Privacy preserving protocols for encounter metrics

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Workshop on Challenges for Digital Proximity Detection in Pandemics: Privacy, Accuracy, and Impact, January 2021
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Workshop on Challenges for Digital Proximity Detection in Pandemics: Privacy, Accuracy, and Impact, January 2021
Motivation

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- We frame the proximity detection problem as that of measuring levels of interactions in a population of autonomous agents.
- In human populations, higher levels of interaction means faster spread of infectious diseases.
- Besides enabling automatic contact tracing, we want to help engineer environments so as to slow the spread of disease.
Two people coinciding in a space/time window is an encounter.
Encounter metrics

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*Pseudonyms being broadcast in all these cases can be linked to an identity.*
A problem that requires mitigation

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In the context of contact tracing for COVID-19, systems that expose the pseudonyms of infected people may also be exposing their identities.
Protect privacy

The system must be used for public health.

The system must not be capable of collecting, processing, or transmitting any more data than what is necessary to achieve this purpose.

Solutions must be fully transparent. The protocols and their implementations, including any sub-components provided by companies, must be available for public analysis.
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It is problematic if we are not given low level access to the platform.
Figure 1: Our colleague Sae Woo Nam.

THANK YOU