Observations on Static Analysis to Detect Security Weaknesses

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 Although we believe the material in this presentation to be accurate, everything should be treated as preliminary, not final.

- General Impressions
- Repeated patterns
- Definition of false alarm
- Summary of warnings
- Definition of "one weakness"

Our Impressions of Tools

- Tools mostly handled the code well not trivial for the size of test cases
- Very impressed by the sophisticated analysis and reporting capabilities of tools
- Tools are useful in the quality "plains"
 - If code is terrible, don't bother with tools educate your development and rewrite
 - For typical quality, tools can help
 - Tools only help in achieving the highest levels
- Not much overlap between tool reports

Analysis phase "misused" tools

- Tools help users answer the question
 - What code should be changed?
- We pose the harder question
 - Where are bugs, and what are they?
- SATE format limited information
- Many tools targeted toward general quality
 - not the same as security.

Suggestions

- Give more internal information, e.g., variable never < 0
- Use clearer weakness names
- Consistent severity (and other) ratings
- Postprocess reports to group them by location or type

Suggestions for CWE

- Clean up the most important weaknesses rather than working on them all
 - Consistent, meaningful names
 - Precise, even formal, definitions
- Add severity rating

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Repeated Patterns

- Because of coding habits, the same construct may be flagged many times.
 - Double Unlock vulnerability

```
while(1){
       pthread mutex lock(&buffer lock);
              ... other stuff ...
       pthread mutex unlock(&buffer lock);
              ... a lot of other stuff ...
}
```

Repeated Patterns

strncpy Does Not Null-Terminate

```
strncpy(variable, temp, sizeof(variable));
variable[sizeof(variable)-1]='\x0';
```

- Our definition of false alarm was vague
 - This bit of code is fine.
 - The warning is correct as phrased.
- By the way, manual review found an error

```
strncpy(input buffer, url, sizeof(input buffer)-1);
output buffer[sizeof(input buffer)-1]='\x0';
```

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Warnings by Severity

	Severity							
		1	2	3	4	5	AII	
Naim		299	155	227	660	407	1748	
Nagios		652	538	1958	1783	1529	6460	
Lighttpd		588	710	2032	403	153	3886	
OpenNN	IS	1140	1266	4342	5564	9248	21560	
MvnForu	ım	113	1129	1406	2244	3174	8066	
DSpace		381	384	2379	1386	1675	6205	
	AII	3173	4182	12344	12040	16186	47925	

Warnings by weakness type

		XSS	SQL inj.	Buffer	Info leak	Null ptr deref	Numeric error
Naim		0	0	624	4	128	155
Nagios		0	0	1684	766	94	559
Lighttpd		0	0	966	1092	293	243
OpenNN	IS	1748	179	0	180	1514	9
MvnForu	ım	471	483	0	174	108	4
DSpace		417	53	0	273	308	0
	All	2636	715	3274	2489	2445	970

Severity 1,2 Warnings Evaluated

		Warnings	Reduced to	ТР	FP
Naim		454	180	52	90
Nagio	S	1190	291	37	205
Lightt	pd	1298	383	13	325
Openi	NMS	2406	2180	160	295
MvnFd	orum	1242	329	264	49
DSpac	е	765	366	115	209
	All	7355	3729	688	1198

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15

Need Better Def'n of Duplicate

- Goal: group warnings that refer to the same weakness
 - To unify warnings from different tools
 - … or warnings from the same tool
- Same sink?
- Same source?
- Same path?
- Mitigation location(s)?
 So what is "the same weakness"??

What is "the same weakness"?

```
schedule service check(...){
1462
        for(temp event=event list low;temp event!=NULL;temp event=temp event->next){
        remove event(temp event, & event list low);
        free(temp event);
        reschedule event(new event, & event list low);
    schedule host check(...){
2603
        for(temp event=event list low;temp event!=NULL;temp event=temp event->next)
{
        remove event(temp event, & event list low);
        free(temp event);
        reschedule event(new event, & event list low);
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```

2 sources, 2 sinks, 4 paths How many weaknesses?

```
2603
        for(temp event=event list low; temp event!=NULL; temp event=temp event->next) {
        remove event(temp event, & event list low);
        free(temp event);
        reschedule event(new event, & event list low);
    reschedule event(...,timed event **event list){
        add event(event, event list);
    add event(...,timed event **event list){
        first event=*event list;
        else if(event->run time < first event->run time){// 43523 43525
 808
        else{
            temp event=*event list;
            while(temp event!=NULL){
                 if(temp event->next==NULL){// 43522 43524
 819
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                                                                                   18
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```