

How AFIS Selection Was Performed for IAFIS: History and Lessons Learned

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Pre IAFIS Concerns

- **IDAS ten-print matching was poor (TAR of about 90%, system FAR of about 10^{-2} for database of 30M versus current system FAR of better than 10^{-9} for a database of 42M)**
- **Fingerprint pattern classification was very manually intensive**
- **Latent matching performance was very poor & very slow**
- **Database and workload sizes greater than any existing AFIS**
- **Database updates were very inefficient**
 - **Data was binned**
 - **Binning required periodic reloads of the entire database**
- **The databases in existing AFISs were overwhelmed, not able to scale (to differing extents), processing was frequently unbalanced**

Background

- **AFIS source selection started c. 1994**
- **Need to replace IDAS**
 - Heavy reliance on soft biometrics
 - Minimal latent search capability
 - Manual pattern and sub-pattern classification (Extended Henry set)
- **Requirements published early; industry and LEAs comments incorporated into RFP**
- **Two stage procurement RFP**
 - **Basic Demonstration Model (BDM) - three vendors to be funded to demonstrate critical technology and risk mitigation**
 - **Final down-select – one vendor to build complete system**

Maximizing competition

- The first stage – BDM required written proposals and orals
- Five teams competed:
 - TRW/Cogent/ *note that TRW/Cogent had recently won the UK's NAFIS contract*
 - Martin Marietta Data Systems/SAGEM Morpho
 - UNISYS/NEC
 - Westinghouse/Printrak
 - Calspan [*note that Calspan had built a significant portion of the previous FBI fingerprint identification system*]
- BDM winners were:
 - TRW /Cogent
 - Martin Marietta/SAGEM Morpho/Calspan (later Lockheed Martin team)
 - UNISYS/NEC
- In all cases, the system integrators were the dominant partners
- All BDM participants were required to revise their proposals incorporating BDM results

Basic Demonstration Model (BDM)

- The FBI funded each team in the amount of about \$12M and required each to build and test a BDM to demonstrate “critical technologies”
 - Algorithms
 - Database loading/updating
- Each team was provided Development Data Sets (DDS) for testing
- DDS contained 120,000 subjects (here, subject = 10-print sets of electronic images scanned from a standard paper ten-print card), and about 100 mated subjects
- The BDM needed a “Quick & Dirty” latent workstation that allowed manual feature encoding and searching
- Each team was required to build a System Architecture simulation model
- Each team given 18 month to demonstrate critical technologies

The BDM Test

- **Government produced test data for use on the BDM systems**
- **BDM Data Set was tightly controlled by Government**
 - Two day load under Government supervision
 - Supervised scrub following BDM
- **The BDM Data set contained a 600k subjects to be used as the gallery**
 - 500k randomly selected ten-print records (scanned paper cards) (“horizontal slice”)
 - 100k subjects with similar fingerprints (“vertical slice”) to measure conversion/extraction/loading into database (see Database issues below):
 - 26k arches
 - 74k small count loops (which are difficult to differentiate from arches)
- **BDM testing lasted ten days under continuous Government supervision**

The BDM Test (continued)

- **The search (probe data) included:**
 - **A ten-print search set of 3,200 subjects**
 - **About 1800 had mates in the background database**
 - **Over 200 had more than one mate in the background database (several had up to 12 mates in the background)**
 - **A latent search set of 300 subjects**
 - **All latents had mates in the background database**
 - **Broadly divided into Good, Bad, and Ugly categories**
- **The DDS was not used in any of the Government tests so as to avoid training issues or potential gaming by the offerors**

Nature of the latent matching problem

- **Latent fingerprint quality extremely variable**
 - No common standard
 - Latent performance numbers “hyped” by vendors, users
- **Development of so called “AFIS searchable quality” (pre-IAFIS) concept – classic case of cooking the data**
 - At time of print collection
 - At time of search submission
- **Unavailability of sufficient test data (latent prints) makes computation of performance metrics very difficult**
- **Effective “miss analysis” is very difficult – ground truth problem**
- **Difficulty in obtaining data because of legal (evidentiary) and privacy concerns**

Testing the Latent Matching Capability

- **300 latents were used to test the latent end-to-end performance**
 - 3 teams of 3 latent examiners encoded each of the 300 latents on each of the 3 BDM systems (2700 encodings)
 - The latent examiners were hired and trained by the vendor
 - Latent performance varied considerably
- **30 latents and 30 rolled mates were manually encoded to obtain minutia ground truth by a team of FBI examiners**
 - Analysis provided insight into algorithm performance
 - Minutia extraction accuracy
- **BDM tests showed that vendors performance in encoding accuracy did not mirror their performance in matching accuracy***
 - Testing process provided a basis for evaluating minutia extraction algorithms
 - Provided basis for conclusion that matchers could be improved
 - Used for subsequent algorithm improvement


* Interestingly, MINEX Report ,March 6, 2006 shows this is still true

Subjective Quality Definitions

Quality/ Characteristic	Good	Bad	Ugly
Ridge structure	Well defined	Some fragmentation, but most minutia relationships discernable	Highly fragmented, minutia relationships difficult to discern
Fingerprint image area discontinuities	Well defined	Some parts of print area is missing or blotchy, but core area is visible	Print image not well defined for much of print or core area poorly defined
Fingerprint likely to overlap rolled fingerprint	Print captures most of the core area	Part of the core area is present in the print	Core area is missing or is undefined

Distribution Varies by Agency

- FBI is often the processor of last resort – the latents sent to the FBI are the ones not matched by the States



BDM Lessons Learned

- All 3 AFIS vendors dramatically improved their products because of the BDM,
- The test demonstrated good automated fingerprint classifications, for all bidders
- Excellent ten-print search performance (accuracy and response)
- Binning problems were resolved by all vendors
- Latent search performance did not meet expectations
 - Better understanding of the latent search issues
 - All vendors proposed latent performance improvement plans

Post BDM Latent analysis

- **Second stage of the AFIS development was won by the Lockheed Martin Team**
- **Government took active part in system development**
 - Design oversight
 - Algorithm testing
- **Development of the Latent Ground Truth test data set**
 - At least 3 latent examiners encoded each of the 300 latents and their corresponding ten-prints (gallery)
 - A comparison tool developed to find encoding differences between the latents and the gallery set for each examiner's encoding
 - Differences resolved using group approach
- **Process repeated showing only minutia visible on the latent and the file print – Ideal Latent Test Data Set**
- **Ground truth data was used for testing algorithm development**
- **The set now has 265 mated subjects and is also known as NIST Special Database 27**

Development of Latent Analysis Tools and Strategies

- **Tools to measure minutia extraction accuracy**
- **A method for estimating latent search performance for a fully populated database**
- **Strategies to limit gallery size (search space) using soft biometrics**
- **Evaluating latent quality impact on matcher performance**

How and why we measured minutia extraction accuracy

- **Developed and used comparison tool to find differences between automatically extracted minutia and ground truth minutia**
 - % true minutia recovered
 - % false minutia produced
- **Following minutia extraction algorithm modifications (and parameter adjustments) tested impact of feature extraction performance on matcher performance**
- **Optimized feature extraction algorithm performance as part of the end-to-end search process**
- **Identified problem areas and tested potential solutions**
 - High curvature areas
 - Exaggerated impact of false minutia


How to estimate performance for a fully populated database?

- **Used various size databases to test impact on performance as a function of gallery size**
 - 33k
 - 300K
 - 3M
- **Validated Rae Moore's Laws**
 - If the latent is going to be found it is likely to be in the top rank about 80% of the time
 - The system FAR (selectivity) is a linear function of the database size for all large databases
- **Able to use small test database for rapid algorithm improvement**


How and why we limited gallery size (search space)

- Using a simulation Model we found that searching 1,000 latents per day would require about 3 times the computing resources as processing 45,000 ten-print searches
- Decision was made to use all available physical descriptors to limit latent searches so that no more than 25% of gallery would be searched
- For high priority searches, full gallery would be searched with administrator permission
- Descriptors included:
 - Finger number (or range of finger numbers)
 - Other descriptors of suspect (sex, race, approximate age, etc)
- Average search space was found to be about 11-14%

How to measure latent quality impact on matcher performance?



Lessons Learned - Latent Reliability (single finger)*



*Fully populated database and using latents with quality similar to BDM set

Additional findings for latent reliability improvements

- **Use of multiple latent impressions and multiple fingers shows great promise**
 - 2 finger search reliability could exceed 75%
 - Multiple impressions for same case can use search result fusion to increase performance
- **Top 1000 candidate reliability is potentially over 70%**
 - Suggests use of automated candidate elimination algorithms
- **Greater ten-print area and more minutia improve performance**
- **Better feature extraction algorithm**
- **Better matching algorithms**