

The ISO/IEC 30107-3 standard for testing of Presentation Attack Detection

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
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Presentation Attack Detection


Outline

- Introduction to International Standardisation on PAD
- ISO/IEC 30107
- Application areas

Biometric Standardisation



First Generation Format Standards



The 19794-Family: Biometric data interchange formats


Presentation Attack Detection

ISO/IEC 30107 - Overview and Part 1

System Perspective - Framework

ISO/IEC 30107-1:2016 Presentation Attack Detection

- Attacks on Biometric Systems



Source: ISO/IEC 30107-1
Inspired by N.K. Ratha, J.H. Connell, R.M. Bolle, "Enhancing security and privacy in biometrics-based authentication systems," IBM Systems Journal, Vol 40, NO 3, 2001.

Presentation Attack Detection

ISO/IEC 30107 - **Scope**

- terms and definitions that are useful in the specification, characterization and evaluation of presentation attack detection methods;
- a common data format for conveying the type of approach used and the assessment of presentation attack in data formats;
- principles and methods for performance assessment of presentation attack detection algorithms or mechanisms; and
- a classification of known attacks types (in an informative annex).


Outside the scope are

- standardization of specific PAD detection methods;
- detailed information about countermeasures (i.e. anti-spoofing techniques), algorithms, or sensors;
- overall system-level security or vulnerability assessment.

Presentation Attack Detection - Framework

ISO/IEC IS 30107-1 Standard

- **now available** in the ISO-Portal
<https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#!iso:std:53227:en>
- SC37 has initiated to make this standard freely available



Online Browsing Platform (OBP)

ISO

Search ISO/IEC 30107-1:2016(en) x

ISO/IEC 30107-1:2016(en) Information technology — Biometric presentation attack detection — Part 1: Framework

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Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1.

The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for the different types of document should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).

Presentation Attack Detection

Definitions in ISO/IEC 30107 PAD - Part 1: Framework



- **presentation attack**

*presentation to the biometric capture subsystem with the goal of **interfering** with the operation of the biometric system*

- **presentation attack detection (PAD)**

*automated **determination of** a presentation **attack***

Definitions in ISO/IEC 2382-37: Vocabulary

<http://www.christoph-busch.de/standards.html>

- **impostor**

*subversive biometric capture subject who attempts to being matched to **someone else's** biometric reference*

- **identity concealer**

*subversive biometric capture subject who attempts to **avoid being matched** to their own biometric reference*

Presentation Attack Detection

ISO/IEC 30107 - Definitions


- **presentation attack instrument (PAI)**
*biometric characteristic or **object used** in a presentation attack*
- **artefact**
*artificial object or representation presenting a **copy** of biometric characteristics or synthetic biometric patterns*

Types of presentation attacks

(General Noun)

(Adjectives describing categories)

(Qualifying adjectives)



Source: ISO/IEC 30107-1

Presentation Attack Detection


ISO/IEC 30107-1: Examples of Artificial and Human Presentation Attack Instruments

Artificial	<i>Complete</i>	gummy finger, video of face
	<i>Partial</i>	glue on finger, sunglasses, artificial/patterned contact lens
Human	<i>Lifeless</i>	cadaver part, severed finger/hand
	<i>Altered</i>	mutilation, surgical switching of fingerprints between hands and/or toes
	<i>Non-Conformant</i>	facial expression/extreme, tip or side of finger
	<i>Coerced¹</i>	unconscious, under duress
	<i>Conformant</i>	zero effort impostor attempt

Source: ISO/IEC 30107-1

Presentation Attack Detection

Biometric framework with PAD



Source: ISO/IEC 30107-1

Presentation Attack Detection

ISO/IEC 30107 - Part 3

Presentation Attack Detection - Metrics

ISO/IEC CD 30107-3

- available as draft

<http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objId=17578675&objAction=Open&viewType=1>



ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37 **N 6364**

ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37

Biometrics

Secretariat: ANSI (United States)

Document type:	Text for CD ballot or comment
Title:	Text of 2nd CD 30107-3, Information technology – Biometric presentation attack detection — Part 3: Testing and reporting
Status:	As per Martigny resolution 3.6, this document is being circulated for a 2nd CD Ballot. Please submit your vote via the online balloting system.
Date of document:	2016-02-29
Source:	Project Editor
Expected action:	VOTE
Action due date:	2016-05-01

Presentation Attack Detection - Testing


Definition of PAD metrics in ISO/IEC 30107-3

- Testing the full system:
- **Attack presentation match rate (APMR)**
*in a **full-system** evaluation of a verification system, the proportion of presentation attacks in which the **target reference** is **matched***
- **Attack presentation non-match rate (APNMR)**
in a full-system evaluation of a verification system, the proportion of presentation attacks in which the target reference is not matched.

Source: ISO/IEC 30107-3

Source: ISO/IEC 30107-3

Image Source: K. Raja, R. Raghavendra, C. Busch: "Video Presentation Attack Detection in Visible Spectrum Iris Recognition Using Magnified Phase Information", in IEEE TIFS, June 2015



Presentation Attack Detection - Testing

Definition of PAD metrics in ISO/IEC 30107-3

- Testing the PAD subsystem:
- **Attack presentation non-response rate (APNRR)**
*proportion of presentation attacks that cause **no response** at the PAD subsystem or data capture subsystem*
- **Bona Fide presentation non-response rate (BPNRR)**
proportion of bona fide presentations that cause no response at the PAD subsystem or data capture subsystem
 - ▶ *NOTE An example of a non-response is a data capture subsystem “time out” if a presentation is not registered within a certain amount of time.*

Source: ISO/IEC 30107-3

Presentation Attack Detection - Testing

Definition of PAD metrics in ISO/IEC 30107-3

- Testing the PAD subsystem:
- **Attack presentation classification error rate (APCER)**
*proportion of **attack presentations** incorrectly **classified as Bona Fide presentations** at the component level in a specific scenario*
- **Bona Fide presentation classification error rate (BPCER)**
proportion of Bona Fide presentations incorrectly classified as attack presentations at the component level in a specific scenario

Source: ISO/IEC 30107-3

Presentation Attack Detection - Testing

Definition of PAD metrics in ISO/IEC 30107-3

- Testing the PAD subsystem:
- **PAI species**
class of presentation attack instruments created using a common production method and based on different biometric characteristic
- **Attack potential**
measure of the effort to be expended in attacking a TOE, expressed in terms of an attacker's expertise, resources and motivation
- **target of evaluation (TOE)**
within Common Criteria, the product or system that is the subject of the evaluation

Source: ISO/IEC 30107-3

Presentation Attack Detection - Testing

Definition of PAD metrics in ISO/IEC 30107-3

- Testing the PAD subsystem:
- **Attack presentation classification error rate (APCER)**
*proportion of **attack presentations** incorrectly **classified as Bona Fide presentations** at the component level in a specific scenario*

$$APCER_{PAIS} = \frac{1}{N_{PAIS}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{PAIS}} (1 - Res_i)$$

Source: ISO/IEC 30107-3

- N_{PAIS} is the number of attack presentations for the given PAI species
- Res_i takes value 1 if the i^{th} presentation is classified as an attack presentation, and value 0 if classified as a bona fide presentation

Presentation Attack Detection - Testing

Definition of PAD metrics in ISO/IEC 30107-3

- Testing the PAD subsystem with different species:
- **Attack presentation classification error rate (APCER)**
*the **highest** APCER (i.e. that of the **most successful PAI**) should be used as follows:*

$$APCER_{at\ attack\ potential\ AP} = \max_{PAIS \in \mathcal{A}_{AP}} (APCER_{PAIS})$$

Source: ISO/IEC 30107-3

Where \mathcal{A}_{AP} is a subset of PAI species with attack potential at or below $AP.s$

Presentation Attack Detection - Testing

Definition of PAD metrics in ISO/IEC 30107-3

- Testing the PAD subsystem with different species:
- **Bona Fide presentation classification error rate (BPCER)**
BPCER shall be calculated as follows:

$$BPCER = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_{BF}} RES_i}{N_{BF}}$$

Source: ISO/IEC 30107-3

- N_{BF} is the number of bona fide presentations
- Res_i takes value 1 if the i^{th} presentation is classified as an attack presentation, and value 0 if classified as a bona fide presentation

Presentation Attack Detection

Application area - Mobile Biometric Transactions

PAD-Standard and FIDO

FIDO - on 9th September 2015

What about rubber fingers?

- Protection methods in FIDO
 1. Attacker needs access to the Authenticator and have swipe rubber finger on it. This makes it a non-scalable attack.
 2. Authenticators might implement presentation attack detection methods.

Remember:

Creating hundreds of millions of rubber fingers + stealing the related authenticators is expensive.
Stealing hundreds of millions of passwords from a server is not.

Presentation Attack Detection

Application area - Identity Concealer

Altered Fingerprint Detection - Testing

Example for fingerprint alterations

- Z-shaped alteration (Finger of Jose Izquierdo, 1997)



Image Source: S. Yoon, J. Feng, and A. Jain, "Altered fingerprints: Analysis and detection,"
IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 451–464, Mar. 2012

Altered Fingerprint Detection - Testing

Example for fingerprint alterations

- Left middle finger of Gus Winkler
(Bank robber in the 1930s)



Image Source: H. Cummins, "Attempts to alter and obliterate finger-prints,"
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, vol. 25, pp. 982–991, May 1935.

Altered Fingerprint Detection - Algorithms

- Feature: OFA and DOFTS
- Orientation Field Analysis (OFA)
 - Altered areas cause discontinuities in the OF [YoonJain2012]
- Differentials of Orientation Fields by Tensors in Scale (DOFTS)
 - ▶ Complex valued structure tensor [MikBig2014]




BonaFide fingerprint



Error map



Altered fingerprint



Error map

[YoonJain2012] S. Yoon, J. Feng, and A. Jain, "Altered fingerprints: Analysis and detection," IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, vol. 34, no. 3, Mar. 2012


[MikBig2014] A. Mikaelyan and J. Bigun, "Symmetry assessment by finite expansion: application to forensic fingerprints," in Proc. BIOSIG, Darmstadt, Germany, pp. 75–86. , (2014)

Altered Fingerprint Detection - Algorithms

- Feature: SPDA
- Singular Point Density Analysis [Ellingsg2014]
- using the Poincare' index to detect noisy friction ridge areas



BonaFide fingerprint



altered fingerprint




Poincare' index response

[Ellingsg2014] J. Ellingsgaard, C. Sousedik, and C. Busch, "Detecting fingerprint alterations by orientation field and minutiae orientation analysis," in Proc. IWBF, Valletta, Malta, (2014)

Altered Fingerprint Detection - Algorithms

- Feature: HIG
 - ▶ Histograms of invariant gradients [Gottschl2014]



[Gottschl2014] C. Gottschlich, E. Marasco, A. Yang, and B. Cukic, “Fingerprint liveness detection based on histograms of invariant gradients,” in Proc. IJCB, Clearwater, USA, pp. 1–7. , (2014)

Altered Fingerprint Detection - Algorithms


- Feature: MDA
- Minutiae Distribution Analysis [YoonJain2012]



Altered fingerprint



minutia distribution



density map


[YoonJain2012] S. Yoon, J. Feng, and A. Jain, "Altered fingerprints: Analysis and detection," IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, vol. 34, no. 3, Mar. 2012

Altered Fingerprint Detection - Algorithms


- Feature: MOA
- Minutiae Orientation Analysis [Ellingsg2014]



Altered fingerprint



minutia distribution




density map

[Ellingsg2014] J. Ellingsgaard, C. Sousedik, and C. Busch, “Detecting fingerprint alterations by orientation field and minutiae orientation analysis,” in Proc. IWBF, Valletta, Malta, (2014)

Altered Fingerprint Detection - Algorithms

- Feature: MH
- Minutiae Histograms by [GottHuck2014]
 - ▶ Distance bins are displayed from top to bottom, directional difference bins from left to right.
 - ▶ A high brightness value corresponds to a high number of occurrences in a bin.



[GottHuck2014] C. Gottschlich and S. Huckemann, "Separating the real from the synthetic: Minutiae histograms as fingerprints of fingerprints," IET Biometrics, vol. 3, no. 4, (2014)

Altered Fingerprint Detection - Algorithms

- Feature: COH
 - ▶ Coherence Measure to what degree gradients share a similar orientation. [Gottschl2012]



normal/unaltered fingerprint



altered fingerprint

[Gottschl2012] C. Gottschlich and C.-B. Schönlieb, “Oriented diffusion filtering for enhancing low-quality fingerprint images,” IET Biometrics, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 105–113, (2012)

Altered Fingerprint Detection - Testing

Database

- Dataset of Ellingsgaard et al. [Ellingsg2014]
 - ▶ Size: 116 altered fingerprints and 180 unaltered fingerprints
 - ▶ This data is **not of sufficient size** !
- Sources:
 - ▶ subset of GUC-100 (NTNU)
 - ▶ subset of Samischenko (Book)
 - ▶ subset of Brno (collection of fingerprints with dermatological diseases)
 - ▶ subset of NIST Special Database 14

[Ellingsg2014] J. Ellingsgaard, C. Sousedik, and C. Busch, “Detecting fingerprint alterations by orientation field and minutiae orientation analysis,” in Proc. IWBF, Valletta, Malta, (2014)

Altered Fingerprint Detection - Testing

Training and test protocol

- Cross-validation
 - ▶ Dataset randomly divided into training and test set 100 times
- Training set size:
 - ▶ 80 altered and 80 unaltered fingerprints
- Test set size:
 - ▶ 36 altered and 100 unaltered fingerprints

[Gotts2015] C. Gottschlich, A. Mikaelyan, M. Olsen, J. Bigun, C. Busch: „Improving Fingerprint Alteration Detection", in 9th International Symposium on Image and Signal Processing and Analysis (ISPA 2015), Zagreb, (2015)


Altered Fingerprint Detection - Testing

Alteration Score

- Feature vector dimensions:
 - ▶ DOFTS = 189, COH = 189, HIG = 180, MH = 100
- Training sets and test set
 - ▶ Class labels:
 - 0 for normal, unaltered fingerprints
 - 1 for altered fingerprints
- Support Vector Machine
 - ▶ LIBSVM with linear kernel
 - ▶ Regression with values between 0 and 1 (alteration score)

Altered Fingerprint Detection - Testing

Results [Gottsch2015]



MDA = Minutia Distribution Analysis, SPDA = Singular Point Density Analysis, MOA = Minutia Orientation Analysis, OFA = Orientation Field Analysis, MH = Minutiae Histograms, HIG = Histograms of Invariant Gradients, COH = coherence, DOFTS = Differentials of Orientation Fields by Tensors in Scale,

Altered Fingerprint Detection - Testing

Conclusions

- We (biometrics community) need:
 - ▶ More research on fingerprint alteration
 - ▶ **Larger databases**
 - ▶ Publicly available datasets
- Aspects for future work:
 - ▶ Combination of multiple features
 - ▶ High speed and high accuracy (e.g. for border control)

Further Reading

References

- [ISO/IEC] ISO/IEC Standards
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_tc_browse.htm?commid=313770&published=on
- [YoonJain2012] S. Yoon, J. Feng, and A. Jain, “Altered fingerprints: Analysis and detection,” IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, vol. 34, no. 3, (2012)
- [MikBig2014] A. Mikaelyan and J. Bigun, “Symmetry assessment by finite expansion: application to forensic fingerprints,” in Proc. BIOSIG, Darmstadt, Germany, pp. 75–86. , (2014)
- [Ellingsg2014] J. Ellingsgaard, C. Sousedik, and C. Busch, “Detecting fingerprint alterations by orientation field and minutiae orientation analysis,” in Proc. IWBF, Valletta, Malta, (2014)
- [Gottsch2015] C. Gottschlich, A. Mikaelyan, M. Olsen, J. Bigun, C. Busch: „Improving Fingerprint Alteration Detection“, in 9th International Symposium on Image and Signal Processing and Analysis (ISPA 2015), Zagreb, (2015)

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