PQDH: A Quantum-Safe Replacement for Diffie-Hellman based on SIDH
Vladimir Soukharev1 and Basil Hess2
1 InfoSec Global, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
2 InfoSec Global, Zurich, Switzerland
Abstract. We present a post-quantum key agreement scheme that does not require distinguishing between the
initiator and the responder. This scheme is based on elliptic curve isogenies and can be viewed as a variant of the
well-known SIDH protocol. Then, we present an efficient countermeasure against a side-channel attack that applies
to both static and ephemeral versions of SIDH and our scheme. Finally, we show how to obtain an isogeny-based
password-authenticated key exchange protocol based on our scheme by applying a construction shown in .
Security and computational complexities summaries are also presented.
Keywords: isogenies, key agreement, side-cha...