

1 ***Cybersecurity Profile for the***
2 ***Responsible Use of Positioning,***
3 ***Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Services***
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5 **DRAFT Annotated Outline**
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9 August 31, 2020
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14 NOTES TO REVIEWERS:

15 NIST’s objective is to deliver a PNT Cybersecurity Profile (hereafter, the Profile) that can be
16 adapted to the needs of PNT service users in the public and private sectors. Furthermore, through
17 the Profile, NIST seeks to increase organizational awareness of the extent to which they use and
18 rely on PNT services.

19 Through the Profile development process, NIST will engage the public and private sectors on
20 multiple occasions to include a request for information, participation in workshops, solicitation of
21 feedback on this annotated outline, and public review and comment on the draft Profile. The Profile
22 development process is iterative and, in the end state, will identify and promote the responsible
23 use of PNT services from a cybersecurity point of view. This Annotated Outline is designed to
24 engage public and private sector stakeholders on preliminary NIST thinking before publishing a
25 draft “*Cybersecurity Profile for the Responsible Use of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT)*
26 *Services*” for public comment in October 2020.

27 NIST seeks insight and feedback on this Annotated Outline to improve the PNT cybersecurity
28 profile, which is scheduled for publication in February 2021. Areas needing more input include
29 feedback on the description of systems that use PNT services and the set of standards,
30 guidelines, and practices addressing systems that use PNT services. NIST welcomes suggestions
31 in these areas in addition to comments on the content within this Annotated Outline.

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Editor’s Note: Italicized text within a lift out box discusses the content to include within that section. In addition, some sections include preliminary, non-italicized text to provide the stakeholder reviewers sample text of what the actual profile may contain.

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34 Executive Summary

35 *Editor's Note: This section contains a concise summary of the Profile.*

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37 **Table of Contents**

38 *Editor’s Note: NIST suggests the Profile have these major headings in its Table of Contents:*

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63 1 PNT Cybersecurity Profile – Introduction

64 *Editor’s Note: This section will summarize the purpose, objectives, and scope of the Profile for organizations that use PNT services.*

65 Executive Order 13905 (EO 13905), “*Strengthening National Resilience through Responsible*
66 *Use of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Services*,” was issued on February 12, 2020 [EO
67 13905]. It seeks to help organizations protect themselves from the disruption or manipulation of
68 PNT services, particularly those organizations whose PNT services are vital to the functioning
69 of U.S. critical infrastructure¹ and related technology-based industries. The Executive Order
70 (EO) directs the Department of Commerce to develop a PNT Profile for users of PNT services.

71 The PNT cybersecurity profile (hereafter, the Profile) is intended for a general audience and is
72 broadly applicable. The Profile applies to:

- 73 • Organizations that have already adopted the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF)² to
74 help identify, assess, and manage cybersecurity risks [NIST CSF];
- 75 • Organizations that are familiar with the CSF and want to improve their cybersecurity
76 postures; and
- 77 • Organizations that are unfamiliar with the CSF but need to implement cybersecurity risk
78 management frameworks for the responsible use of their PNT services.

79 1.1 Purpose and Objectives

80 *Editor’s Note: This section will provide a concise purpose statement and a subset of the activities required to achieve the purpose.*

81 The purpose of the Profile, when used as part of a risk management program, is to help
82 organizations manage cybersecurity risks to systems, networks, and assets that use PNT
83 services. The Profile provides guidance for establishing risk management approaches for desired
84 outcomes as driven by an organization’s business and operational needs. The Profile is not
85 intended to serve as a solution or compliance checklist that would guarantee the responsible use
86 of PNT services.

¹ Critical infrastructure, as defined in the Executive order, means “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or on any combination of those matters” [EO 13905].

² Efforts under the PNT EO build on a previous EO, issued on February 12, 2013, that called for the strengthening of national critical and economic infrastructure against cybersecurity threats. In that EO, the President directed NIST to lead the coordination of a Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) that would reduce cybersecurity risks to critical infrastructures that rely on private sector input and existing standards, guidelines, and practices [EO 13636].

87 Use of the PNT Profile will help organizations to:

- 88 • Identify systems that use PNT services;
- 89 • Identify sources of PNT data;
- 90 • Protect PNT services by adhering to basic principles of responsible use;
- 91 • Detect cybersecurity-related disturbances and/or manipulation of PNT services and data;
- 92 • Address cybersecurity risk in their management and use of PNT services and data;
- 93 • Identify common threats to PNT services, [user] equipment, and data; and
- 94 • Respond to PNT service or data anomalies in a timely, effective, and resilient manner.

95 1.2 Scope


Editor's Note: This section will highlight that the scope is for recipients of PNT services, not the service providers.

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97 The Profile's scope includes systems that use PNT services, including those systems that
98 consume and then rebroadcast PNT data for consumption by other organizational entities where
99 a PNT Service is defined as "any system, network, or capability that provides a reference to
100 calculate or augment the calculation of longitude, latitude, altitude, or transmission of time or
101 frequency data, or any combination thereof" [EO 13905]. The Profile's scope does not include
102 source PNT signal generators and providers (e.g., a GNSS control segment or space segment as
103 shown in Figure 1). PNT Service providers outside of an organization's control or boundary are
104 not in the scope of this effort.

105 PNT Services interface with user equipment (UE) to produce PNT data, which can take the form
106 of position, velocity, or timing information. The responsible use of PNT data requires the
107 stakeholder to identify the dependencies of PNT data (within their components, sub-systems,
108 and systems), evaluate the impact should the loss of PNT data be realized, and manage the
109 residual risk.

110 This Profile defines the responsible use of PNT services as it relates to cybersecurity. In this
111 case, responsible use by organizations includes the incorporation of:

- 112 • Cybersecurity risk-informed management of PNT services,
- 113 • Cybersecurity risk-based approaches that minimize the potential effects of cybersecurity
114 disruption or manipulation of PNT services and data, and
- 115 • Deliberate planning and action regarding the secure management of PNT services.



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Figure 1. The Scope for the PNT Cybersecurity Profile is limited to the user segment only. The provider (in this example, the GPS space and ground segments) is not part of this Profile.

119 1.3 Audience

120 *Editor's Note:* This section will identify parties that will benefit from the Profile.

121 This document should be used by those involved in overseeing, developing, implementing, and
122 managing the cybersecurity of systems using PNT services. This document's intended audience
123 includes:

- 124 • Public and private organizations that use PNT services;
- 125 • Managers responsible for the use of PNT services;
- 126 • Risk managers, cybersecurity professionals, and others with a role in cybersecurity risk
127 management for systems that use PNT services;
- 128 • Procurement officials responsible for the acquisition of PNT services;
- 129 • Mission and business process owners responsible for achieving operational outcomes
130 dependent on PNT services; and
- 131 • Researchers and analysts who study the unique cybersecurity needs of PNT services.

132 2 How to Use the PNT Cybersecurity Profile

133 *Editor's Note:* This section provides guidance on what can be accomplished via the profile.

134 The Profile will help organizations develop cybersecurity PNT profiles that are appropriate for
135 their respective sectors. The Profile will help organizations determine cybersecurity risks based
136 on their assessments of the potential impacts of manipulation or the disruption of PNT services
137 to business and operational objectives. The Profile is intended to help users of PNT services
138 prioritize necessary cybersecurity activities based on business objectives. The Profile may be a
139 tool to help organizations identify areas where standards, practices, and other guidance could
140 help manage the risk of cybersecurity threats to systems that use PNT services.

141 This Profile is intended to assist an organization's risk management effort. The Profile does not
142 prescribe regulations or mandatory practices, nor does it carry any statutory authority.

143 The development of a Profile by an organization is a multi-step process, including a risk
144 assessment in which organizations consider the following:

- 145 • What processes and assets require PNT data (direct recipient of PNT services)?
- 146 • What processes and assets are dependent recipients of PNT data (i.e., identify secondary
147 effects)?
- 148 • What is the impact to the organization should a process or asset be lost or degraded?
- 149 • What processes and assets are vulnerable?
- 150 • What safeguards are available?
- 151 • What techniques can be used to identify threats of concern?
- 152 • What techniques can be used to respond to threats of concern?
- 153 • What techniques can be used to recover pre-event capabilities?

154 3 PNT Cybersecurity Profile – Overview

Editor’s Note: This section contains an overview of envisioned Profile content, a short description of the kinds of PNT data users that are covered by the Profile, and an overview of PNT services. The Profile provides information on risk management, capabilities, and mapping to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework to assist with specific implementation of PNT cybersecurity. The Profile will include informative references (including existing standards, guidelines, and practices) and a glossary of terms.

155

156 3.1 Risk Management Overview

Editor’s Note: This section reviews the risk management process.

157

158 Risk management is the ongoing process of identifying, assessing, and responding to risk as
159 related to an organization’s mission objectives. To manage risk, organizations should understand
160 the likelihood that an event will occur as well as its potential impacts. With this information,
161 organizations can determine the acceptable level of risk to the PNT data and services they use to
162 achieve their mission objectives.

163 As an organization analyzes its mission objectives as they relate to reliance on or use of PNT
164 data, there are a series of guiding questions that inform the process. They include:

- 165 • What are the threats to achieving mission objectives?
- 166 • What damages can result when those mission objectives are disrupted?
- 167 • What are the most important assets for a given mission objective?
- 168 • Where does physical infrastructure affect cybersecurity infrastructure and vice versa?

169 An organization should also be aware of statutory and policy requirements that may have a security
170 or safety dimension. These can be affected by cybersecurity risk or create risks downstream.

171 The PNT Profile supports and is informed by cybersecurity risk management processes. Using
172 the Profile, organizations can make more informed decisions to select and prioritize
173 cybersecurity activities and expenditures that help identify systems dependent on PNT, identify
174 appropriate PNT sources, detect disturbances and manipulation of PNT services, manage the risk
175 to these systems, and ensure resiliency through diversity. For critical infrastructures, PNT
176 sources and distribution networks should be architected with multiple, independent sources;
177 communication paths; and communication mediums. The Profile provides a starting point from
178 which organizations can customize—based on business need and risk assessment—to develop
179 the most appropriate processes to manage cybersecurity risk to their PNT services and data
180 essential for the correct behavior of critical infrastructure applications.

181 Organizations can use the PNT Profile in conjunction with existing cybersecurity risk management
182 processes. Examples of cybersecurity risk management processes include International
183 Organization for Standardization (ISO) 31000:2018, ISO/International Electrotechnical
184 Commission (IEC) 27005:2018, and NIST Special Publication 800-39. A full list of helpful
185 resources will be listed in an Annex of the Cybersecurity PNT Profile.

186 **3.2 Capabilities Overview**

*Editor's Note: The section describes some of the capabilities and controls that impact the
187 organization's ability to manage residual risk (in the context of PNT degradation or outage).*

188 **3.2.1 Policies and Procedures**

*Editor's Note: This section will discuss policies and procedures that organizations should
189 consider when managing cybersecurity risks to systems, networks, and assets that use PNT
services.*

190 Historically, the perceived risk to PNT services has been low while the reliance on PNT services
191 has increased. Responsible use of PNT should include policies and procedures that map to threats
192 to PNT services and the impacts should the threats be realized. Threat modeling may need to
193 consider alternative PNT services (other than GNSS.) The impact to the organization may include
194 secondary effects, such as a severe PNT data disruption that impacts a sector that provides services
195 required by other enterprises.

196 Cybersecurity policies and procedures will vary in accordance with each organization's tolerance
197 of a PNT data loss and their required PNT data precision. Though it does not add value to burden
198 an organization with excessive requirements, there should be a level of consistency within a
199 sector to enable collaborative efforts, such as the sharing of PNT interference events.
200 Consistency also facilitates the acceptance or rejection of inherited risk and compatible tools;
201 techniques and processes enable coordinated responses.

202 Multiple professional organizations and sector-specific stakeholders have defined PNT data
203 security requirements and practices (references available in Appendix C) to inform PNT
204 cybersecurity policies and procedures. In some cases, accepting degraded PNT service within a
205 bounded uncertainty can be tolerated. Other organizations may choose to secure PNT data, provide
206 alternative PNT services as a backup, or provide integrated PNT data from truly independent PNT
207 service providers.

208 PNT policies and procedures should be reflected in an organization's continuity of operations plan
209 (COOP). If the COOP identifies the use of legacy (or alternative) PNT, then the legacy procedures
210 need to be exercised and updated in accordance with normal COOP procedures.

211 3.2.2 Security Technical Capabilities Overview

Editor's Note: This section will discuss the capabilities of PNT services upon which an organization's systems rely, a discussion of potential threats that impact those systems, and a list of security controls that could potentially mitigate the risks.

212

213 Responsible use of PNT services requires organizational planning that includes an adequate
214 understanding of the technical capabilities needed to ensure appropriate levels of PNT data
215 precision, availability, and integrity.

216 When considering the technical capabilities as they pertain to PNT resilience, users must consider
217 certain technical challenges that a PNT service may encounter. PNT data may need to transfer time
218 and frequency over long distances (for a global enterprise) while retaining accuracy (within a
219 bounded uncertainty, 100 ns range for some applications) to Coordinated Universal Time (UTC)
220 and availability. Should alternative PNT service providers be deemed necessary, the compatibility
221 of implementation must be considered when investigating alternative PNT service providers. For
222 example, while GPS notifies receivers of impending leap seconds via an announcement six weeks
223 in advance, other PNT services only have a 12-hour advance notice. Other implementations adjust
224 for leap seconds by introducing a frequency adjustment over an extended time interval in order to
225 ensure that the clock continues monotonically increasing through a leap second event. However,
226 such a frequency adjustment introduces both a time and frequency error relative to the legal UTC
227 time [<https://www.nist.gov/pml/time-and-frequency-division/services/internet-time-service-its>].
228 GPS signals travel by line of sight, and receivers typically require at least four satellites to be in
229 view to provide accurate position, velocity, and time (PVT) solutions. Urban canyons, mountains,
230 trees, and atmospheric variabilities can contribute to errors in PVT solutions.

231 It is beneficial to consider that the analysis of potential integration of multiple and independent
232 technologies can facilitate the detection of anomalies, provide additional precision of PNT data,
233 and ultimately contribute to a more resilient system in the event of a disruption.

234 3.3 The PNT Cybersecurity Profile

Editor's Note: This section will contain the PNT Cybersecurity Profile, which maps the functions, categories, and sub-categories of the CSF with informative references. This section contains information on how users of the profile can mitigate risks that they have deemed necessary to address based on their assessment of the PNT services they are using. This is not an exhaustive list, and the actual selection of controls (if any) must be based on a cost-benefit analysis that is consistent with the risk. NIST welcomes input on available standards, guidelines, and practices that can be considered for inclusion as informative references in the Profile.

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237 **3.3.1 Protection of PNT Services**

Editor's Note: This section contains examples of various means to protect PNT services. This is not an exhaustive list and will not necessarily provide the appropriate level of assurance for a particular cyber ecosystem. The actual selection of mitigation techniques and controls (if any) must be based on a cost-benefit analysis that is consistent with the risk. The following sections identify, at a high level, the elements to consider in order to ensure the responsible use of PNT services. The PNT profile will incorporate these elements into actionable guidance (risk and threat mitigation techniques and controls) that organizations can implement to protect the PNT components under their purview.

238

239 The following list contains cybersecurity considerations that are applicable to GPS-based devices,
240 signals, data, hardware and software:

- 241 • Encrypted GPS signals for civilian use and GPS firewall technology should be
242 considered.
- 243 • Assured mechanisms (e.g., signed, verified code) for GPS software and firmware
244 upgrades on trusted platforms need to be in place to ensure the integrity of PNT data
245 processing.
- 246 • Modeling and simulation—including simulated disruptions, variations in leap second
247 implementations, and other implementation details—should be performed to exercise,
248 test, and update these technical protections. If at all practical, open test plans and inter-
249 sector collaboration should be encouraged so that sectors are aware of and accommodate
250 potential cross-sector impacts.
- 251 • GPS signals may be hardened using directional antennas in conjunction with accurate
252 tracking of individual satellites or shielded antennas that block terrestrial signals.

253 *Characteristics.* Organizations should identify the characteristics of the user's PNT system
254 infrastructure and individual devices that provide, communicate, or consume PNT data.
255 Characteristics of interest can include calibration to a traceable reference, PNT data stability over
256 time, communication latency and jitter, and device response behavior at start-up under steady
257 state conditions, with environmental stressors or disruptions, and typical observed PNT data
258 characteristics.

259 Organizations should identify the environmental surroundings and conditions that the PNT
260 system will be exposed to while maintaining the specified requirements. For example:

- 261 • Will there be sources of RF, multi-path interference?
- 262 • Will there be large temperature variations or extreme temperatures?
- 263 • Will there be sources of vibrations (e.g., along a busy road or in earthquake prone area)?

264

265 3.3.2 Detection of Disruptions to PNT Services

266 *Editor's Note: This section contains ways to detect disruptions to PNT services.*

267 *System verification and validation policy and procedures.* Organizations should identify steady
268 state and transient test cases, test plans, and test schedules as an end user, applicable to the
269 industry supply chain, to serve as a basis for verifying and validating PNT data users in order to
270 manage assessed risks associated with PNT disruptions.

271 Spatial diversity and shielded antennas can be used to detect anomalies and possible spoofing.
272 Other approaches include the use of diverse algorithms, cross-checking GPS solutions, verifying
273 GPS data with other GNSS for consistency, and examining alternative constellations (low-earth
274 orbit satellites, such as iridium) for sources of PNT.

275 It is beneficial to consider that the analysis and potential fusion of multiple and independent
276 technologies can facilitate the detection of anomalies, improve the precision of PNT data, and
277 ultimately contribute to a more resilient system in the event of a disruption.

278 There are numerous vendor products that detect anomalies using techniques such as analyzing the
279 signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) or the doppler shift (on a per space vehicle basis).

280 3.3.3 Resilience of PNT Services

281 *Editor's Note: This section contains ways to operate through periods of PNT service outages
or degradations.*

282 The ability to provide useable PNT data despite a compromise can be accomplished with
283 technologies such as:

- 284 • Atomic clocks (with a known holdover)
- 285 • PNT diversity and segmentation
- 286 • Alternative signals, such as other satellite constellations
- 287 • Network-based solutions
- 288 • Terrestrial RF sources
- 289 • Signals of opportunity (such as cellular)

290

291 **4 Conclusion**

***Editor's Note:** This section provides a brief conclusion to summarize the major points of the publication as well as discuss potential next steps and future work plans (e.g., communicating that this is a living document that will evolve over time).*

292

293 Appendix A—Acronyms and Abbreviations

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295 Appendix B—Glossary

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297 Appendix C—References

298 ...

299 [EO 13636] Executive Order 13636 (2013) Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.
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304 House, Washington, DC), February 12, 2020.
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310 ...

311 Appendix D—NIST Cybersecurity Framework

Editor’s Note: Appendix D summarizes the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), which provides guidance based on existing standards, guidelines, and practices for organizations to better manage and reduce cybersecurity risk.

312

313 The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) provides guidance based on existing standards,
314 guidelines, and practices to help organizations better manage and reduce cybersecurity risk. One
315 component of the CSF – the Framework Core – describes a set of cybersecurity activities and
316 desired outcomes determined to be essential across critical infrastructure sectors. The Framework
317 Core consists of five concurrent and continuous Functions: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and
318 Recover. When considered together, these Functions provide a high-level, strategic view of the
319 organization’s management of cybersecurity risk. The Framework Core then identifies underlying
320 key Categories and Subcategories for each Function and matches them with example Informative
321 References, such as existing standards, guidelines, and practices for each Subcategory. The five
322 Framework Functions can be performed concurrently and continuously to form an operational
323 culture that addresses dynamic cybersecurity risk.

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Table 1: Function and Category Unique Identifiers from NIST Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.1 [NIST CSF]

Function Unique Identifier	Function	Category Unique Identifier	Category
ID	Identify	ID.AM	Asset Management
		ID.BE	Business Environment
		ID.GV	Governance
		ID.RA	Risk Assessment
		ID.RM	Risk Management Strategy
		ID.SC	Supply Chain Risk Management
PR	Protect	PR.AC	Identity Management and Access Control
		PR.AT	Awareness and Training
		PR.DS	Data Security
		PR.IP	Information Protection Processes and Procedures
		PR.MA	Maintenance
		PR.PT	Protective Technology
DE	Detect	DE.AE	Anomalies and Events
		DE.CM	Security Continuous Monitoring
		DE.DP	Detection Processes
RS	Respond	RS.RP	Response Planning
		RS.CO	Communications
		RS.AN	Analysis
		RS.MI	Mitigation
		RS.IM	Improvements
RC	Recover	RC.RP	Recovery Planning
		RC.IM	Improvements
		RC.CO	Communications

327

328 The five functions of the Framework Core are:

- 329 1. **Identify** – Develop organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risks to systems,
330 assets, data, and capabilities. The activities in the Identify Function are foundational to the
331 effective use of the Framework. Understanding the business context, the resources that
332 support critical functions, and the related cybersecurity risks enables an organization to

- 333 focus and prioritize its efforts consistent with its risk management strategy and business
334 needs. Examples of outcome Categories within this Function include Asset Management,
335 Business Environment, Governance, Risk Assessment, and Risk Management Strategy.
- 336 2. **Protect** – Develop and implement the appropriate safeguards to ensure the delivery of
337 critical infrastructure services. The activities in the Protect Function support the ability to
338 limit or contain the impacts of a potential cybersecurity event. Examples of outcome
339 Categories within this Function include Access Control, Awareness and Training, Data
340 Security, Information Protection Processes and Procedures, Maintenance, and Protective
341 Technology.
- 342 3. **Detect** – Develop and implement the appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a
343 cybersecurity event. The activities in the Detect Function enable the timely discovery of
344 cybersecurity events. Examples of outcome Categories within this Function include
345 Anomalies and Events, Security Continuous Monitoring, and Detection Processes.
- 346 4. **Respond** – Develop and implement the appropriate activities to respond to a detected
347 cybersecurity event. The activities in the Respond Function support the ability to contain
348 the impacts of a potential cybersecurity event. Examples of outcome Categories within this
349 Function include Response Planning, Communications, Analysis, Mitigation, and
350 Improvements.
- 351 5. **Recover** – Develop and implement the appropriate activities to maintain plans for
352 resilience and restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to a cybersecurity
353 event. The activities in the Recover Function support timely recovery to normal operations
354 to reduce the impacts of a cybersecurity event. Examples of outcome Categories within
355 this Function include Recovery Planning, Improvements, and Communications.
- 356
357