Canada Border Services Agency Agence des services frontaliers du Canada

Calibrated (Probabilistic) Confidence Scoring for Biometric Identification

Goal: from scores to probabilities

$(0, .5, .5) \quad \rightarrow \quad (80\%, 10\%, 10\%)$

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CBSA - a prime user of <u>Iris</u> biometrics

<u>Why iris ? – Easily accepted by public, touch-less / non-intrusive</u>

<u>Today</u>: for collaborative user-engaged identification of pre-approved travellers in structured/overt environment (NEXUS)

<u>Tomorrow</u>: for fully-automated stand-off (on-the-fly) identification of Good and Bad people as they cross the border ?(3 persons crossing / sec)

Recent RFI examination (Feb 2009-Aug 2009) <u>exposed the problems</u> even with Today's systems/data

With Tomorrow's stand-off systems, <u>these problems will be even more significant</u>!

Gorodnichy, D. O. *"Evolution and evaluation of biometric systems"* IEEE Symposium: Computational Intelligence for Security and Defence Applications, Ottawa June 2009

Gorodnichy, D. O. *"Multi-order analysis framework for comprehensive biometric performance evaluation",* SPIE Conf. on Defense, Security, and Sensing. Orlando, April 2010

Problems exposed through RFI

(With over 20.000.000 CBSA iris data, several state-of-art products, and over 6 months of coding and collecting/analyzing results)

1. There exist many (>5) matching algorithms now

   - All produce single scores output only (no confidence)!

   - Binomial nature of Imposter distributions

   - Binomial nature of Genuine distribution ? - with no noise

2. High FNMR (False Rejects, False Non-Match Rate)

3. High FTA (Failure To Acquire)

4. Despite many vendor/publications claims, systems often have :
   1) more than one match below the threshold,
   2) two or more close matching scores

   There is a need therefore to assign *Confidence value to output*!

Anonymized score distributions

Anonymized stats

Using Multi-order score analysis [Gor09,10], Order 3 have shown that:

Many systems may improve FTA, FNMR, DET (match/non-match tradeoff) at the cost of allowing more than one score below a threshold


(With 500 enrolled travelers, each having 6 passage images)

Trade-off Curves with FCR

DEFINITION [Gor10]: **Failure of Confidence Rate (FCR)** –
the rate of incidences in which there are more than one
match below threshold

Goal: assign confidences to decisions

<u>Given</u>: Person X arrives at the kiosk and produces n scores:
n-tuple $S = (s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_n)$, $s_i = HD(X, x_i)$

<u>Find</u>: Sequence of calibrated confidence scores:
the probability vector $C = (c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_n)$, $c_i = P(\{X = x_i\} \mid S)$

<u>How</u>: as in probabilistic weather forecasting [DeGroot1983]
1. Make use of (assume) binomial nature of Genuine and Imposter score distributions [Daugman1993,2004]:

- $G \sim Binom(m', u')$, with $u' = 0.11$, $d' = 0.065$ ($m' = \sim115$).

- $I \sim Binom(m, u)$, with $u = 0.5$, $m = 249$ ($d = \sim0.03$)

- $P(HD = k/m) = (k, m)\, u^k\, (1-u)^{(m-k)}$

2. Bayes's Theorem for $c_i = P(\{X = x_i\} \mid S) =$

$= P(\{X = x_i\} \wedge S) = P(\{X = x_i\} \wedge S) / P(S) = \ldots$

3. $P(\{X = x_i\} \wedge S) = \ldots$

Simple example to illustrate

Enrolled: three individuals {x1, x2, x3}, six bits in iris string.

- Thus, n = 3, m = m' = 6.

- G = Binom(m', u'), I = Binom(m, u) with u' = 1/3 and u = 1/2 .

- x1 = [0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1], x2 = [1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1], x3 = [1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1]

New person: X = [0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1].

- Matching scores S = (0, 0.5, 0.5). Decision scores: (1, 0, 0).

Using the theorem (for q=0 and P1=P2=P3), we obtain:

- confidence scores C = (0.8, 0.1, 0.1).

How to apply to real system?

➢ Vendor should provide: m', u' m, u

➢ User knows: Pi, q (a-priory probabilities of each person / imposter)

Proposed probabilistic score calibration can be added to any system at little computation cost as post-processing filter:

➢ Provides more meaningful output - for risk mitigating procedures

➢ Improves overall recognition

➢ Introduces Order-3 biometric systems

EER = 5.40% → 2.84%

DETAUC (area under the DET) → 0.17

Appendices

Iris biometrics

> Image converted to 2048 binary digits {0,1}

- only small subsets of bits are mutually independent [1].

> Impostor HD scores follow binomial distribution:
I ~ Binom(m, u),
m = 249 and u = 0.5.

> The variable m represents the degrees-of-freedom and is a function of the mean u and the standard deviation d:
m = u(1 − u) / d^2

G3-1000 Normalized Score Distribution

> Genuine HD scores [2]:
G ~ Binom(m', u') with
u' = 0.11, d' = 0.065

Main theorem and proof:

Theorem 3.1 *Let G be the set of genuine matching scores, and I be the set of impostor matching scores. Suppose $G \sim Binom(\hat{m}, \hat{u})$ and $I \sim Binom(m, u)$. Let $p_i = P(X = x_i)$ and $q = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i$. Let $S = (s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_n)$ be the n-tuple of matching scores produced by person X. Then for each $1 \leq i \leq n$, we have*

$$c_i = P(X = x_i \mid S) = \frac{p_i z_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i z_i + q \cdot \frac{(1-u)^m}{(1-\hat{u})^{\hat{m}}}}, \quad \text{where } z_i = \frac{\binom{\hat{m}}{\hat{m}s_i}}{\binom{m}{ms_i}} \cdot \left(\frac{\hat{u}^{\hat{m}}(1-u)^m}{u^m(1-\hat{u})^{\hat{m}}} \right)^{s_i}.$$

Proof: For each $1 \leq i \leq n$, define $r_i = P(\{X = x_i\} \wedge S)$. Also define $r_{imp} = P(\{X \notin \{x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n\}\} \wedge S)$.

By definition, $r_{imp} = P(S) - \sum_{i=1}^{n} r_i$. By Bayes' Theorem, we have

$$c_i = P(\{X = x_i\} \mid S) = \frac{P(\{X = x_i\} \wedge S)}{P(S)} = \frac{r_i}{r_1 + r_2 + \ldots + r_n + r_{imp}}.$$

To calculate $r_i = P(\{X = x_i\} \wedge S)$, we multiply the probabilities of the following $n + 1$ independent events: it is x_i who comes to the kiosk; the genuine matching score $HD(X, x_i)$ is s_i; and the impostor matching score $HD(X, x_j)$ is s_j for all $1 \leq j \leq n$ with $j \neq i$.

Since $G \sim Binom(\hat{m}, \hat{u})$, there are $\hat{m}$ degrees-of-freedom, and the probability that any of these $\hat{m}$ bits differ is $\hat{u}$. So if $HD(X, x_i) = s_i$, then $\hat{m}s_i$ of the $\hat{m}$ bits differ. We derive the analogous result for the impostor distribution $I \sim Binom(m, u)$, for all $1 \leq j \leq n$ with $j \neq i$. Therefore, we have

$$r_i = p_i \binom{\hat{m}}{\hat{m}s_i} \hat{u}^{\hat{m}s_i} (1-\hat{u})^{\hat{m}-\hat{m}s_i} \cdot \prod_{j=1, j\neq i}^{n} \binom{m}{ms_j} u^{ms_j} (1-u)^{m-ms_j}$$

Details of our simple example

Because m = m' = 6, and u = 1-u=1/2, 2*u'=1-u'=2/3 many things get cancelled out …

Zi (Si) = (6, 6*Si) / (6, 6*Si) * ((1/3 ^ 6 * 1/2 ^6) / (1/2 ^ 6 * 2/3 ^ 6)) ^ Si   =   (1/2^6)^Si = (1/2)^(6*Si)

For S2 = S3 = 0.5, we have: Z2 = Z3 = (1/2)^3 = 1/8.

For S1 = 0, Z1 = 1

Then Ci = (Zi) / (SUM Zi) = Zi/ (1/8 + 1/8 + 1)

and C2 = 4/5 * (1/8) = 1/10,   C1 = 8/10

Multi-order performance evaluation

**Order 0:**

G3-500 Normalized Score Distribution

Order 1:

DET 100 vs. 500 vs. 1000 vs. 4000

Order 2:

G3-1000 Genuine Match Rank Distribution

**Order 3:**

Ref. [Gorodnichy2009,2010]

Multi-order score analysis

Order 1 (Traditional):

➢ Examine single-scores to report trade-off (FMR/FNMR) curves

Order 2:

➢ Examine all scores to report the best (smallest) score

Order 3:

➢ Examine all scores relationship to report Confidences

Five-score example: { 0.51, 0.32, 0.47, 0.34, 0.31 }. T = 0.33

➢ Order 1 → 0.32

➢ Order 2 → 0.31

➢ But in reality it could have been 0.34 ! (if there was noise)

References

Daugman, J. (1993). High confidence visual recognition of persons by a test of statistical independence. IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence,

Daugman, J. (2004). How iris recognition works. IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems for Video Technology, 14(1) 21-30.

DeGroot, M. H. and Fienberg, S. E. (1983), The comparison and evaluation of probability forecasters, Statistician, 12, 12-22.

Gorodnichy, D. O. (2009). Evolution and evaluation of biometric systems. Proc. of the IEEE Workshop on Applied Computational Intelligence in Biometrics, IEEE Symposium: Computational Intelligence for Security and Defence Applications, Ottawa, 2009.

Gorodnichy, D. O. (2010). Multi-order analysis framework for comprehensive biometric performance evaluation, In Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Defense, Security, and Sensing. DS108: Biometric Technology for Human Identification track. Orlando, 2010