

# **Economic Security Mission Center**



**Space: Conflict and Consequences** 





# **Agenda**

- Geopolitics: Russia-Ukraine Conflict
  - Cyber Attacks
  - Electronic Attacks
  - Implications
- Other Geopolitical Actors
- Enduring Threats
  - Cybersecurity
  - Insider Threats
  - Physical Security
  - Supply Chain
- Mitigation: Cybersecurity Best Practices and Resources



# **Russia/Ukraine**

### **Not Deployed:**

- Kinetic Antisatellite (ASAT) Weapons
- Cyber attack on Space Segment

### **Deployed:**

- Cyberattacks
- Electronic attacks
- Sanctions/Countersanctions



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**Space** 



# **Space System Attack Vectors**

### **Segments Vulnerable to Cyberattack**

- Ground
- Space
- Link

### **Vulnerable Owners/Operators:**

- Government
- Military
- Commercial

# **Russia/Ukraine Conflict:**

- Ground
- Link





Ground



### Russia/Ukraine: What We Have Seen

- Cyber Attacks
  - Targeted Ground Segment
  - Space-based assets not targeted
  - Damaging Spillover Effects outside of conflict zone
- Electronic Attacks
  - Targeted Link Segment
  - Signal Spoofing
  - Signal Jamming
  - Damaging Spillover Effects outside of conflict zone



### **Cyber Attack**

### **Cyberattack in Conflict Zone:**

- Spillover effects reaching as far as Morocco
  - 27,000 customers Impacted
- Energy infrastructure sector impacted
  - Long-lasting
  - Open to follow-on attack by different malicious cyber actors
- Potential Damage:
  - Reputational (company and sector)
  - Financial (company)
  - Economic (sector)





### **Electronic Attack**

#### **Electronic Attack In Conflict Zone:**

- Signal Spoofing
- Signal Jamming

### **Spillover effects in Europe and Israel**

- Transportation Sector (aviation)
- Communications Sector (provider)

#### **Aviation industry impacted**

- Planes grounded up to a week
- Planes diverted mid-air

#### **Communication sector impacted**

- Company redirected resources
- Potential delays to other business projects





# **Sanctions/Countersanctions**

### **Space enterprise is interconnected**

- March 2021: Russia Launched 38 spacecraft from 18 different countries on a single Soyuz rocket
- March 2022: Russia is isolated, due to sanctions and its reaction to them.

### **Impacts:**

- ExoMars Rover Research Mission Postponed
- OneWeb launch canceled; forced to find alternate launch provider
- Rocket engine delivery to US Defense Contractors and others canceled
- Delayed launches of the following:
  - One reconnaissance satellite
  - Four Galileo PNT satellites
  - Multiple scientific research satellites



### **Future Conflict**

**Current conflict does not guarantee similar outcomes in future conflict.** 

Different actors have different calculus.

Different actors have different counterspace/cyberspace capabilities:

• China: Kinetic + Cyber

North Korea: Jamming/Spoofing + Cyber

Iran: Cyber



# **Enduring Threats**

- Not exclusive to space industry
- Not limited to nation-states
  - Cyber criminal groups
  - Insider Threats
  - Lone wolves
- Can take the following forms:
  - Weak cybersecurity practices
  - Insider threats
  - Lax Physical Security
  - Supply Chain Vulnerabilities



### **Cybersecurity**

- Imperative to have strong cybersecurity at every stage of space system/space asset development and deployment.
- Malware, ransomware, denial of service: some common types that have affected aerospace/defense sector.
- Reversible and irreversible cyberattacks.
- Insider threats and lax physical security can have a compounding effect on cyberattacks.
- Jurisdictional issues impact cybersecurity and can create additional cybersecurity vulnerability.



# **Supply Chain**

- Many organizations involved in development and deployment of space system/asset.
- Shared components/vendors
- Increases cyber vulnerability





# **Resources for Mitigation**



