "The use of the word 'supports' in this
576 context was proposed by an eminent statistician, H. Jeffreys, and this kind of formulation is, in the
577 author's opinion, the best available. This is the method which is recommended to scientists within the
578 Forensic Science Service. Although it successfully conveys the impression that the evidence favors one
579 hypothesis over the other it is not a probability statement. The strength of the support is based on the
580 likelihood ratio but the overall probability (or odds) in favor of the hypothesis depends also on the other
581 evidence."

582

583 4.1.5.3 There is no standard general probability that applies to all cases alike. Each forensic case has
584 unique surrounding circumstances (information) and data (analytical results). Therefore, probabilities will
585 differ from one case/sample to another. This is an expected property of probability.
586

587 4.1.6 Few results in forensic DNA analysis can be communicated in absolute terms. For example, if a
588 large number of sperm is observed microscopically, this might be considered an unambiguous result as to
589 the presence of semen. However, there may be some level of uncertainty in forensic DNA casework, such
590 as a presumptive test for blood, a low-level partial DNA profile (or component of a DNA mixture), or

591 questions about activity, transfer, and persistence of DNA. When uncertainty is present, the use of
592 probabilities is the preferred way to evaluate evidence.

593
594 4.1.6.1 If sufficient relevant research exists, it is possible to assign numerical values for these
595 probabilities based on these data and the expert's knowledge. However, in many situations the scientists
596 will have to assign a range of notional (personal) probabilities, in the range of 0 to 1. These can also be
597 expressed in a range of verbal terms such as: 'very low, low, medium, high, very high' to convey the
598 probability. Notional probabilities can be based on expectations derived from data and/or from casework
599 experience.

600
601 An example of a calculated LR given sub-source propositions is "the DNA profile is 1 million times more
602 likely if it originated from the person of interest than if it originated from an unrelated individual."
603 Here, the probability of the numerator ($\Pr(E|H_p, I)$) is calculated separately from the probability of the
604 denominator ($\Pr(E|H_d, I)$), and the ratio of the two probabilities is presented as the LR. A desirable quality
605 of this framework is that different models and allele probabilities produce different values, so this
606 calculation can be specific to a particular case by choosing the most suitable model (e.g., accounting for
607 subpopulations) and allele probabilities (e.g., representative of the population in the geographical location
608 of interest) for that case.

609
610 An example of a notional LR given activity level propositions is "in my opinion, the evidence (i.e., full
611 single DNA profile matching Mr. A that was obtained from the steering wheel) is more likely if Mr. A
612 drove the car rather than if he shook hands with the car owner/driver two weeks ago." (Note that the
613 choice of calculating a numerical value or presenting a verbal result is acceptable for this example.) At
614 times, there may be studies (published or internal) available to inform the probability to some degree.
615 However, each forensic case is unique, and laboratory studies that are repeated under controlled
616 conditions may have little to do with the circumstances of a given case. In such cases, the probability of
617 outcomes from studies (typically, frequencies) will need to be modified by the expert to fit the
618 circumstances of the cases. As mentioned in the Supreme Court decision *Daubert v Dow Pharmaceuticals*
619 [509 U.S. 579 (1993)], the court is aware that sometimes there are no studies available for the expert to
620 use when assigning probabilities:

621 "Some propositions, moreover, *are too particular*, too new, or of too limited interest to be
622 published. But submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of "good
623 science," in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be
624 detected." (Emphasis added.)

625 Nevertheless, the expert should use probabilities in a robust, transparent, logical, and balanced approach
626 when assigned probabilities are necessary, which is further alluded to in *Daubert*:

627 "This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or *methodology* underlying the
628 testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or *methodology* properly can be
629 applied to the facts in issue." (Emphasis added.)

630 It is for this reason that experts are encouraged to adopt an accepted methodology such as CAI or BNs
631 when evaluating DNA evidence given activity level propositions.

632 4.2.1 If there is no dispute about whose DNA is present, then the LR given sub-source propositions
633 should no longer be the focus of the expert testimony. Since the parties are now in agreement, it is no
634 longer relevant. If an LR given sub-source propositions is calculated, then it should be made explicit that
635 this figure does not relate in any way to questions regarding how or when the DNA was transferred. Not
636 presenting an LR given sub-source propositions (or RMP) would simplify the task of the jury, since they

637 would not have to listen to testimony about an LR or RMP when there is no dispute as to who's DNA is
638 present.

639
640 4.2.2.1 See supporting information for 4.1.5.1.

641
642 4.2.2.2 See supporting information for 4.1.5.2.

643
644 4.2.2.2.1 Making a statement about the POI being the source of the DNA is commonly known as
645 transposing the conditional for an LR, and the prosecutor's fallacy (which is a form of the transposed
646 conditional) for an RMP.

647
648 4.2.2.3 See supporting information for 4.1.5.3.

649
650 4.2.2.4 The LR is expressed in a manner that links the numerical value to the DNA profile and not the
651 person of interest. "This DNA profile is 1 million times more likely if it originated from Suspect rather
652 than from an unknown unrelated person."

653
654 There is an impression that the LR is more difficult to explain to a jury. The use of a verbal scale may be
655 helpful in conveying the strength of the evidence.

656
657 A statement similar to "Whatever your belief about whose DNA is present in the sample without my
658 testimony, based on other information that you have (but I don't), your belief should be X times greater
659 with my evidence than it was without my evidence" may be helpful.

660
661 This statement introduces the concept of prior odds, and communicates that the value of the prior odds
662 (other evidence) should be determined by the jury.

663
664 4.2.3 See supporting information for 4.1.6.

665
666 4.2.3.1 See supporting information for 4.1.6.1.

667
668 4.2.3.2 Usually the RMP is a very small number (e.g., 0.000001). However, it is most commonly
669 expressed as a fraction, e.g., "1 in 1 million". It may be useful in explaining this to the jury by stating, "In
670 a general population of 1 million unrelated persons (that we know does not include the offender) the
671 profile obtained from the evidence is expected to occur one time on average. If multiple populations of 1
672 million persons are tested, sometimes it may not occur at all, and sometimes more than once, but on
673 average, only one time." Care needs to be taken to avoid the defense attorney's fallacy or the uniqueness
674 fallacy [Evetts and Weir, 1998].

675
676 4.2.3.3 See supporting information for 4.1.6.2.

677
678 4.3 For DNA results, source level propositions relate to the attribution of the body fluid or tissue giving
679 rise to the DNA profile result which matches the person of interest. An example of source level
680 propositions might be: The bone has originated from Mr. X vs. the bone has originated from an unknown
681 person unrelated to Mr. X. The results considered are those of the DNA comparison: their value is
682 calculated given sub-source level propositions. By using source level propositions, the scientist is
elevating the opinion regarding from whom the DNA has originated to from whom a specific body
material has originated [Evetts et al., 2002].

683 Note that source level propositions are not the same as the identification of the biological source (i.e.,
684 nature of the body fluid or tissue) of the recovered DNA (e.g., the DNA is from the bone). Both are
685 important, but the distinction should be maintained by the expert.

686
687 4.3.1 There are times when there is little uncertainty about the nature of the biological material.
688 Sometimes this is stated by saying “Semen was identified”, such as when thousands of spermatozoa are
689 observed on a microscope slide.

690
691 4.3.3 An example of uncertainty about the nature of the biological material is when semen/spermatozoa
692 testing gives conflicting serological results. For example, this could occur as a negative acid phosphatase
693 test, a positive immunological test (PSA/p30) and no spermatozoa were visualized microscopically.

694
695 In the example of only a positive PSA/p30 test, other information may be useful, such as where the
696 sample came from (i.e., high vaginal sample or underwear) or that the sample ultimately revealed a male
697 DNA profile in the fraction designed to give DNA results from sperm. In such cases, the use of
698 probabilities may allow for an opinion on the nature of the biological material to be given in likelihood
699 ratio form. “This evidence is more likely if the sample contained semen than if it contained some other
700 form of biological material.” The expert might consider additional information, such as reported injuries,
701 when giving the overall opinion about the nature of the biological material. The expert should give
702 serious consideration as to whether or not it is appropriate to give this opinion based on the available case
703 information.

704
705 4.3.4 When more than one biological material may be present (i.e., blood and semen, saliva and skin
706 cells) and a mixed DNA profile was obtained from the sample, the expert should be very careful when the
707 line of inquiry by the parties is concerned about which donor is the source of which biological material.

708
709 If the source of each biological material is in dispute, or only a small amount of biological material
710 resulted in a mixed profile, it may be more appropriate to discuss the evidence given activity level
711 propositions. More value is added at the activity level, and if this activity is not specifically considered,
712 the jury may make their own evaluation of activity level propositions without proper guidance.

713
714 4.3.5 When the nature of the biological material is in question, making a statement considering only the
715 DNA profiling results could be mis-interpreted as a comment on the biological material.

716
717 Example: The sample has produced a positive result with Bluestar (a test that reacts with blood). The
718 DNA profile produced from this trace shows a minor profile matching the suspect and a major profile
719 matching the complainant. The LR statistic is more than 1 billion, meaning that the results are more than
720 1 billion times more likely if the complainant and suspect are the source of the DNA than if two unknown
721 persons are. However, if the question of interest is “Whose blood is it?” this large LR for the DNA profile
722 offers no information as to whose blood it is. The expert should be careful to either make an appropriate
723 evaluation of the evidence if the blood was from one or both donors, or at the very least a caution that the
724 LR of 1 billion given sub-source propositions cannot be transferred to the source (blood) level.

725
726 4.3.6 When the biological material is semen, there is usually an inference of sexual activity. If no
727 evaluation of the evidence is given considering the alleged activities, the jury may be left with no
728 alternate proposition to consider and assume that sexual activity is the only activity that could have
729 occurred.

730
731 4.3.7.1 See supporting information for 4.1.5.1.

732
733 4.3.7.2 See supporting information for 4.1.5.2.

734

735 4.3.7.3 See supporting information for 4.1.5.3.

736

737 4.3.8 See supporting information for 4.1.6.

738

739 4.3.8.1 See supporting information for 4.1.6.1.

740

741 4.3.8.2 See supporting information for 4.1.6.2.

742

743 4.4.2.1 See supporting information for 4.1.5.1.

744

745 4.4.2.1.2 Questions of bias can be minimized when the expert records propositions and expected results
746 given those propositions prior to testing. This also has an effect on the LR – the probabilities used in
747 calculating the LR were determined independent of the data, and the results end up supporting one
748 proposition compared to the other with little to no post results influence of the data. It should be noted
749 that the propositions are not immutable, and that they may require refinement or alteration during the
750 course of the case.

751

752 A simple statement such as “Per case information, one proposition will be that Suspect touched the item
753 directly, and the alternative proposition will be that Suspect was interacting with a group of people, and
754 someone else who had contact with Suspect touched the item” may be sufficient when there is
755 information that Suspect was with a group of people that had some exposure to the evidence item.

756

757 4.4.2.1.2.1 An example of expected results may be “I would expect to see DNA only from Suspect if the
758 first proposition is true; I would generally expect to recover DNA from Suspect and additional
759 contributors if the alternative proposition is true.”

760

761 The expert should be cautious of assigning any probability of 1 or 0 (zero) as that indicates no uncertainty
762 and leaves no room for the other proposition to have any part in the evaluation of the evidence. These
763 situations are rare in practice. (See the discussion on “possible” at Annex A 4.4.4.2 in this document.)

764

765 4.4.2.1.2.2 This process follows a recognized model for casework assessment and interpretation [ENFSI,
766 Cook et al. (1998) CAI paper]. A number of steps are conducted:

767

1. The scientist will consider the expected outcomes of the test: for example, no DNA profile
768 matching the person of interest, or DNA matching a person of interest.

769

2. (Notional) probabilities are then assigned to the expected outcomes given the truth of the
770 proposition. This is repeated for each of the propositions in the case.

771

3. The relative weight of evidence (LR) that the findings provide is then derived through division of
772 the probabilities.

773

774 The examples presented here are very simple and minimalistic. It is recommended that more formal
775 approaches be adopted such as CAI using a table of probabilities or Bayesian network software. These
776 approaches will require training and effort, but the tables or graphs that result are easily used to
777 communicate the thought process to the decision maker. They also allow for transparency and ensure that
778 conclusions are robust (i.e., sustain scrutiny by peers and cross-examination by counsel during the trial).

779

780 The use of CAI and BNs are strongly recommended, as these methods are recognized in published studies
781 for the evaluation of DNA evidence given activity level propositions. Several are listed in Annex C as a
782 starting point. Because it is expected that different experts may present different likelihood ratios for
783 DNA evidence given activity level propositions (as is the case for likelihood ratios given sub-source level

784 propositions when using different models), the courts have recognized that using a rigorous framework is
785 imperative for the evaluation of the testimony of the expert by the court. In *Kumho Tire Co. v Carmichael*
786 [526 U.S. 137 (1999)], the Supreme Court has emphasized that the method applied by the expert must
787 stand up to scrutiny, whether from published studies and data or notional probabilities based on personal
788 observations and experience gained through evidence testing:

789
790 “It is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or
791 personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
792 characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” (*Kumho Tire Co. v Carmichael*, 526
793 U.S. 137 (1999))

794
795 4.4.2.1.3 “Transfer” is not a part of the actual actions alleged in the proposition. Anytime DNA moves
796 from point A to point B, transfer has occurred, but it is not descriptive of the actions that may have been
797 taken by the parties. The mode of transfer is implicit in the activities considered in the propositions.

798
799 Propositions are addressed by the court. If the term “transfer” is woven into the propositions, then it
800 would mean that the court has to assess transfer. However, as forensic scientists have knowledge on that
801 topic, it should be part of the assessment, not of the propositions.

802
803 An incorrect example of using “transfer” in the propositions is:

804
805 “The presence of the DNA on the knife is more likely if direct transfer occurred than if indirect
806 transfer occurred.”

807
808 This is incorrect because the term “transfer” is a part of the propositions. “Transfer” is not a proposition;
809 it is a mechanism.

810
811 Another incorrect example is:

812
813 “It is more likely that direct transfer occurred than indirect transfer.”

814
815 This statement is incorrect for two reasons: 1) it transposes the conditional, and 2) the term “transfer” is a
816 part of the propositions.

817
818 The correct statement would be:

819
820 “The presence of the DNA on the knife is more likely if the suspect held the knife rather than if
821 the suspect had shaken hands with the true offender.”

822
823 It would be incorrect to say, “This evidence is more likely if primary transfer occurred than if secondary
824 transfer occurred.” It would be correct to say “This evidence is more likely if Mr. A handled the gun than
825 if Mr. A didn’t handle³ the gun.” While there is a ‘primary’ transfer for the first proposition, and a
826 ‘secondary’ transfer in the alternative proposition, the actual propositions are based on the allegations of
the parties and communicate more to the finder of fact.

827
828 4.4.2.1.4 Typically, the expert is aware of the prosecution’s version of events at the time of evidence
829 testing. The proposition is formulated for the purpose of assigning the probability of the evidence if this
830 proposition were true.

³ In the case information, one will describe what is meant by ‘not’ (e.g, The gun was touched by the police with the same gloves that were worn to arrest Mr. A).

831
832 There may be times where the prosecution proposition is not supported by the evidence and the evidence
833 is more probable given the defense proposition. For example, when the sexual activity in question
834 occurred 72 hours ago according to the prosecution, yet many sperm heads are seen from a vaginal swab.
835 This does not mean the proposition is or is not true. Rather, the defense may have an alternative time
836 frame (e.g., 24 hours rather than 72 hours) for the sexual activity that is better supported by the evidence.
837 If this is the situation, then the expert should explain that the evidence is more likely if the sexual activity
838 occurred one day prior to collection than if it occurred three days before collection.

839
840 4.4.2.1.5 The alternative proposition must be different and mutually exclusive from the prosecution’s
841 proposition or version of events. That is, if a proposition is “true,” then the alternative proposition cannot
842 be “true” and vice versa. The alternative proposition must either benefit the defense, *as understood by the*
843 *expert based on the available information*, or if provided, reflect the position of the defense.

844
845 4.4.2.1.5.1 It is crucial to be aware that in the United States (as well as in other countries) there is no
846 requirement for the defense to make a statement of any sort. This does not relieve the expert from the
847 responsibility of evaluating the evidence using a proper Bayesian framework with competing
848 propositions.

849
850 4.4.2.1.5.2 When there is no specific information, the expert has no choice but to adopt a proposition for
851 the defense. This is necessary to give a balanced evaluation of the evidence.

852
853 Examples of proxy propositions for the defense may sometimes be found in surrounding activities that are
854 not in dispute. Examples in a sexual assault case may include having dinner together, social contact,
855 having previous intercourse, holding hands prior to touching an item, and so on. On occasion, the expert
856 may have little choice but to choose a proxy of “not sex” or “not touching the knife” if there is little to no
857 information available. Be aware that these “not X” proxy propositions can be problematic both for the
858 expert (difficult to assign a probability of the findings given this proposition) and the defense (may lead to
859 relatively large LR’s which favor the prosecution proposition.)

860
861 4.4.2.2 See supporting information for 4.1.5.2.

862
863 4.4.2.3 See supporting information for 4.1.5.3.

864
865 4.4.2.3.1 There is always a concern about bias when the expert needs case information to evaluate the
866 evidence. Only task-relevant information should be considered (e.g., relationships of the individuals, the
867 alleged activities, the time between the alleged events and evidence collection). Information such as prior
868 convictions, whether the suspect was recognized or not, and the presence of other evidence are examples
869 of information that is not useful and potentially harmful. Some laboratories will filter the information
870 given to the analysts, so that the person(s) assessing the findings will only be given task relevant
871 information.

872
873 The so-called “black box” expert where the expert testifies only to analytical results with no conditioning
874 information has its own dangers and could be misleading to the decision maker. In the following
875 examples, the expert needs information about the circumstances of the case and the propositions of the
876 parties in order to give any value to the evidence that was examined.

877
878 One example would be where the expert testifies only to “the major semen DNA profile” and doesn’t
879 evaluate the evidence given activity level propositions. If the question of interest to the court is the
880 timeline of activity (e.g., 12 hours or 72 hours) and no comment is made beyond “major semen DNA
881 profile” the jury does not have the information necessary to evaluate the real issue before the court.

882
883 Another example might be “Complainant is included as a DNA contributor on the item.” If there is no
884 dispute that the DNA profile came from the Complainant, because the question of interest is whether
885 direct or indirect contact occurred between the complainant and the object, this statement by the expert
886 adds no value to the case.

887
888 4.4.2.4 The principles used to assign a likelihood ratio provide a recognized framework to communicate
889 the value of the evidence given activity level propositions [Gill et al., 2020, ENFSI Guidelines 2015]. It is
890 common to consider propositions at the activity level in forensic DNA testimony. Activity levels can be
891 implied at the sub-sub-source level (e.g. complainant corresponds to major profile on Suspect fingernails
892 in a digital penetration case) or the source level (e.g. Suspect matches the semen profile). It can also be
893 direct testimony given activities of interest from one or both of the parties in the case. There is a high
894 level of uncertainty in most cases involving activity. The likelihood ratio using probabilities of the
895 evidence given competing propositions is the preferred way of evaluating evidence. It is important to use
896 the Bayesian framework where the expert focuses on the likelihood ratio and lets the decision maker
897 (jury/judge) consider the other evidence (prior odds). The decision maker – and not the expert – is
898 responsible for the final evaluation of the propositions (posterior odds). Oftentimes the judge instructs the
899 jury on this issue, even if these exact terms are not used.

900 4.4.3 See supporting information for 4.1.6.

901

902 4.4.3.1 See supporting information for 4.1.6.1.

903

904 4.4.3.2 See supporting information for 4.1.6.2.

905

906 4.4.4 Oftentimes, whether or not there is any statement made prior to court regarding the activities,
907 counsel will ask the expert a hypothetical question about DNA transfer and persistence (e.g., “Is it
908 possible for one person to handle an item, and then a second person handle that same item and transfer the
909 DNA of person 1 to a second item?”).

910 ‘*Whose DNA is it?*’ is an entirely different question from addressing ‘*How and when did the DNA get*
911 *there?*’ This means that any sub-source statistics quoted have no bearing on the issues regarding how or
912 when the DNA was transferred. In a scientific context, it might not be known for certain ‘how’ or ‘when’
913 DNA was transferred to an object.

914 The ‘how’ and ‘when’ questions involve issues affecting the transfer of DNA from one place to another
915 and a consideration of how long the DNA might have persisted on the item once transfer has taken place.
916 In addition, the attribution of the DNA to a particular body fluid will also form an important part of these
917 considerations as well as background levels of DNA and possible contamination.

918 Any DNA transfer event requires four factors to be considered and fulfilled:

919 i) there needs to be a source of DNA.

920 ii) there needs to be a mechanism by which the DNA is transferred.

921 iii) there needs to be an opportunity for the DNA to be transferred by the proposed mechanism.

922 iv) the DNA must be in sufficient quantity and quality to persist and be recovered from the item.

923 Consideration of these points needs to be undertaken within the context of the case information.

924 4.4.4.1 Most often, a hypothetical question is asked at court in an attempt to explain the evidence after the
925 evidence (results) are known. The expert should understand that an explanation is not a proposition.
926 However, a hypothetical question on activity/transfer/persistence issues by the defense is an engagement
927 about the activity and should be considered in the same manner as a more formal proposition. When this
928 happens, the best answer the expert can give is to evaluate the evidence if the prosecution's proposition
929 occurred compared to if the hypothetical situation just asked about occurred. (See the discussion on
930 "possible" at Annex A 4.4.4.2 in this document.)

931
932 The expert needs to be aware that such "after the fact" hypothetical questions (explanations) will often
933 lead to an LR of 1. That is to say, after the results are obtained, there may be multiple explanations that
934 can be put forward that could yield results similar to the observed results. For example, if the prosecution
935 proposition involved non-consensual sex and the defense proposition involves consensual sex, the
936 probabilities of the result given either of those propositions would be equal. This assessment of the DNA
937 evidence offers no value to the proceedings.

938
939 4.4.4.2 The forensic scientist should not deal with "possibilities" as this is a mathematically meaningless
940 term. In the context of a hypothetical case, "possible" typically means any non-zero probability. However,
941 probabilities are discrete values between 0 and 1, and if there are several outcomes to consider, the sum of
942 all probabilities must equal 1. The opposite term for "possible" is usually "not possible" or "impossible".
943 In mathematical terms, this can be expressed as $(1 - \text{possible} = \text{impossible})$ where impossible has a
944 probability of zero. Therefore "possible" cannot be dealt with mathematically by the scientist when
945 evaluating evidence.

946
947 When a question is asked if something is "possible" one or more of the following may be useful:
948

949 "As a scientist, I can only deal with probabilities as all things may be possible."

950
951 "Possible is any non-zero probability, yet what is relevant when evaluating evidence is to
952 consider the relative probability assigned to that evidence given each of two different
953 propositions."

954
955 "I can only answer your question if I consider relative probabilities of the evidence considering
956 two options, not by stating some unknown intrinsic value of a single proposition in isolation."

957
958 "The only way to put "possible" into context is to compare the relative probabilities of the
959 evidence given each of two different propositions. We can never be certain about the probability
960 of the evidence for a given event, but we can provide context by comparing the probabilities
961 given each of two different and mutually exclusive propositions."

962
963 "There may be a lot of ways to explain how DNA was deposited somewhere. I can't properly
964 assess every possibility on its own. My job is to compare the probabilities of getting this type of
965 DNA profile under two different scenarios that are useful and reasonable to the case. The
966 outcome may change when different scenarios are compared, but there is not much value in
967 considering only one scenario by itself."

968
969 4.4.4.3 This may be the biggest challenge when considering activity level propositions. Often
970 hypothetical questions are directly asked in reference to the activity, or the expert is asked to provide
971 activities that could result in the type of testing results found in the case. The expert needs to recognize
972 these questions as the transposed conditional (See 4.1.5.2) and attempt to answer appropriately by
973 referring to the evidentiary findings if that activity has occurred. Answering these questions directly is not
974 the role of the expert. We list some examples and possible responses below:

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Q1 “What are some other explanations for this data?” – Requires the expert to know the other evidence in the case in order for the explanation to have a prior. This is outside the scope of the expert.

“You are asking me to provide explanations after I know the data. This is outside my role. If you have additional explanations that interest you, I can give you an opinion on whether or not the evidence supports what you are interested in.”

“I’m not aware of any case information that would allow me to make any speculations like that.”

Q2 “Is it possible that the DNA got there by secondary transfer?” – Any simple answer (yes/no/maybe) is a comment on the probability of the proposition, not the probability of the evidence if the proposition were true. Therefore any “simple” answer is a transposed conditional. Also, see the problems with “possible” addressed in 4.4.4.2.

“I’m certain that if we were able to run some trials, we could determine how often and under what circumstances DNA is detected from a secondary transfer event. However, what is relevant is whether the observed DNA profile is more likely if an object was handled by the person of interest or if he did not handle it but had contact with an unknown person who did.”

“When you ask if that’s possible, the answer is yes. However, if we do not attach any value to the results then this is of little assistance. Is it possible to win the lottery 6 times, yes it is possible. Is it possible that if I flip a coin it will land on heads, yes it is possible. But as you see the probabilities are very much different. Here, in this specific case, in order to be of assistance to the court, I would need to give the value of the DNA results considering the two competing views of the parties.”

4.4.4.4 When answering a hypothetical question, the expert should be clear as to whether or not he/she has relevant case information related to the question. While the expert should never give an opinion about the other evidence (which represents prior odds in the Bayesian approach), it is prudent to consider the case information that has been presented to the expert. The expert needs to be aware that giving an opinion on the weight of evidence for a given pair of propositions may imply some activity has occurred when there is no other evidence supporting that particular proposition.

The use of a likelihood ratio does not generally imply that one of the two propositions considered must be true. Though the considered propositions are those deemed most relevant, they do not need to be exhaustive, so both propositions could be false. The likelihood ratio says nothing about propositions other than the two that were considered.

If the hypothetical seems “reasonable” such as ‘dancing together’, the expert may not have specific case information about dancing but is aware that V and S were on a date. In this case, the expert may feel that he/she has an opinion that could add value.

“I’m unaware of any specific information about dancing, but I’m aware that V and S were together on a date for the evening. Therefore, I am comfortable giving an opinion that the evidence is more/less likely if they danced together than if X were true,” where X is some other proposition.

If the hypothetical seems “unreasonable” such as multiple steps of transfer that require specific conditions for which no information is available to the expert to consider, the expert may or may not be able to

1026 answer directly. Consider an apparent outlandish scenario of semen on a vaginal swab with a hypothetical
1027 question of V using contaminated toilet paper because the holder was empty [Gittelsohn 2016]:

1028
1029 “I am unaware of any information in the case where it was claimed the toilet paper roll was empty
1030 so V used discarded tissue from the bathroom trash. However, in my opinion, recovering a DNA
1031 profile from sperm cells is more likely if sexual activity occurred than if contaminated tissue was
1032 the source of the sperm cells.”

1033
1034 “I have not been presented with this specific alternative in this case. I would need some more
1035 information and some time to prepare an answer if this is relevant.”

1036
1037 The expert should remember that any transfer mechanism of DNA could have a non-zero probability
1038 given the right circumstances. Because the specific case information matters, the expert should discuss the
1039 limits of any opinion with the decision maker and be clear that hypothetical questions should fit within
1040 the overall case information.

1041
1042 4.4.4.5 Often an expert is asked a series of hypothetical questions. The expert should attempt to make the
1043 court understand that the best way to answer these questions is to consider the probability of the results
1044 obtained given each of two different options. When one hypothetical question involves a significant
1045 question (such as “touch DNA” moving to a body fluid), the expert may need to ask for a moment to
1046 consider the answer. Finally, if the answer were to involve much effort, perhaps it is best to ask for a
1047 recess. It is also possible that the expert should answer by saying he/she has no ability to offer an opinion
1048 on the probability of the evidence given that scenario.

1049
1050 **Annex B**
1051 **(informative)**
1052 **Examples**

1053
1054 The following examples have been included in an attempt to give guidance on how one might testify at
1055 trial when the court has interest in the evaluation of the evidence given activity level propositions. In the
1056 examples presented, both parties have described activities that could have legitimately led to the transfer
1057 of DNA. These examples have been simplified and may exclude issues such as lab-derived
1058 contamination, background DNA, or underlying issues with the testing methodology. The reader must be
1059 aware that in real life cases these issues might need to be considered.

1060
1061 It is beyond the scope of this best practices recommendation to give detailed instructions and strategies
1062 for specific cases examples. For more information, consult the references cited throughout this document.

1063
1064 It is recommended that the expert include the following information as general background before
1065 addressing his or her opinion about the evidence given propositions at the activity level of the Hierarchy
1066 of Propositions:

- 1067
- 1068 ● “In order to assist the court, I have followed a recognized framework for evidence evaluation by
1069 considering the probability of observing the results in this case given two alternative propositions.
1070 These reflect the prosecution and defense standpoints as understood by me.”
 - 1071
 - 1072 ● *(This statement may be needed as well:)* “I have no specific information that would allow me to
1073 infer what alternative activities would have taken place. To assess the biological results, I have
1074 adopted a proposition that incorporated case information that is not disputed between the parties,
1075 to the best of my knowledge.”

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- “The approach to the examination and interpretation of the findings in a case is crucially dependent on the information made available to me and the propositions considered. If any of the information I used in the evaluation were to change, is incorrect, or incomplete, then I will reconsider the evaluation of the evidence and this may result in a different overall opinion.”

The examples are intended to model the thought processes and the proper presentation of the opinion using a Bayesian framework. The process used in the examples follow the recognized framework for casework assessment and interpretation (CAI) [Cook et al., 1998 CAI] as described in the introduction of this document.

Both qualitative and quantitative approaches are acceptable. It is recommended that if a purely qualitative approach is used consisting of verbal qualifiers (such as more likely/very much more likely, high/low), the expert should give context by at least discussing the word choices, and some indication as to the relative scale of each. Because words may mean different things to different people, it is recommended that a quantitative evaluation be used whenever possible. However, there may be situations where this is not possible as there is no available research that is directly related to the case activities of interest. In addition, there may be jurisdictional preferences between qualitative and quantitative evaluations that must be considered. Much more information may be gained by consulting the references cited in this best practices recommendation.

The examples are intended to move through a progression from entirely qualitative in the first example to a fully quantitative example at the end. The examples between the first and last are intended to show a progression that incorporates published literature, and some form of numerical quantification of the strength of the evidence – even if that is merely an acknowledgement that a numerical evaluation cannot be calculated. While a qualitative evaluation is acceptable, and sometimes the only available option, it is recommended that all efforts be made to offer a quantitative assessment whenever possible.

- Example 1 is purely qualitative and makes no mention of research.
- Example 2 is qualitative, although there is mention that a numerical evaluation cannot be performed. Some relevant research is mentioned, but it is unbalanced and only related to one proposition. Therefore, a numerical evaluation is not presented.
- Example 3 is a continuation of Example 2 and serves to show how new/additional information may have a significant effect on the expert’s opinion.
- Example 4 presents a quantitative number, but it is based on a qualitative scale. This is one way to bridge the gap between qualitative and quantitative evidence evaluation, and further serves to enforce the criteria of transparency, balance, logic, and robustness.
- Example 5 is an attempt to show a quantitative approach using relevant literature. However, the numerical LR presented in #5 has been simplified for clarity and an example of the craft:
 - Simplified propositions were considered.
 - No attempt was made to find current literature that may exist, the citations are fictitious.
 - A Bayesian network was not used.
 - Sensitivity analysis was not done.

Case scenario 1.

Information:

Ms. Y alleges that she awoke to find Mr. X masturbating over her, and that he ejaculated on her clothing. Mr. X denies the allegation, but stated he argued with Ms. Y, and did at one point spit at her. A night

1124 shirt with a stain has been provided as evidence and was collected within a few hours of the event. Mr. X
1125 is not vasectomized.

1126
1127 **Question:** Did Mr. X ejaculate onto Ms. Y's clothing?
1128 Propositions considered:

- 1129 ● Mr. X ejaculated on Ms. Y.
- 1130 ● Mr. X spat on Ms. Y.

1131
1132 **Laboratory testing:**

- 1133 a) Visible stained area on shirt, this area also shows fluorescence using a forensic light source.
- 1134 b) Positive result for the presence of amylase.
- 1135 c) P30 test returned a negative result.
- 1136 d) No sperm were found via microscopic analysis of the stain.
- 1137 e) After quantification, the DNA extract required a 10-fold dilution before amplification.
- 1138 f) A DNA profile was recovered from the stain on her nightshirt.
- 1139 g) The DNA typing results showed a major profile matching Mr. X, and Ms. Y accounts for the minor.

1140
1141 **Assumptions:**

1142 Any DNA matching Mr. X on the nightshirt has originated from him.

1143
1144 **Oral Testimony:**

1145 I have evaluated the evidence with respect to two propositions: either Mr. X ejaculated on Ms. Y, or Mr.
1146 X spat on Ms. Y. If ejaculation had occurred, then I would expect the P30 test to be positive, and perhaps
1147 there to be sperm cells present. If spitting had occurred, then I would expect the amylase test to be
1148 positive. The second proposition would give rise to the results obtained in this case, whereas the first
1149 would not. Therefore, I consider that the results would be very much more likely to be observed if Mr. X
1150 spat on Ms. Y rather than if Mr. X ejaculated on Ms. Y.

1151
1152 **Evaluation:**

1153 a) Based on case information, the analysis was limited to semen and saliva testing. Laboratory validation
1154 shows that when semen is present (with similar timing as in this case), one expects to have a P30 positive
1155 test and to observe sperm heads using microscopy. (Case information exists that Mr. X has not been
1156 vasectomized). When saliva is present (again within the same timing), we expect a positive amylase test.
1157 However, amylase testing is not a specific or confirmatory test. I do not expect DNA recovered from an
1158 item of evidence to require a 10-fold dilution prior to amplification as a result of normal social contact (or
1159 background level DNA). Generally, only body fluids and tissue samples require dilution.

1160
1161 b) Considering the first proposition. I do not expect to observe negative semen testing results if
1162 ejaculation occurred. Based on a timely collection of the evidence and proper handling to preserve
1163 biological material, I would expect positive semen testing results if semen were present on the shirt. I do
1164 not expect such quantities of DNA as recovered here to be present as background. The probability of
1165 these results if Mr. X ejaculated on the shirt are considered to be extremely low.

1166
1167 c) Considering the alternative proposition. The results in this case (large quantity of DNA; saliva positive
1168 test, negative semen test) are what I would expect if spitting took place. I do not expect such quantities of
1169 DNA as recovered here to be present as background. The probability of these results if Mr. X spat on the
1170 shirt are considered to be extremely high.

1171
1172 d) In summary, only one of these activities would be expected to give rise to the findings in this case.
1173 Therefore, in my opinion, the results are very much more probable if spitting took place rather than if
1174 ejaculation took place.

1175

1176 **Case scenario 2:**

1177 **Information:**

1178 Mr. X and Ms. Y were socializing in a public bar. They were part of a group who drank and danced
1179 together. Ms. Y has accused Mr. X of forcibly penetrating her with his fingers while dancing. Mr. X has
1180 not washed his hands, and he has invoked his right to remain silent.

1181

1182 **Question:** Did Mr. X digitally penetrate Ms. Y?

1183 Propositions considered:

- 1184 ● Mr. X digitally penetrated Ms. Y and also socialized (danced) with Ms. Y.
- 1185 ● Mr. X simply socialized (danced) with Ms. Y.

1186

1187 **Laboratory testing:**

- 1188 a) Right- and left-hand fingers/fingernails of Mr. X swabbed ~5 hours after the alleged incident.
- 1189 b) DNA Right hand fingers/fingernails of Mr. X give a mixed DNA profile. The major component profile
1190 matches Ms. Y; the minor component profile matches Mr. X.
- 1191 c) The left-hand fingers/fingernails gave a DNA profile matching Mr. X only.
- 1192 d) No laboratory testing has been performed to establish the body fluid or cell type.

1193

1194 **Assumptions:**

1195 The source of the DNA is not disputed (i.e., the DNA is from Mr. X and Ms. Y).

1196

1197 **Oral Testimony:**

1198 I have evaluated the evidence in this case with respect to two propositions: either Mr. X digitally
1199 penetrated Ms. Y during an evening spent socializing/dancing, or Mr. X simply socialized/danced with
1200 Ms. Y. My opinion, considering the probability of observing the results under the different propositions,
1201 is that the results would be considered much more likely to be observed if the first proposition were true
1202 rather than the second. I am unable to provide a quantitative measure of the relative strength of support
1203 that the findings provide.

1204

1205 **Evaluation:**

1206 a) Considering the first proposition. The vaginal environment contains an abundance of DNA rich cells.
1207 Insertion of a finger would require some force and, in conjunction with the wet nature of the cells, would
1208 promote DNA transfer to a finger. This would likely result in a good quality DNA profile matching Ms.
1209 Y, as were the findings in this case. The absence of a similar result on the other hand is also considered
1210 significant under this proposition. This is because there is an expectation of similar results on both hands
1211 if Mr. X and Ms. Y only had typical social contact. The expectation of these results if digital penetration
1212 occurred is so high that for simplicity's sake, one can ignore the "social contact" portion of this first
1213 proposition. If the first proposition is true, then the probability of obtaining the results in this case would
1214 be considered 'high'.

1215

1216 b) Considering the alternative proposition. Social situations will provide opportunities for direct and
1217 indirect DNA transfer through successive contacts with common objects and individuals. In this situation,
1218 it would be my expectation that these activities would generate complex mixed DNA profile results from
1219 many contributors, since Mr. X and Ms. Y were part of a larger social group. Additionally, these results
1220 would be expected on both hands. The probability of obtaining the results found in this case (all DNA
1221 accounted for by Mr. X and Ms. Y, and only on one hand) if this proposition were true would therefore be
1222 considered 'low,' and against expectations.

1223

1224 c) Additionally, research indicates that the chances of finding a high-quality foreign DNA profile on a
1225 person's fingernails, other than from someone with whom they have an intimate relationship, is low.

1226
1227 d) In summary, both activities would give rise to the findings in this case, but with different expected
1228 probabilities. When considering the probability of observing the results under the different propositions,
1229 the results would be considered much more likely to be observed if the first proposition were true rather
1230 than the second.

1231
1232 **Case Scenario 3:**

1233 This is a continuation of Case Scenario 2. However, after the initial expert testimony by the DNA expert,
1234 defense later presented a witness that testified during the evening he saw Ms. Y lick the index finger of
1235 Mr. X's right hand after he dipped it into her drink.

1236
1237 Note: The expert was not incorrect in Case Scenario 2, but rather the information provided was
1238 incomplete with respect to the alternative proposition. In light of the new information introduced by the
1239 defense, it is imperative (and logical) that the expert re-assess the results given the new information.
1240 Although Mr. X has made no statement, the defense is entitled to introduce evidence as fits their case
1241 strategy, and this may—or may not—affect the evaluation of the evidence by the DNA expert.

1242
1243 **Question:** Did Mr. X digitally penetrate Ms. Y?

1244 Propositions considered:

- 1245 ● Mr. X digitally penetrated Ms. Y.
- 1246 ● Ms. Y licked the index finger of Mr. X and no digital penetration took place.

1247
1248 **Laboratory testing:**

1249 See Case Scenario 2; there are no additional testing results.

1250
1251 **Assumptions:**

1252 All previous assumptions apply.

1253
1254 **Oral Testimony:**

1255 I have evaluated the DNA results in this case with respect to two propositions: either Mr. X digitally
1256 penetrated Ms. Y, or Ms. Y licked the index finger of Mr. X and no digital penetration occurred. The fact
1257 that Ms. Y and Mr. X danced together and spent the evening together in a social setting is taken into
1258 consideration under both propositions, as this is not contested. The probability of observing the DNA
1259 results under the different propositions would be generally considered the same when considering the
1260 nature of the body fluids and cell types (vaginal cells/fluids versus buccal cells or saliva). I would expect
1261 the same findings for either proposition. Therefore, the results are uninformative or neutral and do not
1262 help address the issue.

1263
1264 **Evaluation:**

1265 a) Considering the first proposition. The probability of obtaining the result remains 'high' as stated in
1266 Scenario 2 for the proposition that Mr. X digitally penetrated Ms. Y's vagina.

1267
1268 b) Considering the alternative proposition. The new information changes the probability of the results
1269 under the alternative proposition. Insertion of a finger into the oral cavity, as with the vagina, is expected
1270 to provide a good opportunity for the transfer of cells/DNA. The probability of obtaining the results under
1271 this proposition, with conditions of retention and persistence being the same as that of the first
1272 proposition, is considered 'high' and equal to the probability of the results if there were digital
1273 penetration.

1274
1275 c) In summary, I would expect the same findings under both propositions. Notwithstanding that the nature
1276 of the body fluid cannot be determined, the probability of observing the DNA results under the different

1277 propositions would be generally considered the same. Therefore, the results are uninformative or neutral
1278 and do not help address the issue.
1279

1280 **Case scenario 4**

1281 **Information:**

1282 Motor vehicle collision – airbag deployed. One person (driver) is seen leaving the scene.

1283 Mr. X is charged with the offence. He states that:

- 1284 ● he owns the car, and therefore, his DNA will be on surfaces within the car
- 1285 ● a cup was present in the central console of the car which he has drunk from
- 1286 ● someone stole the car prior to the collision.

1287

1288 **Question:** Who was driving the car at the time of the collision?

1289 Propositions considered:

- 1290 ● Mr. X was driving the car at the time of the collision.
- 1291 ● An unknown person was driving the car at the time of the collision, not Mr. X.

1292

1293 **Laboratory testing:**

1294 a) Airbag tested for saliva and DNA.

1295 b) Central front region contained an area of staining that yielded a strong amylase positive result.

1296 c) The area of assumed saliva gives a good quality single source profile matching Mr. X.

1297 d) The LR is 1 billion. That is, it is 1 billion times more likely to observe the DNA evidence if it
1298 originated from Mr. X rather than if it originated from someone else unrelated to Mr. X.

1299

1300 **Assumptions:**

1301 a) The determination of saliva is not under dispute.

1302 b) The DNA has originated from the saliva tested.

1303 c) Saliva has originated from Mr. X.

1304

1305 **Oral testimony:**

1306 I must first point out that the stated likelihood ratio for the DNA profile (i.e., 1 billion) cannot be applied
1307 to the evaluation of the evidence given the propositions about who was driving the car. I have considered
1308 this evidence with respect to two possible propositions: Mr. X was driving the car at the time of the
1309 collision, or an unknown person was driving the car at the time of the collision. It is my understanding
1310 that Mr. X is the normal driver. It is my opinion that both scenarios could give rise to the findings in this
1311 case. However, when considering the probability of observing the results under the different propositions,
1312 the results would be considered much more likely to be observed if the first proposition were true rather
1313 than the second. This is because I have a high expectation of these results given one proposition, and a
1314 low expectation given the other.

1315

1316 I can illustrate my opinion by assigning a numerical value, for example, of 0.9, or 90% to the term ‘high’
1317 and 0.01, or 1%, to the term ‘low.’ So another way to express my opinion is to say that the evidence
1318 recovered from the airbag is in the order of 90 times more likely if Mr. X were driving the car at the time
1319 of the collision than if someone else were driving, and Mr. X’s DNA was present due to car ownership. I
1320 have simplified this mathematical example by not considering that the cup Mr. X had in the car was an
1321 alternative source of the DNA on the airbag. In my opinion, this possibility is so remote as to have no
1322 influence on my calculation.

1323

1324 **Evaluation information:**

1325 a) The two probabilities assigned for the observed results given each proposition allow the calculation of
1326 a likelihood ratio. This likelihood ratio represents the relative strength of support that the findings provide
1327 given the stated propositions. I am giving a qualitative opinion, as I am unaware of any published studies

1328 related to DNA profiles recovered from airbags and car owners. However, I am aware of numerous
1329 studies involving the comparison of DNA transferred by saliva and other body fluids compared to skin
1330 cells, and also of studies involving general background levels of DNA.

1331
1332 b) Considering the first proposition. If Mr. X were driving, then it is reasonable to consider that the
1333 driver's airbag has deployed into his face with some force. There is an expectation that this would have
1334 resulted in the transfer of his saliva, and therefore his DNA, to the central part as a single source DNA
1335 profile as were the findings in this case. The probability of the evidence given this proposition is
1336 considered very high (i.e., close to 1), because these results are expected if this proposition is true. I have
1337 assigned a probability value of 0.9 to this proposition as an illustration of 'high.'

1338
1339 c) Considering the alternative proposition. If some other person were seated in the driver's seat, then:
1340

- 1341 ● saliva is present in the area tested as a result of the airbag being deployed into the unknown
1342 driver's face and
- 1343 ● the DNA profile of the 'true' driver (i.e., the driver at the time of the collision) could, by some
1344 very remote possibility, match that of Mr. X. This is not expected to be the case; therefore, I have
1345 to accommodate for the profile of the 'true' driver not being detected.
- 1346 ● Since the airbag is entirely enclosed within the steering column before deployment, there would
1347 be no reasonable opportunity for DNA from Mr. X to be transferred to it as a result of him
1348 sneezing over it or being in his car on a previous occasion. Therefore, we may consider the
1349 DNA/saliva was transferred through contact with areas of the car where his DNA is expected to
1350 be present when the airbag was inflating or deflating. Additionally, in my opinion, it would be
1351 difficult to conclude that the saliva detected on the airbag could be explained from transfer of
1352 saliva from the rim of a cup in the cup holder. This saliva would have to be wet to facilitate
1353 transfer and would have to be present over a similarly shaped and equivalent area as detected on
1354 the airbag (i.e., not commensurate with the rim of a cup).
- 1355 ● In this situation the chances of observing the DNA profiling results would be considered 'low.'
1356 This is because the second alternative requires a number of assumptions and conditional events to
1357 come together in an unlikely manner for the results to be observed. I have assigned a probability
1358 value of 0.01 to the results given this proposition to illustrate 'low'.

1359 d) In summary, both activities might be expected to give rise to the findings in this case. However, when
1360 considering the probability of observing the results under the different propositions, the results would be
1361 considered much more likely to be observed if the first proposition were true rather than the second.
1362 Using the numerical example to express this outcome is to say that the evidence is in the order of 90 times
1363 more likely given that Mr. X was driving the car rather than an unknown person.

1364 **Case Scenario 5**

1365 **Information:**

1366 A female, Ms. Y, is assaulted by a man as she exits a bar. She puts up a fight and scratches his face with
1367 her dominant hand. The incident was observed by other customers. Mr. X states he was in the bar on the
1368 night in question but did not assault the complainant.

1369
1370
1371 **Question:** Did Ms. Y scratch Mr. X or some unknown person?

1372 Propositions considered:

- 1373 ● Ms. Y scratched Mr. X outside the bar they both visited during the evening.
- 1374 ● Ms. Y scratched an unknown person but was present in the same public space as Mr. X

1375 **Laboratory testing:**

1376 Samples are recovered from underneath Ms. Y's fingernails, an hour after the incident. DNA from her
1377 dominant hand yielded a mixed DNA profile exhibiting one major male component profile (Contributor
1378

1379 1: mixture proportion 90%) and a minor profile (Contributor 2: mixture proportion 10%). The minor
1380 profile contribution is concordant with the profile of Ms. Y.
1381 A statistical evaluation, a determines that the DNA profile result is on the order of 1 billion times more
1382 likely if it originated from Ms. Y and Mr. X rather than Ms. Y and an unknown person who is unrelated
1383 to Mr. X.

1384
1385 **Assumptions:**

- 1386 a) Ms. Y is the minor contributor on the sample from her fingernails.
1387 b) There is a reasonable basis for concluding that Mr. X (rather than someone else) and Ms. Y contributed
1388 to the DNA mixture.
1389 -Mr. X has given a statement that he was at the same bar at the same time as Ms. Y.
1390 -Mr. X matches the major contributor to the DNA profile from the fingernails of Ms. Y.
1391 -There is a large LR for the DNA profile that supports the inclusion of Mr. X.
1392 c) The evaluation considering activity level propositions is based upon the DNA from the fingernails of
1393 Ms. Y coming from both Ms. Y and Mr. X.
1394 d) It is not in dispute that Ms. Y was involved in an incident where she scratched someone.
1395

1396 **Oral Testimony:**

1397 I have evaluated the DNA results in this case with respect to two propositions: either Ms. Y scratched Mr.
1398 X during a scuffle, or she scratched some unknown person and Ms. Y and Mr. X just happened to be in
1399 the same bar at the same time, which might have resulted in casual social interaction.

1400
1401 There is data from research that discusses the occurrence of foreign DNA under one's fingernails after
1402 casual social contact. These studies show that recovering even a partial foreign profile from casual contact
1403 is remote, and if it is, then it is expected to be at a very low level. Generally, foreign profiles can be
1404 attributed to the person's partner, which means it is very unusual to recover a major profile of a non-
1405 partner from someone's fingernails, which is the data in this case.
1406

1407 In contrast, scratching during a fight often leads to skin cells, and sometimes even blood and tissue, under
1408 one's nails. We can typically expect to recover good quality DNA profiles in this situation, often with the
1409 foreign profile being the major donor. Studies done where volunteers have participated in vigorous
1410 scratching experiments show foreign profiles in about 60% of the samples collected. Therefore, I have
1411 assigned a probability to this evidence of 0.6 if the proposition that Ms. Y scratched Mr. X during a
1412 scuffle was true. I would describe this probability as reasonable, because it is unlikely that the volunteers
1413 in the scratching experiments I have described scratched as aggressively as what might happen during a
1414 fight.
1415

1416 I have also assigned a probability to the evidence given the alternative proposition. If Ms. Y scratched an
1417 unknown person instead of Mr. X, yet she was present in the same public space as Mr. X, then this means
1418 we did not detect the DNA of the person she scratched. Based in part on the timely collection of the
1419 sample, it is very unlikely to not detect DNA from the person Ms. Y scratched and to detect the DNA of a
1420 single random person that happened to be at the same bar. Therefore, my probability of the DNA result is
1421 very small, in the order of 0.0004 if this alternate proposition were true.
1422

1423 When I consider the two propositions, the DNA results are 1500 times more likely if Ms. Y scratched Mr.
1424 X rather than if Ms. Y scratched an unknown person but was present in the same public space as Mr. X.
1425

1426 It is important to note that the LR of 1 billion is for the evaluation of the DNA evidence if Mr. X were a
1427 contributor or if some other unrelated person were a contributor of the material from under the fingernails
1428 of Ms. Y. This LR of 1500 only relates to my interpretation of the evidence given scratching occurred
1429 rather than if only social interaction took place. These numbers are not interchangeable and have very

1430 different magnitudes. We do not ever expect such large LR's for the evaluation of DNA results given
1431 activity level propositions.

1432

1433 **Evaluation:**

1434 a) Background information:

- 1435 ● The scientific literature provides some useful information which allows a quantitative evaluation
1436 of obtaining the results if DNA had been transferred by scratching or by social contact. Given that
1437 the data represents the state of knowledge in this area at the moment, it can be used to inform my
1438 expert opinion.
- 1439 ● Research and data demonstrate that:
 - 1440 ○ the incidence of foreign DNA beneath the fingernails in the general population as a result
1441 of casual social contact is low;
 - 1442 ○ even if foreign DNA is detected, then invariably it is attributable to a person's partner
1443 rather than to a random individual and is generally attributed to more intimate contact;
 - 1444 ○ foreign DNA profiles from casual social contact tend to be at a low/trace level;
 - 1445 ○ scratching promotes the transfer of foreign DNA to fingernails resulting in good quality
1446 foreign DNA profiles.
- 1447 ● Experience shows that transfer events of DNA in a social environment are typically complex and
1448 involve direct and indirect DNA transfer involving many individuals. This situation is expected to
1449 generate low level DNA profile results most likely from multiple foreign contributors.

1450

1451 b) Considering the first proposition:

- 1452 ● If Ms. Y had scratched Mr. X, then I expect a good quality DNA profile a little more than half of
1453 the time when sampled in a timely fashion. This is based on a study where volunteers scratched
1454 one another for time intervals from 5 to 30 seconds. In that study, 52% of the samples yielded a
1455 complete (but minor) foreign DNA profile [Meandhim, 2040].
- 1456 ● More vigorous scratching, such as that which might occur during a fight, would be expected to
1457 promote DNA transfer through the transfer of cellular material/skin tissue (and possibly blood) to
1458 the fingernail area. The transferred cellular material would produce a good quality DNA profile
1459 from the scratched person. The presence of Ms. Y's own DNA would also be expected to form
1460 part of the result. These expectations match the DNA findings in this case.
- 1461 ● However, I am adjusting the probability of these results slightly upward given the scratching
1462 proposition, since this real-life situation resulted in a major foreign DNA profile. The study by
1463 Meandhim only found minor profiles. This is support for more transfer in a real-life fight than
1464 that found in the study. Therefore, in my opinion the probability of observing the results if she
1465 scratched him would be in the order of 60%.

1466

1467 c) Considering the alternative proposition:

- 1468 ● If no scratching has occurred between Ms. Y and Mr. X, then any DNA matching Mr. X has
1469 arisen through social activity.
- 1470 ● Therefore, the scratching has occurred between some unknown person and Ms. Y. This unknown
1471 person's DNA profile would be expected to be observed in the result, but this was not the case.
1472 Literature shows the absence of a DNA profile of a person who has been scratched is in the order
1473 of 20% [Soandso, 2050]. This value is favorable to the alternative proposition, as it is
1474 understandable that volunteers would not agree to be scratched in an overly aggressive fashion.
1475 The actual probability of not finding DNA from someone scratched in an aggressive fashion, and
1476 collected in a timely fashion, is assumed to be less than 20%.
- 1477 ● Research data indicates that finding a foreign DNA profile, following social activities, associated
1478 with someone's fingernails is remote, in the order of 2% [Thisandthat, 2060].
- 1479 ● Additionally, my expectation is that any DNA profile resulting from social interaction would be a
1480 complex low-level mixture of multiple foreign contributors. Mr. X's DNA would be at the same

1481 level as others whose DNA might have been transferred in a social environment. However, these
1482 were not the findings in this case. Because a mixture with a major component was recovered
1483 instead of a mixture with multiple trace contributors, the probability is adjusted downward by a
1484 factor of 10 for transfer only via social interaction at the same bar.

- 1485 • I have considered that the events are independent. Therefore, in my opinion, the probability of
1486 observing the results if this proposition was true would be ‘very low’ on the order of 0.0004 (0.2
1487 x 0.02 x 0.1 = 0.0004).

1488
1489 d) In summary, both scenarios might give rise to the findings in this case. However, when considering the
1490 probability of observing the results under the different propositions, the results would be considered 1500
1491 times (0.6 / 0.0004) more likely to be observed if the first proposition were true rather than the second.
1492

1493 **Possible follow-up questions based on Scenario 5:**

1494 Note: The previous examples conclude with the expert opinion. In practice, a series of follow-up
1495 questions is common by both parties. The following are examples of questions that might arise after the
1496 expert gives his or her opinion.
1497

1498 Q1) So you are saying that it is a billion times more likely that Ms. Y scratched Mr. X?

1499 A) No. The statistical evaluation of a DNA profile result, which addresses the question regarding ‘whose
1500 DNA is it?’ is an entirely different question from addressing ‘how and when did the DNA get there?’ This
1501 means that the statistic of ‘1 billion’ has no bearing on the issues regarding how or when the DNA was
1502 transferred. With respect to this question of scratching I have conducted a qualitative evaluation and given
1503 a verbal likelihood ratio.
1504

1505 (Notes: This question crosses levels of the hierarchy of propositions and additionally, it contains a
1506 transposed conditional.)
1507

1508 Q2) So what you are saying is that Ms. Y scratched Mr. X?

1509 A) No, this is a statement on what has happened, which I do not know. But, I can help with this issue by
1510 assessing how likely the results are given the propositions. What I can say is, given that they were in the
1511 same bar, I am offering my opinion on the probability of observing the mixed DNA profile result with
1512 respect to two propositions:

- 1513 either Ms. Y scratched Mr. X
- 1514 or, Ms. Y scratched some unknown person.

1515 In my opinion the DNA result is more likely if Ms. Y scratched Mr. X than if Ms. Y scratched some
1516 unknown person. This is a piece of the puzzle that must fit with the other puzzle pieces as the jury tries to
1517 decide what happened. I do not have those other pieces.
1518

1519 (Notes: This question is asking for a direct comment on the activity that is alleged to have occurred. This
1520 is sometimes referred to as “the ultimate issue”. It is not the role of the expert to comment on this. The
1521 expert is to comment on the evidence, not the activity.)
1522

1523 Q3) So, it is possible the result can be explained by DNA transfer through social contact?

1524 A) Yes, and I have indeed considered this explicitly in the evaluation of my results. But my evaluation
1525 considers the probability of the DNA results (quantity, major corresponding to Mr. X) given one
1526 proposition (here, scratching during a scuffle) compared to the alternative (here, social contact in the bar).
1527 The evidence I evaluated shows a foreign male profile matching Mr. X from the nails of Ms. Y. I do not
1528 expect this result from social contact. I do have some level of expectation of finding these results if
1529 someone was scratched during a fight. Therefore, in my opinion the evidence is more likely if Ms. Y
1530 scratched Mr. X than if Ms. Y scratched some unknown person. What is important is that my evaluation
1531 does not eliminate the possibility that the results were obtained by social contact; however, given that

1532 alternative scenario to scratching during a fight, I consider these results less likely to be observed if the
1533 social transfer scenario were true rather than if scratching had occurred as alleged.

1534
1535 (Notes: An LR which says the evidence is more likely if A than if B does not mean that B cannot be
1536 “possible”. But the term possible has no meaning in a probabilistic assessment of the evidence. In this
1537 example, the evidence is “possible” if either option occurred, but the expert analysis clearly favors the
1538 evidence as being more likely if Mr. X were scratched by Ms. Y.)

1539
1540 Q4) Are there any other explanations for the findings?

1541
1542 A) I do not have any additional information as a DNA scientist that would help me say what could have
1543 happened in this case. I can give you my opinion on the results when given activities of interest to the
1544 court, but not on the (alleged) activities themselves. It is not my role. In addition, discussing the
1545 probability of these results given only a single explanation offers no real value, as it needs to be put into
1546 contrast using alternate propositions. Only then may I offer an opinion that the evidence is more likely
1547 under proposition A than proposition B, and those propositions must have some reasonable relation to the
1548 case.

1549
1550 (Notes: The expert needs to be aware of the difference between an explanation after the results are known
1551 compared to a proposition based on case information. The expert should not be the source of new
1552 propositions, and any evaluation of a single proposition by itself has no real meaning in the context of the
1553 activities alleged by the parties. For example, the probability of the evidence given explanation A is $\Pr(E |$
1554 $A) = 0.001$ (one in one thousand). Numerically, that is a low number. However if the probability of the
1555 evidence given another explanation (B) is $\Pr(E | B) = 0.0001$ (one in ten thousand), then comparatively,
1556 $\Pr(E | A)$ is a high probability.)

1557
1558 Q5) Your opinion is subjective in that it is based on personal beliefs. Why should the court rely on this?

1559 A) I have considered my results in the light of two propositions. For this I have used my personal
1560 knowledge and in that sense, it is my opinion, so it is subjective. But it is not arbitrary nor biased. My
1561 opinion is based on my experience, my expertise, and the relevant data and literature that addresses these
1562 questions. I am qualified, by virtue of my training, to address the questions put forward to me by the court
1563 following a recognized framework, which accommodates both the prosecution and defense alternatives.
1564 My opinion is presented in a transparent manner which allows scrutiny and discussion.

1565
1566 (Notes: All expert opinion is subjective to one degree or another, or else there would be no expertise.
1567 Even evaluation of evidence given the sub-source level propositions is subjective, as a choice was made
1568 about which allele frequency database to use, artifact labeling, statistical models or software, and other
1569 issues.)

1570
1571 Q6) The LR reported for the activity level propositions is very much lower than that reported when
1572 considering whose DNA might be present (1 billion). Doesn't this mean that the LR of 1500 has less
1573 probative value?

1574 A) First of all, the two LRs relate to two very different questions. The LR of “1 billion” is helping to
1575 answer the question of “Whose DNA is present?” and the LR of 1500 is helping to answer the question
1576 “How did the DNA get there?” The factors that go into the calculation of these two different numbers
1577 consider very different things with different magnitudes. The results are also very different. In the first
1578 LR, the results pertain to the comparison of two DNA profiles. In the second, as there is no dispute on the
1579 source of the DNA for the activity propositions, the results are only the quantity of DNA from which
1580 donors - or lack of donors. The two numbers are therefore not comparable as they are addressing different
1581 things.

1582

1583
1584
1585
1586
1587

Annex C
(informative)
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