



# Remote Camera for Reactor Latch Inspections


& Other Reactor Engineering Projects








Taian Chen

University of Maryland, College Park  
A. James Clark School of Engineering

NIST Center for Neutron Research  
Reactor Operations and Engineering

7/25/2025





1967



First criticality

1985

Upgraded from  
10 MW to 20 MW

1987

Cold neutron  
source

1995

First neutron  
source upgrade

2003

Second neutron  
source upgrade

2021

Incident after  
refueling

# Background


NIST Center for Neutron Research (NCNR)

Supports: Neutron Scattering • Neutron Activation Analysis • Neutron Interferometry


The National Bureau of Standards Reactor (NBSR) research reactor is the NCNR's neutron source.

February 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2021  
Partial Fuel Meltdown

Reactor Vessel



Reactor Core




① The core is composed of an upper and lower grid plate, with slots that accommodate fuel elements.

① Refueling involves the removal of spent fuel elements, and insertion of fresh fuel elements.

30  
Fuel Elements



- ✦ 1. The operator engages the element with a turning tool and presses down on the spring to release tension on the latch.
- ✦ 2. The operator turns the latch to the “secured” position, aligning with the notches in the upper grid plate of the core.
- ✦ 3. The operator disengages the turning tool from the element. The spring restores force onto the latch and keeps it in the secured position.



If the latch is not properly secured, the fuel element can become dislodged. This may restrict the flow of coolant and result in damage to the fuel element.

This is exactly what occurs on February 3<sup>rd</sup> of 2021, after the reactor was restarted.



# Exigence

Lists are not exhaustive.

Before 2021, the NCNR had operated without incident for over 50 years.

The incident did not affect the surrounding community.



## Response

- Major SCRAM, confinement sealed.
- Assessment of situation.
- Assessment of environmental contamination.
- Initial report to NRC.



## Recovery

- Investigation into root causes.
- Cleaning of vessel and primary cooling loop.
- Repairs and testing.
- Vessel inspections.
- Reactor restart authorized and attempted in 2023.




## Prevention

- Addressing vulnerabilities in latching mechanism of fuel elements.
- Implementing visual latch inspections as part of refueling procedures.



Research Operations  
Planned to Resume in Early  
2026



February 3<sup>rd</sup> Incident



Proficiency Training



Procedure Improvements



ECR 1195




Fuelhead Latch Redesign



Corrective Action Program

Action




February 3<sup>rd</sup> Incident



ECR 1195

- Demand for visual inspection of latches before startup.
- Preventative control against similar incident




Initial Design

- First version of visual inspection tool.
- Designed to be inserted into reactor.
- Successfully deployed between 2022 and 2023.

Action





February 3<sup>rd</sup> Incident

Action

ENGINEERING CHANGE REQUEST (ECR)		ECR No.:	1195
ECR Title:	Core Inspection Tool		
System:	Fuel (elements, tools, storage, cannon)	Date:	08/04/2021
Introduction			
System or Equipment to be changed:	New Equipment for the refueling system		
Purpose:	Provide tool for visual inspection to verify and document all fuel elements are in the proper fully latched position following fuel manipulations.		
Description Summary			
Discuss Design Functions, Planned Change, and Risk Management			
<p>The visual inspection tool is to be used in response to the incident on February 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2021 at the NCNR where a fuel element was not properly latched when the reactor underwent startup. The function is to provide video evidence and confirmation that all fuel elements are properly latched after fuel manipulations and before startup to avoid any similar future incidents. Previously fuel latching was verified by rotational check per tech spec 3.9.2.1(2). This visual inspection tool provides an extra layer of redundancy by allowing a visual inspection per tech spec 3.9.2.1(3) to be performed after each refueling operation. Both the refueling and the rotational check are performed by feel. This visual inspection will allow us to see the condition of the element heads and latch bars prior to startup</p>			
<p>The tool is composed of a camera, lights, and an enclosure. The form of the system is designed to be very similar to a fuel element in terms of shape and weight to make use of an operator's muscle memory that is developed for moving fuel elements in the reactor. Use of unsecured fasteners is limited to avoid the tool leaking during usage and/or becoming dropped into the vessel. Additionally, the tool is designed out of aluminum, stainless steel and titanium for the body and fasteners with polycarbonate for the transparent face to ensure it is safe for use in a D2O environment. The tool is developed to be easy to decontaminate, using a smooth surface with minimal nooks, holes, and valleys that could trap contamination and/or make</p>			






ECR 1195



Initial Design




aluminum, stainless steel and titanium for the body and fasteners with polycarbonate for the transparent face to ensure it is safe for use in a D2O environment. The tool is developed to be easy to decontaminate, using a smooth surface with minimal nooks, holes, and valleys that could trap contamination and/or make decontamination harder.
<p>The tool must fit within the refueling tool plug and be manipulated with the same transfer tool. The buoyancy weight and movement of the tool are designed to be similar to a new element. This will allow insertion, movement through the transfer arms, and removal similar to a new element. This will also allow the reactor to stay on helium sweep with a raised vessel level, the same way a new element is put into the reactor. The transfer arms are by the nature of their normal use designed to move an element directly over each grid position with no obstructions. By designing our tool similar to a new element, it will be able to be moved over every grid position and look straight down on the fuel head, latching block, and latching bar assembly.</p> <p>To avoid the possibility of tangling cables on core components, such as the poison hold-down tubes, the tool is designed to be completely wireless, containing within the enclosure its own battery and storage media. Our current design is for recording only with no live view feature. To be compatible with any computers in the NCNR both at present and in the future, the video format of the recorded video shall be a non-proprietary format.</p> <p>After the tool has recorded an entire trip around the core on each transfer arm over each element position, the video shall be moved off of the camera, reviewed by a qualified individual to verify all elements are fully latched, and then moved to the R drive for long term storage.</p>







## Key Issues

	Inspection footage can only be viewed after the tool is recovered.
	Charging and offloading data requires disassembling the tool for access to the camera.
	Housing is susceptible to D <sub>2</sub> O contamination.

## Imperfect

Initial design is not practical for routine use.  
New revision is needed to meet ECR 1195 requirements and satisfy operational needs.



#### Key Features for Revised Tool



New electronics and software will support a remote video feed.



Exterior hermetically-sealed connector will provide charging and data I/O.



Improved housing will reduce cavities for D<sub>2</sub>O to collect in.

# Imperfect

Initial design is not practical for routine use.  
New revision is needed to meet ECR 1195 requirements and satisfy operational needs.

11 months later...

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(Not)  
**Perfect**  
(But Good Enough)

PAVE PT4-SS-150-6-20-3112P-SOC  
Docking Connector  
Socket for charging and data transfer.

ContDisc Screw-Type 1/4" NPT Muffled  
Pressure Relief Valve  
Burst-disc relief valve for excessive internal pressure.

TBD  
Payload Assembly  
Contains camera sensor, lens, and electronics.



09-018-003  
Fuelhead Surrogate  
Interfaces with fuel management tools. Reuses existing infrastructure and operator training.

TBD  
Antenna Window  
RF-transparent polycarbonate window for radio antenna for wireless communications.

Zeus Battery PC9-12S  
Rechargeable SLA Battery  
12 V with 9 Ah of capacity. Allows tool to operate in the reactor without tethering.


TBD  
Cover Assembly  
Seals bottom of inspection tool. Has a polycarbonate window for the camera to see through.

Latching Sighting Tool, Revised  
(LSTR)

E-02-050A  
Fuel Pickup Tool



09-018-003  
Fuelhead Surrogate





# Restrictions

This introduces a lot of problems for the internals of the tool, because:

1. The tool is cylindrical.
2. 5" of diameter is not a lot to work with.
3. There's even less space after accounting for the thickness of the hull.


# #1

Tool Diameter

ø 5.5"

Hole to Drop-out Chute  
Insertion point for inspection  
tool. Grants access into reactor  
vessel, overlooking the core.


ø 5"  
Tool Dim.





## ECR 1195

- 5 hours of uptime per inspection.
- Power source must be internal (due to other restrictions that will be discussed).



## Technical Details

- Realistic estimate for power draw of tool was 25 W.
- Battery capacity expected to degrade over lifespan, need to over-spec capacity.



## Initial Ideas

Can't fit larger battery sizes.  
Need power density or reduce power consumption!

1. Lithium polymer (Li-Po) or lithium ion (Li-Ion) battery.
2. Lithium iron-phosphate ( $\text{LiFePO}_4$ ) battery.
3. Lead-acid with power optimizations.

# Restrictions

# #1


Tool Diameter

- Selected conveniently-dimensioned 12 V, 9 Ah (108 Wh) SLA battery.
- Replaced off-the-shelf camera with more integrated embedded camera, and separate optics (12.5 to 75 mm vari-focal lens).

No fire hazard while fulfilling ECR!

A lot of things just don't fit into a 5" tube.

Unfortunately, this includes many models of off-the-shelf rechargeable batteries.



# Restrictions

#1

Tool Diameter

Mezzanine here!

Power Management Daughterboard  
Handles battery management,  
charging, and power regulation.

Motherboard  
Carries embedded computer.  
Central hub for various sensing  
peripherals.

Not enough internal space for  
monolithic mainboard.

Motivates stacked design with  
daughterboard, connected to a  
motherboard through a board-to-board  
mezzanine connector.

# Restrictions

## #2

### No Tether

#### Question

How do you move the tool to overlook different parts of the reactor?


#### Answer

By using transfer arms (part of fuel management infrastructure).


Cannot use umbilical cable for power and data. Would get tangled while tool moves between transfer arms.

Motivates engineering requirement for **internal battery** and **wireless communications**.

Why IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi)?



Or just stick an antenna into the vessel and pick Wi-Fi, because it's the most ubiquitous and easiest to implement.







## Radiation

Counterintuitively not a problem.


1. High magnification optics, more separation distance.
2.  $D_2O$  provides inherent shielding.
3. Exposure not expected to affect tool, nor did it affect initial prototype.



## Contamination

Of significant concern.

1. Tool is partially submerged in  $D_2O$ .
2. Need to resist  $D_2O$  from entering tool.
3. Need to reduce cavities for  $D_2O$  to collect in, mostly contributed by blind holes for screws.



## Thermal

Of significant concern.

1. 21 to 38°C ambient  $D_2O$  temperature.
2. Tool generates waste heat, need heat capacity and dissipation.
3. Care to be taken around heat-sensitive components.



## Darkness

Needs addressing.

1. No lighting installed inside of reactor vessel.
2. Like with initial design, new design needs onboard lighting.
3. IR is not a solution.


# Conditions

Inside of a Reactor

## New Design



## Initial Design



Screw-on design removes volume for  $D_2O$  by eliminating the usage of fasteners.

O-rings used in both designs are made from the same fluoro-elastomer material for thermal and chemical resilience.



Contamination

Conditions  
Inside of a Reactor

Exposed Copper Pad for Heatsinks

Front

Thermal Vias



Wire-to-Board  
Interfaces for RTDs  
(External  
Temperature  
Sensors)

Absolute Pressure Sensor

Ambient Temperature Sensor

LED Driver IC


Darkness



Thermal

Conditions



Inside of a Reactor



# Controls



\* Mentioned in previous slides.






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(Brief Overview Of)  
**Software**



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# Future



# PAC Room Reorganization

Addressing Corrective Action Program Report 694

- For the Process Automation and Control (PAC) Room.
- Rearrange hardware by subsystem.
- Restructure power distribution.
- Meet standards for workspace clearances.
- Cable management and labeling.
- Implement controls against undocumented modifications.

Blatant stock photo.

It's a security issue if I publicly distribute images of the PAC room.  
Just imagine some CAT6 spaghetti for me, alright?

# Tritium Monitoring System Overhaul

Restoration of H-3 Monitoring at the NCNR

- Airborne tritium is a weak beta radiation source.
- Monitoring is of interest for the sake of ALARA.
- Overhaul seeks to resolve maintenance and operational issues.
- Engineering requirements being developed.
- Health Physics and Reactor Operations included in discussion.

Others




Sponsor and  
Supervisor  
Andrew Main

Inspection Tool  
Project Owner  
Sam MacDavid

PAC Room  
Project Owner  
James Whipple

Tritium Mon.  
Project Owner  
Sahar Rubin

SURF Directors  
Leland Harringer  
Susana Teixeira  
Julie Borchers  
Julie Keyser



CHNRS OUTREACH AND RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

SUPPORTED BY



David Hix  
Majd Zaker  
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Robert Newby  
Osman S. Celikten

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Don Lopez

Dagistan Sahin  
Jessie B. Burton  
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
David Griffin  
Jacob Seiter  
Keith A. Consani

*As a  
Montgomery  
College Alumni*  
| ♦ |  
Thank you to the NIST PREP  
program at MC for hosting me.

Susan Bontems  
Alla Webb  
Farnaz Eivazi

# Acknowledgements





*Bldg. 235, Rm. E114*  
*The Interns of Shark Tank!*

Questions?

**Static Structural**

Total Deformation




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Unit: in

Time: 1 s

Deformation Scale Factor: 90 (2x Auto)


10/30/2024 2:04 PM


**Ansys**  
2024 R2






CYLINDRICAL SUPPORT ON OUTER RING  
WHERE CONTACTING COVER BASE.

~60 PSI INTERNAL PRESSURE.  
O-RING COMPRESSION FORCE OF ~1011  
LBF.

NO HYDROSTATIC PRESSURE OR GRAVITY  
CONSIDERED.



Static Structural  
Total Deformation  
Type: Total Deformation  
Unit: m  
Time: 1 s  
Deformation Scale Factor: 4.2e+002 (Auto Scale)  
7/23/2025 1:18:54 PM



FULLY SUPPORTED. ASSUMES SURROUNDING COMPONENTS ARE RIGID.

~60 PSI INTERNAL PRESSURE.  
O-RING COMPRESSION FORCE OF ~369 LBF.

NO HYDROSTATIC PRESSURE OR GRAVITY CONSIDERED.