

2016 Public Safety Broadband Stakeholder Meeting *Day 1*

Certain commercial equipment, instruments, or materials are identified in this paper in order to specify the experimental procedure adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, nor is it intended to imply that the materials or equipment identified are necessarily the best available for the purpose.

This publication is intended to capture external perspectives related to NIST standards, measurement, and testing-related efforts. These external perspectives can come from industry, academia, government, and other organizations. This report was prepared as an account of a workshop; it is intended to document external perspectives and does not represent official NIST positions.



Sue Swenson FirstNet Chairwoman



NIST's Public Safety Innovation Accelerator Pulling the Future Forward Dereck Orr PSCR Program Manager





Innovation Accelerator PSCR Pulling the Future Forward

NIST's Public Safety Innovation Accelerator

Dereck Orr

NIST CTL Division Chief & PSCR Program Manager

Day 1 - Tuesday, June 7th 9:30am - 10:30am

NIST's Role in the *Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act*



Section 6303 directs NIST to conduct R&D to advance public safety communications technology and allocates \$300 million in funding through 2022



- Requirements & Standards
 - Testing & Evaluation/Measurement
 - Research & Development
 - Modeling & Simulation
 - Security Research

PSCR Technology Roadmapping

November 2013 - PSCR hosted a 2-day roadmapping workshop to collect information on priority R&D focus areas for public safety

- Location-based Services
- Analytics
- Enhanced User Interface






Innovation Accelerator PSCR Pulling the Future Forward






Innovation Accolorator 9

Location-Based Services



Services



Day 2 - Wednesday, June 8th

9:30am - 10:00am


SNAPSHOT: Advanced Positioning Using Improved Timing within an LTE Network **Dave Howe** - *PSCR Location-based Services*

10:00am - 11:00am


Public Safety Location-based Services Roadmap, Summit Findings, & Project Launch Overview

Moderator: Tracy McElvaney, PSCR Advanced Communications Research Group Lead Vihang Jani, PSCR Advanced Communications Research Group Ryan Felts, PSCR Roadmapping Support Christian Militeau, West Safety Services (formerly Intrado)

Analytics



Analytics




Day 3 - Thursday, June 9


3:00pm - 4:30pm

Public Safety Analytics Roadmapping Paving the Road to the Summit

Moderator: Jeb Benson, PSCR Advanced Communications Research Group Noah Fritz, International Association of Crime Analysts (IACA) Tom Sorley, NPSTC, City of Houston Deputy CIO, Public Safety Marc Leh, PSCR Roadmapping Support John Garofolo, PSCR Video Analytics Neal Fishman, IBM




Interface




Day 3 - Thursday, June 9th

User Interface Roadmapping for Public 10:00am - 11:30am **Safety Panel** Mobilizing the Future from Interface to Experience Mary Theofanos, *PSCR User Interface* **Brian Stanton**, *PSCR User Interface* Brad Fain, Georgia Tech Research Institute Lexie Spiro, Motorola **Ray Bizal**, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) **SNAPSHOT: Public Safety's Immersive Test** 11:30am - 12:00pm **Environment Dereck Orr**, *NIST CTL Division Chief & PSCR*


Program Manager






Day 1 - Tuesday, June 7th 10:30am - 12:00pm **Mission Critical Voice** Bridging the Gap & Advancing the Future Jeb Benson, PSCR Advanced Communication Research Group **Richard Rouil**, *PSCR Modeling & Simulation* Andrew Thiessen, PSCR Standards & Requirements Lead **Chief Paul Roberts**, *Division Chief - City of Boise Fire* Department Day 2 - Wednesday, June 8th 1:30pm - 3:00pm **BREAKOUT SESSION A: Tutorial 101A – Mission Critical** Voice PTT, D2D, & GCSE – Oh My ! Jeb Benson, PSCR Advanced Communications Research Group 3:30pm - 5:00pm **BREAKOUT SESSION A: Tutorial 101A – Mission Critical** Voice PTT, D2D, & GCSE – Oh My ! Jeb Benson, PSCR Advanced Communications Research Group

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Day 2 - Wednesday, June 8th

11:00am - 11:30am SNAPSHOT: LMR to LTE Standards Update

Andrew Thiessen, *PSCR Standards Lead*

Prizes & Challenges

Prize Challenges

Federal government increasingly leveraging prize challenges to spur innovation and solve tough problems

- NIST partnering with Under Armour, NFL, & GE to innovate impact-absorbing materials for use in football helmets
- Smart Cities Challenge
- DARPA Robotics Challenge



NIST is partnering with NASA's Center of Excellence for Collaborative Innovation to launch initial Innovation Accelerator prizes

& Challenges

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CHALLENGES

CONTACT

ABOUT

Public Safety Communications Innovation Accelerator

Department of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology

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Discussions

Agency Info

Welcome to PSCR's prize page. We are the public safety communications research division of NIST and our office develops the technology standards for devices and systems that are used by 60,000 agencies and 5 million first responders.

Starting summer of 2016, we invite you to participate in prize competitions to drive innovation and advances in the following areas:

- 1. Location Based Services (LBS)
- 2. Land Mobile Radio (LMR) transition to -> Long Term Evolution (LTE)
- 3. Mission-Critical Voice
- 4. User Interface/User Experience (UI/UX)
- 5. Data Analytics

We will even have some video and creative competitions to tell the stories of why these technologies are critically important to the 320 million Americans who need timely and effective responses to emergencies and disasters.

The programs will continue over the next five years, so check back often or register here at Challenge.gov and we'll keep you posted on the latest

PSprizes@nist.gov

bit.ly/PSprizes



Grants/Cooperative Agreements

NIST will leverage grants and cooperative agreements as part of the Innovation Accelerator program. These tools will increase collaboration and innovation with external partners in order to advance communications technology for public safety.

Day 2 - Wednesday, June 8th

9:00am - 9:30am Keynote Address

Steven Rader, NASA Center of Excellence for Collaborative Innovation (CoECI)

1:30pm - 3:00pm BREAKOUT SESSION B: Prizes and Competitions 101 How to Engage in Prizes, Grants, Cooperative Agreements, & Competitions

> Tammi Marcoullier, PSCR Prize Architect Heather Evans, NIST Program Coordination Office

3:30pm - 5:00pm BREAKOUT SESSION B: Prizes and Competitions 201 Brainstorming Early Prize Competition Opportunities





Innovation Accelerator **PSCR** Pulling the Future Forward

Get Involved!



Sign up for the PSCR Newsletter on pscr.gov



Attend Innovation Accelerator working groups & technology summits



Consider competing or judging prize competitions

Thank You!





Mission Critical Voice Bridging the Gap & Advancing the Future





Paul Roberts Boise FD, Chief – Special Operations Division

Men Andrew Thiessen PSCR/NTIA, Chief – ITS.P Division

NPD Richard Rouil PSCR/NIST, Wireless Networks Division

Jeb Benson PSCR/NIST, NIST R&D Team Lead

Questions/discussion at conclusion of speakers



Mission Critical Voice (MCV) – The Charter

Middle Class Tax Relief & Job Creation Act of 2012 §6303

"ACCELERATE the development of mission critical voice... over broadband networks"




Typical LTE Deployment Timeline

Months:	24 - 48	18 - 24	12 - 24
	Standards	Pre-Deployment	Deployment
- Specifications		 R&D Lab certification Field certification	Live testingSustainment




Our Goal






Importance of MCV – Public Safety Perspective



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From Public Safety to 3GPP Standards



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This work is sponsored by



FirstNet (First Responder Network Authority)



Agenda

- Mission Critical Voice Defined
- Standards Recap
 - Direct Mode
 - Group Communications
 - Audio Quality
 - Emergency Alerting
 - Talker Identification
 - Push To Talk



MCV Roundtable – Key Elements


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	Direct mode	Ability for a radio or group of radios to operate independent of existing network infrastructure $^{\rm 42}$

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
Direct Mode

Proximity Services (ProSe)



Direct Mode (cont'd)

Proximity Services (ProSe)




Dimension 2: 1 to 1, 1 to many, 1 to all



Direct Mode (cont'd)

Proximity Services (ProSe)



Dimension 3: Discovery vs. communication



Direct Mode (cont'd)

- What didn't we get in Release 12
 - UE-to-UE relay
 - Out of network discovery (came in Release 13)
- How is direct mode changing now (Release 14 and beyond)
 - Three new markets popping up
 - Vehicle to X communications
 - Internet of Things
 - Wearables




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Group Communications


Group Communications System Enablers for LTE (GCSE_LTE)





Group Communications

Group Communications System Enablers for LTE (GCSE_LTE)



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Scoup Communications

- 3 major standards components of Group Communications
 - GCSE_LTE
 - Establishes the mechanisms through which group communications are routed to eNodeB's
 - eMBMS
 - A method by which multicast and broadcast communications are sent out over a specialized radio link to largely predefined geographies
 - SC-PTM
 - A method that uses the eMBMS architecture but doesn't use eMBMS bearers, thus allowing for more dynamic group communications
- New MCCoRe work draws group comms out of MCPTT into common specs that other services can leverage



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(Audio Quality

- Stephen Voran will present about audio codecs for Mission Critical Voice after lunch!
 - SNAPSHOT: Public Safety Audio Quality Research from 1:30pm 2:00pm



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Emergency Alerting

- Two types of alerting based on public safety requirements
 - Emergency
 - Imminent Peril
- Emergency call
 - An urgent MCPTT call that highlights the potential of death or serious injury to the initiator
- Imminent peril call
 - An urgent MCPTT call that highlights the potential of death or serious injury, but is less critical than an MCPTT Emergency Call. For example a call prioritized in the event of immediate threat to any human life such as resulting from an MCPTT user's observation of or engagement in a situation involving imminent peril to the general public (e.g., a forest fire about to encircle campers, tanker truck ready to explode near a school, casualties at the scene of a car bombing)



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Talker Identification

- Several types of identities created in MCPTT over LTE
 - Mission Critical user ID
 - An identity which is linked to a set of credentials (e.g., biometrics, secureID, username/password)
 - MCPTT user ID
 - Given that a Mission Critical user ID could be used more than just MCPTT, there is also a specific ID for MCPTT
 - MCPTT group ID
 - An ID that represents a set of MCPTT users within an MCPTT system
- MCPTT user profile
 - An MCPTT user is associated with at least one MCPTT user profile
 - Profile contains myriad of information about the user and authorizations the user may have




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
Mission Critical Push To Talk over LTE (MCPTT)




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Push To Talk (cont'd)

Mission Critical Push To Talk over LTE (MCPTT)






EPS

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Push To Talk (cont'd)

Mission Critical Push To Talk over LTE (MCPTT)






Push To Talk (cont'd)

- In Release 14 we are fixing bugs and closing gaps not filled in Release 13
- Created a study on LMR to LTE connection to be discussed tomorrow



Evaluating Unique Public Safety Requirements





This work is sponsored by




FirstNet (First Responder Network Authority)




Department of Homeland Security Science & Technology Directorate Office for Interoperability and Compatibility (DHS S&T OIC)



MCV Use Cases



MCV Out of Coverage Architecture



(off-network mode)

Figure: Protocol stack of MCPTT off-network over ProSe basic operations

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ProSe Functionalities

- Services
 - Direct Discovery: The ability to detect the presence of another UE in proximity
 - Announce/Monitor functions
 - Includes Restricted discovery for Public Safety
 - Group discovery
 - Direct Communication: The capability to exchange user traffic without going through the eNodeB
- Requirement
 - Device synchronization




ProSe vs Uplink

Key Differences	Uplink (UE->eNodeB)	ProSe (UE->UE)
Schedulertype	Centralized (eNodeB)	Uncoordinated (UEs)
Scheduling Interval	1 ms	40 ms – 320 ms
Resource allocation	Dynamic	Pre-configured
Reliability	HARQ with acknowledgement	HARQ without acknowledgement (always 4 transmissions)
Physical layer transmission mode	Unicast	Groupcast (Rel 12), Unicast (Rel 13)

Hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ) is a mechanism to reliably transmit data packets with increasing chance of decoding the packets at each retransmission.



Example of ProSe Resource Allocation



• Transmitting UEs (Tx mode):

• To transmit, a UE selects a **random resource** n in the PSCCH pool to send a Control Information Message, indicating where and how the data will be transmitted in the PSSCH.

• Listening UEs (Receive mode):

• Each UE listens to the control channel to know if another UE is going to transmit

Depicted

Subframes used in control channel

Subframes used in shared channel

Resources assigned to a pool

Resources selected for data

resource selected in

control channel

transmission




Key Findings on Resource Allocation

- Several constraints to consider
 - No coordination = collisions
 - Multiple UEs transmit on the same resources in time and frequency.
 - Half duplex
 - A UE cannot transmit and receive in the same sub-frame.
 - Layer 1 groupcast communication
 - No HARQ feedback
 - Selection of the Modulation and Coding Scheme (MCS) must take into account the link quality of the various members
 - Pool size
 - Resources have to be shared among multiple pools (different priorities, different agencies)

Adequate dimensioning of the resource pools is necessary to obtain desired level of performance


KPIs: Number of users/groups

Impact of resource pool configuration on outdoor deployment





Number of non-overlapping pools




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Other Findings on ProSe

- Discovery
 - For a given pool size and number of UEs trying to discover each other, there is an optimal value for the transmission probability θ that optimizes the probability of discovery
- Synchronization
 - Ping-pong effect depending on the method used to perform scanning
 - Hidden node problem where a transmitter UE with a different timing can disrupt the communication between UEs that belong to the same group


Example of probability that a discovery message from UE Y reaches UEX



UE 1's proximity to UE3 can trigger lost of synchronization with UE 2




MCPTT and ProSe Interactions





MCPTT Findings To Date

- Protocol validation
 - MCPTT was officially completed in March 2016
 - In reality, more Change Requests (CRs) and updated versions are on the way
- (Pre-)Configuration and Scheduling of ProSe Resource Pools to Support MCPTT
 - Semi-static, pre-configured
 - Tradeoff between efficiency, flexibility and reliability
- Interaction between ProSe and MCPTT
 - Mapping between ProSe-Per-Packet-Priority (PPPP) and MCPTT Call Types (emergency, imminent peril, basic)
 - Mapping between ProSe Layer-2 Group ID and MCPTT group IDs
- Floor Preemption Decision:
 - No rules defined in 3GPP standards
 - Up to implementation




Current Work

- Off network evaluation
 - Partial coverage
 - In coverage
 - MCPTT features
 - Call control
 - Emergency alert
- In network MCV evaluation
 - Core network
 - Network to UE relays



MCV R&D – Public Safety Driven





Disclaimer

Please note, all information and data presented is preliminary/in-progress and subject to change.



STAKEHOLDER INPUT





Interviews & Roundtable

• Conducted interviews with ten key public safety stakeholders

Key Element	Features: Context
Key performance indicators (KPIs): Measure	Challenges: Inform

- Hosted one day MCV Roundtable:
 - Public safety
 - FirstNet
 - Public Safety Advisory Council (PSAC)
 - DHS and DOJ





MCV Roundtable – Key Elements

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Coverage & Capacity		C	(
Range / Coverage / Signal Strength					\checkmark
Interference					~
Capacity / Max # of groups / Max users per group	\checkmark		\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Efficiency				\checkmark	
Success / Busy / Failure rate	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		



<u>Timing</u>		C			
Latency / Call setup	\checkmark		\checkmark		\checkmark
Hang time / Time-out	\checkmark				~
Resolution time / Refresh rate		\checkmark			



Integrity	C			
Data accuracy		\checkmark		
Intelligibility			\checkmark	\checkmark




		C	(
Coverage & Capacity	3	1	1		2	3
Timing	2	1	1			2
Integrity			1	1		1
TOTALS	5	2	3	1	2	6

- Impossible to talk about PTT without either Group Communications or Direct Mode totals a bit misleading
- Appropriate focus on Direct Mode It is a lifeline
- Disproportionate concern about Emergency Alerting highlights importance



KPI UX Spectrum






STRATEGY





MCV Technology Stack



MBMS = Multimedia broadcast/multicast service SC-PTM = Single-cell point-to-multipoint




LTE/P25 Interworking

MCPTT over LTE			Gateway	P	п	
AMR-WB (mandatory) EVS-SWB (optional) AMR-WB = Adaptive multirate - wideband EVS = Enhanced voice services						IBE IBE
Group Communication Sys for LTE (GCSE_L		Proximity Services (ProSe) Direct Communications			Mada	
Broadcast Bearer MBMS or SC-PTM	EPS (Unica	control Ist) Bearer D2D Bearer			Mode 1	Mode 2

Public Safety User Interface (vendor specific)



MCV Technology Area Breakdown Structure





Mission Critical Push to Talk (MCPTT)

Objectives

Accelerate development, testing, and implementation of the MCPTT capabilities.

<u>Challenges</u>

New technology for 3GPP vendors and public safety users. Niche market. Lack of common baseline KPIs.

MCPTT

Impact

MCPTT is the most important feature set for public safety.

Candidates

LMR/LTE KPI benchmarks Application server acceleration Adaptive/Predictive Floor Control




LMR/LTE KPI Benchmarks

Description Measure KPIs for MCV in P.25 and possibly analog LMR systems for comparison to LTE MCPTT rollout	i	Challenges Incredible number of variables in LTE; no precedent exists for measuring direct mode	
KPIs Timing: Latency Timing: Call setup / Hang time / Time-out Timing: Resolution time / Refresh rate Timing: Success / Busy / Failure rate (see following slides)		Performance Goals Consult TIA-102 and 3GPP specifications where applicable	l
Deliverables NIST special publication Peer-reviewed papers Test bench		Major Tasks Spin-up LMR systems in lab, identify test equipment & design, develop test bench, determine test cases	


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'Real World' vs Lab






Using KPIs to Inform Adoption & Gaps






TECHNOLOGY ACCELERATION





New Technologies Take Time




- MCPTT will as well
 - Public Safety Grade

Source: SNS Research, The Public Safety LTE and Mobile Broadband Market: 2015 - 2030



New Technologies Take Markets






Proximity Services – Initial Markets

- Public Safety requirements revolutionized the 3GPP ecosystem and changed mainstream thinking
- Specification vs Regulations; the push to commercialize
- After a couple releases, they are now identifying new markets & business models...

		Network coverage	
	<u>Inside</u>	<u>Outside</u>	<u>Relay</u>
Direct Discovery	Commercial	Uncertain	Uncertain
Direct Communication	Public Safety	Public Safety	Public Safety




Proximity Services – New Markets





D2D Tech Acceleration






MCV Tech Acceleration - Opportunities

- D2D chipset direct communications, high power & data rate, out-of-network
- Application Servers MCPTT, GCSE, ProSe
- Algorithms
 - Adaptive/predictive floor control
 - Sidelink/uplink interference management
 - D2D resource selection in/out/partial coverage
 - Floor control implementation in UE
- Test equipment
 - Inject and prioritize PS needs in carrier-driven roadmaps

- Network
 - Smart Macro-to-D2D transition
 - Emergency Alert 'fallback' from D2D to Macro
 - Coverage/transition indication app
- Discovery-enabled applications
- Integrating MC Video & Data
- Software Defined Radio
- Path to 5G

Investment Strategies






MISSION CRITICAL COMMUNICATION






NIST R&D Lanes






MCV vs Communication



Ineffective communications breakdown:






MCPTT	MC Video	MC Data					
Mission Cri Broadcast/Group/	Internetworking						
Broadcast Bearer MBMS or SC-PTMcontrolEPS (Unicast) BearerD2D Bearer							
Public Safety User Interface (vendor specific)							



MCV vs Communication

- How do we 'free up' MCV to be most effective?
- Not just a technology issue it's governance
 - Strategy, policy, training, etc.
- We ALL need to consider these opportunities moving forward.
- Do we need new KPIs, e.g. effectiveness/bit?



Words



Is a Picture Really Worth 1000 Words?







Let's do the Numbers...



"... the bridge has collapsed... there are cars in the water..."

1000 words ≈ 10 minutes 10 mins @ 13 kbps ≈ 8 Mb ≈ 1 MB



1 MB, < 2 sec

- A picture may really be = 1000 words!
- Maybe we should say "A picture is worth 10 minutes"
- How critical are those first
 10 20 minutes?



OPPORTUNITIES TO CONTRIBUTE



I'm Excited – How do I Help?

- Ideas Get started in Prizes & Competitions 201 Brainstorming
- MCV working group
 - Public safety + Industry + Government + Academia
 - Help us identify and prioritize focus & tech acceleration
 - Influence the future of MCV over LTE
 - Summit Oct/Nov timeframe





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Takeaways – MCV Panel

- MCV over LTE is essential for long term adoption and evolution of the NPSBN
- PSCR will continue to support 3GPP standards development related to MCV from a technical perspective
- PSCR is evaluating critical public safety features in the standards
- Public safety has identified initial KPIs associated with MCV for PSCR to baseline
- There are opportunities to accelerate and innovate MCV over LTE



Closing notes...

- MCV Working Group & Summit
 - jeb.benson@nist.gov
- Analytics Panel
 - Thursday, June 9 from 3:00pm-4:30pm
- MCV 101 for Public Safety
 - Wednesday, June 8 at 1:30pm & 3:30pm
 - Who should attend? Drum roll...

Top 10 5 Reasons You Know You Need to Attend MCV 101

- 5. Last time you used a push-to-talk device it responded 'One. One puppy.'
- 4. Once when somebody asked you about your hang time, you replied "It was never that great. But, I can shoot the three."
- 3. You like watching engineers try to be funny. They're so bad, it's actually funny. Like now.
- 2. Before this panel, you thought an eNodeB was the ship that D2D rode in on a mission to destroy the Death Star.
- 1. Whenever somebody mentions Mission Critical Voice you shout "They were the best, man. I still have all their albums"



SNAPSHOT: Public Safety Audio Quality Research Assessing Codecs for Mission Critical Voice Stephen Voran PSCR Audio Quality Lead



This work is sponsored by:



Department of Homeland Security Science & Technology Directorate Office for Interoperability and Compatibility (DHS S&T OIC)





Please note, all information and data presented is preliminary/in-progress and subject to change.



Assessing Codecs for Mission Critical Voice



What should Mission Critical Voice deliver?

(Acoustic Domain)

Speech Quality and Speech Intelligibility.

Why Codecs are Critical, Inherent Codec Trade-Offs.

PSCR Speech Intelligibility Tools.

Example Results: Noise, Bit-Rate, Audio Bandwidth.

Looking Forward: Radio Channel Impairments.



What are the Goals for MC Voice?

In acoustic domain:

- Listener can understand what is being said...
- Listener can identify the speaker...
- Listener can detect stress...
- Background noise environment shall be sufficiently clear... (identifying acoustic context)



Quantifying "Listener Can Understand..."

Speech Quality Testing:

Very popular protocol: ACR, produces MOS values.

Excellent (5), Good, Fair, Poor, Bad (1)

Example result: Average opinion of speech quality = 3.5.

Speech Intelligibility Testing:

Quantify success rates for understanding, words, messages, callsigns, etc.

Many different protocols.

Example result: 63% of words correctly understood on average.

Do they measure the same thing?



Demonstration 1




<u>Quality</u> Higher

Intelligibility Imperfect

Transcripts

"We have a forty-two year old female unconscious."






Lower

Perfect

"Let me get my binoculars"



Demonstration 2






Demonstration 3





Lab Data: 8 Combinations of Handset & Noise

From Dynastat, published in ITU-T, SG12, COM 12-C296, January 2016.




(Mr))) #PSCR2016

Quantifying "Listener Can Understand..."


- Speech Quality Testing and Speech Intelligibility Testing provide related yet different information.
- Speech Intelligibility Testing is the most direct way to quantify "listener can understand."




Why are Codecs Critical?



Why are Codecs Critical?




Why are Codecs Critical?






Fundamental Codec Trade-Offs





Fundamental Codec Trade-Offs


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Fundamental Codec Trade-Offs

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Audio Bandwidth Demonstration

Audio Bandwidth Name	Nominal Passband	
Original Recording Fullband (FB)	20 – 20,000 Hz	
Super Wideband (SWB)	50 – 16,000 Hz	
Wideband (WB)	50 – 7,000 Hz	
Narrowband (NB)	300 – 3,400 Hz	

Including additional audio frequencies can:

- Enhance "presence," "realism," or "naturalness."
- Change the character of speech and background noises.




Assessing Codecs for Mission Critical Voice

We are assessing a fundamental requirement (Speech Intelligibility) of a fundamental system building block (Codec). How do we do it?



PSCR Intelligibility Tool Kit: MRT

Modified Rhyme Test (MRT)



20-50 Human Subjects Sound-Isolated Room Play Recordings of Systems Under Test



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Statistical Analysis of 10,000's Trials o Went o Sent • Bent o Dent o Tent o Rent Each trial is either a success or a failure 4 Talkers, 300 Words each **Example Result:** 1200 Trials per condition MRT Intelligibility is 87.3




PSCR Intelligibility Tool Kit: ABC-MRT

Articulation Band Correlation - Modified Rhyme Test (ABC-MRT)

A digital-signal processing (DSP) algorithm

Based on human perception and processing

Currently extending to cover more use cases



Example Result: Estimated MRT Intelligibility is 86.8

<u>MRT</u>

- Takes Months
- +/- Requires Humans

ABC-MRT

- + Takes Hours
- +/- Uses DSP to estimate human responses



Published Results 2008-2016

- Speech Codec Intelligibility Testing in Support of Mission-Critical Voice Applications for LTE, NTIA Technical Report TR-15-520, September 2015.
- Using articulation index band correlations to objectively estimate speech intelligibility consistent with the modified rhyme test, 2013 IEEE International Workshop on Applications of Signal Processing to Audio and Acoustics, October 20-23, 2013.
- Intelligibility of Analog FM and Updated P25 Radio Systems in the Presence of Fireground Noise: Test Plan and Results, NTIA Technical Report TR-13-495, May 2013.
- Intelligibility of the Adaptive Multi-Rate Speech Coder in Emergency-Response Environments, NTIA Technical Report TR-13-493, December 2012.
- Intelligibility of Selected Radio Systems in the Presence of Fireground Noise: Test Plan and Results, NTIA Technical Report TR-08-453, June 2008.
- Relationships Between Intelligibility, Speaker Identification, and the Detection of Dramatized Urgency, NTIA Technical Report TR-09-459, November 2008.
- Speaker Identification in Low-Rate Coded Speech, International Measurement of Audio and Video Quality in Networks Conference, Prague, Czech Republic, May 2008.
- Listener Detection of Talker Stress in Low-rate Coded Speech, IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, March 2008.




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Recent Work

- Goal: Measure intelligibility of codecs suitable for MC voice in different acoustic noise conditions (perfect radio channels)
- Used ABC-MRT (DSP) to evaluate 4482 conditions; broad, coarse preselection
- Selected 168 conditions for MRT (humans); targeted, precise evaluation
- Results reported relative to Analog FM LMR (de facto user expectation)

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


Noise	NB Codec ≈ 6 kb/s	Analog FM LMR	WB Codec ≈ 16 kb/s
Siren			
Saw			

Intelligibility < AFM
Intelligibility = AFM
Intelligibility > AFM



Considering Channel Impairments



- RAN or core network can produce channel impairments when pushed to limits.
- Severe channel impairments create data outages (frame erasures)at decoder.
- Decoder may partially conceal outages for short durations.
- Ability to conceal is called robustness.
- Robustness is a key codec trade-off.
- Assessment of time-varying intelligibility required.

20% FER Example



0% FER Example






Example Results

Test Protocol

- Public safety messages recorded and processed under controlled conditions
- Test subjects report all words heard in messages.
- Subjects' reports compared with transcripts to find fraction of words correctly reported.

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Three systems shown, one has somewhat higher robustness.

It does a better job of concealing losses.

Take Away

- Speech intelligibility is key (speaker ID, speaker stress detection, acoustic scene understanding, also desirable).
- Intelligibility and quality not equivalent concepts.
- Codecs drive speech intelligibility, subject to constraints and trade-offs: Audio Bandwidth
 - Robustness
 - Bit-Rate
 - Algorithmic Delay
- PSCR has speech intelligibility toolkit (Human Subjects, DSP).
- We are applying tools for Stakeholder benefit:

Optimize MC voice attributes given constraints and trade-offs.

• More at PSCR.gov







Public Safety & Network Security Enhancements Identity Management & Data Isolation Solutions

This work is sponsored by:



FirstNet (First Responder Network Authority)



Disclaimer

Please note, all information and data presented is preliminary/in-progress and subject to change.



Panel Members

- John Beltz (Moderator)
 - PSCR IT Security Manager
- Joshua Franklin
 - NIST Information Technology Laboratory (ITL)/PSCR
 - Primary Research Engineer for Application/Data Isolation Project
- Harlin McEwen
 - Chair, FirstNet Public Safety Advisory Committee (PSAC)
- Paul Grassi
 - National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC)/PSCR
 - Primary Research Engineer for PSCR Identity Management Project





Mobile Data & Application Isolation

Joshua Franklin – IT Security Specialist, NIST ITL/PSCR

Introduction

- The NPSBN enables first responder use of modern mobile devices
- Mobile devices erode traditional network boundaries and increase threat surface by adding new points of compromise
- The data and applications residing on public safety mobile devices need to be secured against modern threats
- Protection mechanisms, such as isolating commercial applications from mission critical ones, need to be identified and validated
 - This enables Bring Your Own Device scenarios for first responders



Mobile Data & Application Isolation

- The Mobile Data & Application Isolation project explores methods to manage and isolate applications/data for deployment on the NPSBN
- Devices and data can be compromised in many ways:
 - Lost or stolen devices
 - Network eavesdropping
 - Insecure network interfaces (e.g., WiFi, cellular)
 - Device and user tracking
 - Mobile malware


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- This leaves sensitive public safety information at risk
- Need to protect the hardware, operating system, applications, and data to protect public safety information



Mobile Protection Mechanisms

Devices and data can be compromised at various layers of the mobile security stack



Example Use Cases

- Entering and exiting neighboring jurisdictions
- Securing evidence and other incident data on-device
- Device loss and theft
- Protecting wireless data transmissions
- Volunteers needing to access public safety services
- Bring Your Own Device scenarios
- Notifying user of malicious code on a device





Enterprise Mobility Management


- EMM: Standard method to deploy mobile devices in an enterprise
- MDM: Defines and delivers policies to mobile devices
- EMM applications (or agents) reside on the device
 - Help to enforce policies
- Example policies:
 - Lockscreen security
 - Enable VPN
 - Device encryption
 - Root / jailbreak detection
 - Application whitelisting / blacklisting






EMMs in Action

PSC



Current Research Efforts


- Completed Research
 - Identified mobile security characteristics
 - Identified relevant mobile security products
 - Understand the degree to which industry products implement mobile security characteristics
- Need to understand gaps in commercially available technologies and what public safety needs
- Testing is underway





Preliminary Results


- Since testing is underway, preliminary results are arising
- Interesting results surrounding the following topics:
 - Multiple isolation technologies on a single device (Co-management)
 - Whitelisting and blacklisting
 - Encryption standards
 - Battery consumption statistics
- Capabilities vary widely from EMM to EMM





Impact on Battery Life

- EMMs may have an adverse impact on battery life
- We're collecting data to understand the degree of impact
 - Need to identify which functions consume the most power



Conclusion

- First responders need tools and support to accomplish their mission
- Compromised data and devices may allow attackers to access the cellular network infrastructure and other critical resources
- Research efforts currently underway complete in ~ 3 months
 - Phase 2 of our research is under development
- This research will ensure public safety has the right tools in place to:
 - Protect real-time communication,
 - Secure access to data and services, and
 - Operate in a modern threat environment.



Identity Proofing for a National Public Safety Network Chief Harlin McEwen, Chair, Public Safety Advisory Committee (PSAC)



ICAM: PSAC Task Team Focus Areas

The Public Safety Advisory Committee (PSAC) has a task team that advises FirstNet on Identity, Credential, and Access Management (ICAM) requirements for Public Safety

PSAC has been working on three important aspects of ICAM from a Public Safety perspective

- Different **user types** accessing the network
- Types of access
- Policy and procedures for proving the identity of Public Safety users



ICAM- Types of Users

- Public Safety Primary: Users are generally personnel from the traditional public safety disciplines, both full time and volunteer
 - Emergency Medical Services (EMS), Fire Department/Services, Law Enforcement, Public Safety Communications Centers/PSAPs
- Public Safety Secondary: Users are personnel who may participate or support responses of primary users, who at times, may be elevated to a primary user role
 - Personnel such as Law Enforcement Civilian, Courts, Corrections, Emergency/Disaster Management Departments, Search and Rescue, Family and Protective Services



ICAM-Types of Users

- Public Safety Support: Users are personnel, commercial and governmental entities that support Public Safety Primary and Secondary
 - Personnel such as Public Transportation, Utilities, Alarm Companies, Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
- **Public**: Public users
 - Treated as a commercial customer and authenticated by FirstNet partner to access the NPSBN-band class 14



ICAM-Levels of Access

	Secure Data Access	& Interoperability		
Public Safety User Types				
Access to the Network (Device Identity)	Access to FirstNet Applications (FirstNet Identity)	Access Restricted FirstNet Applications (FirstNet Identity)	Access Enterprise Data & Services (Federated Identity)	
Access to the NPSBN "pipe"	Access to FirstNet Non-Sensitive	Access to FirstNet Sensitive	Interoperability	



ICAM-Types of Access

- Access to the Network (Device Identity)
 - Access to the NPSBN "pipe"
 - Use of commercial mobile apps
 - Similar to commercial service
 - Very low barrier to entry
- Access to FirstNet Applications (FirstNet Identity)
 - FirstNet app store
 - Local control
 - Static prioritization



ICAM-Types of Access

- Access Restricted FirstNet Applications (FirstNet Attributes)
 - Dynamic prioritization
 - Attribute based access control (types of users and other attributes)
- Access Enterprise Data & Services (Federated Identity)
 - \circ Interoperability with other agencies
 - Additional Single Sign On (SSO) capabilities
 - Access to third party data (Federated Identity Participants)



Identity Proofing

- Identity Proofing The process by which an individual's identity is vetted and proven to be who they claim to be
 - o Identity proofing mechanisms vary in strength/assurance levels
 - PSAC ICAM task team is assisting FirstNet security team in establishing:
 - Guidelines around strength of identity proofing
 - Details of the identity proofing process with emphasis on policy and procedure








Paul Grassi, Primary Research Engineer for Identity Management Project

- <u>Relevance to Public Safety-</u> Mobile Single Sign-On will significantly enhance mission effectiveness, communication capabilities and user experience for First Responders:
 - Interoperability Support multiple secure credential types
 - Reduce, in a secure manner, multiple and inconvenient authentication requirements
 - $\,\circ\,$ Integration with EMM solutions to enhance security
 - Enable proper levels of access for levels of users through federated identity management






- Applied Research Goal- Build a reference architecture for Mobile Single Sign-On (SSO) to understand capabilities of current standards technologies in relation to multiple mobile platforms and user types
 - Mobile SSO is still relatively new, with limited enterprise deployments
 - $\,\circ\,$ Industry research is varied and immature
 - $\circ\,$ Mobile credentials vary
 - \circ Operating system support varies
 - Strong likelihood of valuable outcomes that will directly impact mission



PSCR Identity Management



Mobile SSO Research Highlights

- SSO between native and browser based apps
- Integrated into Public Safety application(s)
- Flexible authentication methods
 - \circ Multiple credentials
 - $\circ \quad \text{Shared devices} \quad$
 - Multiple Levels of Assurance (LOA) / strengths
 - Align each method with use cases and how public safety users carry out their duties
- Standards based
 - \circ OAuth
 - Fast Identity Online (FIDO)
 - $\circ \quad \text{Open ID Connect} \\$
 - Security Assertions Markup Language (SAML)



PSCR Partnership with NCCoE

- Research is to be conducted as a partnership with the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE)
- Funded by PSCR with additional resources provided under NCCoE and the private sector
- Significant industry contribution
- Transparent and Open All material made publicly available with comment periods
- Expected Outcomes
 - $\circ~$ Special Publications Mobile Single Sign On for the Public Safety Community
 - PSCR, FirstNet, and NCCoE gain knowledge and experience with Mobile SSO implementation for Public Safety users
 - $\circ~$ Facilitates the adoption of Mobile SSO





Complimentary Efforts

- National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace
 Multiple Pilots, for example GSMA
- Digital Authentication Guideline (Draft)
 - o https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3
- Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate
 - Mobile Device and and Attribute Validation
 - o <u>https://kantarainitiative.org/kantara-ccicada/</u>
- Identity Ecosystem Steering Group (IDESG)
 - Identity Ecosystem Framework
 - Self-Assessment Listing Service (SALS)





SNAPSHOT: PSCR's Demonstration Network Preparing Today's Network for Tomorrow's Research

Disclaimer

Please note, all information and data presented is preliminary/in-progress and subject to change.



Speakers

- Ellen Ryan
 - PSCR Lab Operations Group Lead
- Donald Harriss
 - PSCR Lab Operations



PSCR Lab Operations: Managing a Secure Network

Lessons Learned

Transforming PSCR Network from a small-scale static network to a secure, diverse public safety broadband environment



PSCR Lab Operations: Lessons Learned

Managing Network

<u>Resources</u>

- Asset Inventory Tool
- Resource Reservation Tool
- Change Request System
- Network Deployment Process
- Encrypted Data Storage

Secure Network

Architecture


- Network Segmentation
- Firewall Implementation
- VPN Access
- Secure Configurations
- Anti-Virus & Vulnerability Scans
- Event Monitoring Systems



Lesson 1: Identify Key Requirements

- Simple and specific
 - Tools should increase productivity
 - Skills to develop tools in-house?
- Understand total costs
 - Base cost
 - Annual support contract; including upgrades?
 - SME contract for configuration and training?
 - Annual network device licenses and other future costs?
- Product Evaluations







Implemented a Technology Deployment Process





Deployed in
Quarantine Zone

Fully Deployed

- Plan for new features
- Documented Network Requirements
- Minimizes Unnecessary network changes

- Provides Limited Network Access
- Implement Security Requirements

- Approved Level of Security
- Network Regression Testing
- Backward Compatibility and Interoperability Testing



Lesson 2: Implement an Upgrade & Regression Testing Plan

Complex Research Configurations + Multiple Technologies = Complex Upgrade and Testing Challenge

- Schedule maintenance windows for upgrades we perform
- Coordinate upgrade schedules with vendors
- Plan post-upgrade testing strategies (backward compatibility, interoperability testing)

<u>Security Patching:</u> PSCR Network will never be 100% upgraded at a given time with all available security patches



Lesson 3: Secure Network Architecture

The Need to Protect Data:

- Maintain Public Trust
 - Do not become an example
- Staying productive by preventing downtime
 - Time = Money AND Lives for Public Safety



Lesson 3: Secure Network Architecture

Threats to data:

- ► Equipment Failure
- Environmental Disasters
- Malware: Viruses, Worms, Ransomware
- ≻Data Leakage




Lesson 3: Secure Network Architecture

Methods to Protect Data:

- Enhanced access policies
- Imposes network bandwidth limitations
- Encrypted devices
- Secure configurations



Layered Network Architecture



Secure Network Architecture Reporting Tools

Network Monitoring System

- Traffic Profiling
- Top Talkers

Log Monitoring

#PSCR2016

- Detailed device logs
- Hardware failure

TOP 15 Ap BOTH, LAST	plications 1 HOURS				EDI	T HELP
APPL	ICATION	INGRESS BYTES	EGRESS BYTES	INGRESS PACKETS	EGRESS PACKETS	PERCENT
🛨 💼 🎭 (World Wide Web HTTP (80)	157.1 Mbytes	150.5	179 OF 1	400.04 1	
+ 🔳 🗞 I			Mbytes	170.03 K	155.91 K	36.68%
	Microsoft-DS (445)	122.6 Mbytes	91.9 Mbytes			
	Microsoft-DS (445) http protocol over TLS/SSL (443)	122.6 Mbytes	-	627.06 k	459.66 k	25.58%
		122.6 Mbytes 47.6 Mbytes	91.9 Mbytes	627.06 k 84.27 k	459.66 k 62.57 k	25.58% 10.7%
	nttp protocol over TLS/SSL (443)	122.6 Mbytes 47.6 Mbytes 52.9 Mbytes	91.9 Mbytes 42.1 Mbytes	627.06 k 84.27 k 47.62 k	459.66 k 62.57 k 33.53 k	25.58% 10.7% 9.31%
	http protocol over TLS/SSL (443) Palace-6 (9997)	122.6 Mbytes 47.6 Mbytes 52.9 Mbytes 19.7 Mbytes	91.9 Mbytes 42.1 Mbytes 25.3 Mbytes	627.06 k 84.27 k 47.62 k 114.52 k	459.66 k 62.57 k 33.53 k	25.58% 10.7% 9.31% 4.06%
	http protocol over TLS/SSL (443) Palace-6 (9997) GLOBECAST-ID (6109) cmd like exec, but automatic authentication is	122.6 Mbytes 47.6 Mbytes 52.9 Mbytes 19.7 Mbytes 4.5 Mbytes	91.9 Mbytes 42.1 Mbytes 25.3 Mbytes 14.3 Mbytes	627.06 k 84.27 k 47.62 k 114.52 k 25.2 k	459.66 k 62.57 k 33.53 k 78.75 k 87.28 k	25.58% 10.7% 9.31% 4.06% 3.46%
	http protocol over TLS/SSL (443) Palace-6 (9997) GLOBECAST-ID (6109) cmd like exec, but automatic authentication is (514)	122.6 Mbytes 47.6 Mbytes 52.9 Mbytes 19.7 Mbytes 4.5 Mbytes 11.7 Mbytes	91.9 Mbytes 42.1 Mbytes 25.3 Mbytes 14.3 Mbytes 24.5 Mbytes	627.06 k 84.27 k 47.62 k 114.52 k 25.2 k 22.61 k	459.66 k 62.57 k 33.53 k 78.75 k 87.28 k	25.58% 10.7% 9.31% 4.06% 3.46%
	http protocol over TLS/SSL (443) Palace-6 (9997) SLOBECAST-ID (6109) cmd like exec, but automatic authentication is (514) Jinmonitored traffic PCsync HTTPS (8443) BM Enterprise Extender SNA XID Exchange	122.6 Mbytes 47.6 Mbytes 52.9 Mbytes 19.7 Mbytes 4.5 Mbytes 11.7 Mbytes 7.4 Mbytes	91.9 Mbytes 42.1 Mbytes 25.3 Mbytes 14.3 Mbytes 24.5 Mbytes 7.6 Mbytes	627.06 k 84.27 k 47.62 k 114.52 k 25.2 k 22.61 k 9.48 k	459.66 k 62.57 k 33.53 k 78.75 k 87.28 k 14.79 k	25.58% 10.7% 9.31% 4.06% 3.46% 2.29%
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +	http protocol over TLS/SSL (443) Palace-6 (9997) SLOBECAST-ID (6109) cmd like exec, but automatic authentication is (514) Jinmonitored traffic PCsync HTTPS (8443) BM Enterprise Extender SNA XID Exchange	122.6 Mbytes 47.6 Mbytes 52.9 Mbytes 19.7 Mbytes 11.7 Mbytes 7.4 Mbytes 5.5 Mbytes	91.9 Mbytes 42.1 Mbytes 25.3 Mbytes 14.3 Mbytes 24.5 Mbytes 7.6 Mbytes 9.8 Mbytes	627.06 k 84.27 k 47.62 k 114.52 k 25.2 k 22.61 k 9.48 k 4 k	459.66 k 62.57 k 33.53 k 78.75 k 87.28 k 14.79 k 8.18 k	25.58% 10.7% 9.31% 4.06% 3.46% 2.29% 2.05%
+ + + + + + <td>http protocol over TLS/SSL (443) Palace-6 (9997) SLOBECAST-ID (6109) cmd like exec, but automatic authentication is (514) Jumonitored traffic PCsync HTTPS (8443) BM Enterprise Extender SNA XID Exchange (00)</td> <td>122.6 Mbytes 47.6 Mbytes 52.9 Mbytes 19.7 Mbytes 4.5 Mbytes 7.4 Mbytes 5.5 Mbytes 4.1 Mbytes</td> <td>91.9 Mbytes 42.1 Mbytes 25.3 Mbytes 14.3 Mbytes 24.5 Mbytes 9.6 Mbytes 9.9 Mbytes</td> <td>627.06 k 84.27 k 47.62 k 114.52 k 25.2 k 22.61 k 9.48 k 4 k 4.8 k</td> <td>459.66 k 62.57 k 33.53 k 78.75 k 87.28 k 14.79 k 8.18 k 7.53 k 4.8 k</td> <td>25.58% 10.7% 9.31% 4.06% 3.46% 2.29% 2.05% 1.83% 0.97%</td>	http protocol over TLS/SSL (443) Palace-6 (9997) SLOBECAST-ID (6109) cmd like exec, but automatic authentication is (514) Jumonitored traffic PCsync HTTPS (8443) BM Enterprise Extender SNA XID Exchange (00)	122.6 Mbytes 47.6 Mbytes 52.9 Mbytes 19.7 Mbytes 4.5 Mbytes 7.4 Mbytes 5.5 Mbytes 4.1 Mbytes	91.9 Mbytes 42.1 Mbytes 25.3 Mbytes 14.3 Mbytes 24.5 Mbytes 9.6 Mbytes 9.9 Mbytes	627.06 k 84.27 k 47.62 k 114.52 k 25.2 k 22.61 k 9.48 k 4 k 4.8 k	459.66 k 62.57 k 33.53 k 78.75 k 87.28 k 14.79 k 8.18 k 7.53 k 4.8 k	25.58% 10.7% 9.31% 4.06% 3.46% 2.29% 2.05% 1.83% 0.97%
Image: Constraint of the constr	http protocol over TLS/SSL (443) Palace-6 (9997) SLOBECAST-ID (6109) cmd like exec, but automatic authentication is (514) Jinmonitored traffic PCsync HTTPS (8443) BM Enterprise Extender SNA XID Exchange (00) acmsoda (6969)	122.6 Mbytes 47.6 Mbytes 52.9 Mbytes 19.7 Mbytes 4.5 Mbytes 7.4 Mbytes 5.5 Mbytes 4.1 Mbytes 3.0 Mbytes	91.9 Mbytes 42.1 Mbytes 25.3 Mbytes 14.3 Mbytes 24.5 Mbytes 9.8 Mbytes 9.9 Mbytes 4.1 Mbytes	627.06 k 84.27 k 47.62 k 114.52 k 25.2 k 22.61 k 9.48 k 4 k 4.8 k 20.51 k	459.66 k 62.57 k 33.53 k 78.75 k 87.28 k 14.79 k 8.18 k 7.53 k 4.8 k	25.58% 10.7% 9.31% 4.06% 3.46% 2.29% 2.05% 1.83% 0.97%
Image: Constraint of the constr	http protocol over TLS/SSL (443) Palace-6 (9997) SLOBECAST-ID (6109) cmd like exec, but automatic authentication is (514) Jinmonitored traffic PCsync HTTPS (8443) BM Enterprise Extender SNA XID Exchange (00) acmsoda (6969) SNMP (161)	122.6 Mbytes 47.6 Mbytes 52.9 Mbytes 19.7 Mbytes 4.5 Mbytes 11.7 Mbytes 5.5 Mbytes 3.0 Mbytes 3.4 Mbytes	91.9 Mbytes 42.1 Mbytes 25.3 Mbytes 24.5 Mbytes 24.5 Mbytes 9.8 Mbytes 9.9 Mbytes 4.1 Mbytes 4.1 Mbytes 3.0 Mbytes	627.06 k 84.27 k 47.62 k 114.52 k 25.2 k 22.61 k 9.48 k 4 k 4.8 k 20.51 k 5.94 k	459.66 k 62.57 k 33.53 k 78.75 k 87.28 k 14.79 k 8.18 k 7.53 k 4.8 k 20.54 k	25.58% 10.7% 9.31% 4.06% 3.46% 2.29% 2.05% 1.83% 0.97% 0.85%
	http protocol over TLS/SSL (443) Palace-6 (9997) SLOBECAST-ID (6109) cmd like exec, but automatic authentication is (514) Jinmonitored traffic PCsync HTTPS (8443) BM Enterprise Extender SNA XID Exchange (00) acmsoda (6969) SNMP (161) The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol (22)	122.6 Mbytes 47.6 Mbytes 52.9 Mbytes 19.7 Mbytes 4.5 Mbytes 11.7 Mbytes 7.4 Mbytes 5.5 Mbytes 3.0 Mbytes 3.4 Mbytes 2.2 Mbytes	91.9 Mbytes 42.1 Mbytes 25.3 Mbytes 24.5 Mbytes 24.5 Mbytes 9.8 Mbytes 9.9 Mbytes 4.1 Mbytes 4.1 Mbytes 3.0 Mbytes	627.06 k 84.27 k 47.62 k 114.52 k 25.2 k 22.61 k 9.48 k 4 k 4.8 k 20.51 k 5.94 k 4.19 k	459.66 k 62.57 k 33.53 k 78.75 k 87.28 k 14.79 k 8.18 k 7.53 k 4.8 k 20.54 k 4.75 k	25.58% 10.7% 9.31% 4.06% 3.46% 2.29% 2.05% 1.83% 0.97% 0.85% 0.77%
	http protocol over TLS/SSL (443) Palace-6 (9997) SLOBECAST-ID (6109) omd like exec, but automatic authentication is (514) Jinmonitored traffic PCsync HTTPS (8443) BM Enterprise Extender SNA XID Exchange (00) acmsoda (6969) SNMP (161) The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol (22) Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (389)	122.6 Mbytes 47.6 Mbytes 52.9 Mbytes 19.7 Mbytes 4.5 Mbytes 11.7 Mbytes 7.4 Mbytes 5.5 Mbytes 3.0 Mbytes 3.4 Mbytes 2.2 Mbytes	91.9 Mbytes 42.1 Mbytes 25.3 Mbytes 24.5 Mbytes 24.5 Mbytes 9.8 Mbytes 9.9 Mbytes 4.1 Mbytes 3.0 Mbytes 1.5 Mbytes	627.06 k 84.27 k 47.62 k 114.52 k 25.2 k 22.61 k 9.48 k 4 k 4.8 k 20.51 k 5.94 k 4.19 k	459.66 k 62.57 k 33.53 k 78.75 k 87.28 k 14.79 k 8.18 k 7.53 k 4.8 k 20.54 k 4.75 k 3.01 k	25.58% 10.7% 9.31% 4.06% 3.46% 2.29% 2.05% 1.83% 0.97% 0.85% 0.77% 0.45%

Lesson 4: Incident Response Plan

An organized approach to addressing and managing the aftermath of an **incident**. The goal is to handle the situation in a way that limits damage and reduces recovery time and costs.

Industry Best-Practices:

- Prepare & Identify
- Contain & Eradicate
- Recovery & Lessons Learned



Lesson 4: Incident Response Plan

Real PSCR Scenario:

2 Day snow storm, 9 hour power outage, rabbit chewed through the wiring for a backup generator....



Conclusion

To Build and Maintain a Secure Network:

- ➢ Know Your Requirements
- Understand Maintenance Costs
- ➢ Have a Solid Deployment Plan
- Implement a Secure Network and Devices
- Build or Implement Monitoring and Mitigation Tools
- Create an Incident Response Plan



Thank you!

<u>PSCR Lab Operations Team</u>: Roger Blalock, Christopher Dennis, Jaydee Griffith, Don Harriss, Philip Williams, Ellen Ryan and Wyatt Suess

> PSCR Network Security Team: John Beltz and Scott Ledgerwood









Local Control for Public Safety A Successful Demonstration of Local Control

Speakers

- Tracy McElvaney (Moderator)
 - PSCR Advanced Communications Research Group Lead
- Mika Skarp
 - CloudStreet
- Wim Brouwer
 - Nokia
- Chris Walton
 - PSCR Advanced Communications Research Group



DELIVERING FLAWLESS CONNECTIONS ON MOBILE NETWORKS

USE CASE & SOLUTION OVERVIEW

Mika Skarp CTO





About Cloudstreet

Network service orchestration platform for mobile operators first developed at Nokia's Silicon Valley campus. Started 2010



Fully-developed business/network layer application for the delivery of differentiated Quality of Service / Quality of Experience (QoS/QoE) for mobile broadband.



Real-time, dynamic profile-based service for application-aware bandwidth allocation.



First LTE/5G mobile network-ready business model to commercialize the delivery of guaranteed bandwidth capacity on-demand.






"In order to avoid congestion, investment in network capacity should be complemented by service and customer-oriented network management."

GSMA, 2015

Differentiating OTT Traffic Classes



Best effort, YouTube type service, gaming, social media and downloading short video files




NUMBER OF USERS

Starter and Starter



Differentiating Profiles For Assured QoE

Cloudstreet in Practice in the Connected City



[First Responders Network: DPC U2, U2, U1 and S1]

Differentiating Profiles For Assured QoE


Cloudstreet in Practice in the Connected City



Status Quo vs. Cloudstreet Capacity Example

ASSUMPTIONS

- Cell has a maximum limit of 100 users or bearers
- Regular users have scheduling weight of "1"
- Cloudstreet users have scheduling weight of "20"
- Maximum cell capacity is 50/25 Mbps
- 100% RF coverage for Cloudstreet users



RESULTS WITHOUT CLOUDSTREET

Scenario: (Status Quo) All users have an equal scheduling Weight

Experience: 0,5/0,25 Mbps for all (Best Case)

RESULTS WITH CLOUDSTREET


Scenario: 1 user with Cloudstreet Experience: 8.4/4.2 Mbps@20/119 (worst), 0.42/0.21Mbps for the rest

Scenario: 2 users with Cloudstreet Experience: 7.2/3.6 Mbps@20/138 (worst), 0.36//0.18 Mbps for the rest



199

Technical Description



FEATURES & BENEFITS

- From 92% reliability to 99,99% (2Mbps)
- 8 simultaneous data bearers through one SIM card
- Not only GBR, 246 different services classes
- Different APN per organization, dedicated connection from APN
- Group functions
- DC has open north and south bound interfaces

Thank-You!








Dynamic Policy Control Possible LTE Implementation

Wim Brouwer CTO FirstNet/Federal Customers <u>Wim.Brouwer@nokia.com</u>

20 2 © Nokia 2016



Nokia – A Leader in Key Segments



© Nokia 2016 All figures and positions reflect market share, based on combined Nokia and Alcatel-Lucent 2014 year end results




Dynamic Policy Control Strategy

- Dynamic Policy Control must leverage open, standards-based interfaces
- Dynamic policy changes must take effect immediately
- Require minimal, if any, manual intervention



Dynamic Policy Control Application Request For Dedicated Bearer







Dynamic Policy Control Traffic Flow Template – Details

List of packet filters, each containing the following information:

- Identifier of the packet filter
- Precedence of the packet filter
- Direction (UL and DL)
- Filter itself (e.g. pattern matching on IP 5-tuple)



Dynamic Policy Control Application Request For Updated User Profile/Role









Local Control for Public Safety

Chris Walton

PSCR Advanced Communications Research Group



This work is sponsored by:



Department of Homeland Security Science & Technology Directorate Office for Interoperability and Compatibility (DHS S&T OIC)



Disclaimer

Please note, all information and data presented is preliminary/in-progress and subject to change. Conceptual prototypes developed in PSCR labs were created with proof of concept and research goals in mind, and are not being presented as a complete solution or final architecture for Local Control in broadband networks.




PSCR Local Control Research

- Last year, we stated we were going to develop a conceptual API and a prototype Local Control Server/Simulator that will enable QPP management requests to be generated from outside the LTE core ...
- WE DID IT!
- Lessons Learned
- Next Steps



Static Control




Static Control

<AttributeAssignment DataType="http://www.net.org/2001/XMLSchoma#string" Attribute="Dia-Avp">GX||RAR||*avp[Charging-Rule-Install;grouped{avp[ChargingRuleDefinition;grouped{avp[Chargi ngRule-Name;value(secret_rule_3)]#avp[Flow-Information; grouped{*avp[Flow-Description; multiple(value(permit in 15 from 10.20.30.40/32 1-65535 to 10.20.30.40/32 1-65535))]}]#avp[Flow-Status;value(2)]#avp[Precedence;value(10)]#avp[QoS-Information; grouped{avp[Allocation-Retention-Priority;grouped{avp[Priority-Level;value(0)]#avp[PreemptionCapability;value(0)]#avp[Preemption-Vulnerability;value(0)]}]#avp[Guaranteed-Bitrate-DL;value(600000)]#avp[GuaranteedBitrateUL;value(000000)]#av p[Max-Requested-Bandwidth-DL;value(3000000)]#avp[Max-Requested-Bandwidth-UL;value(000000)]#avp[QoS-ClassIdentifier;value(0)]}]}#avp[Resource-AllocationNotification;value(0)]}]</AttributeAssignment>




Dynamic Control Concept






Open API: Moving Public Safety Information to the Broadband Network




Lesson 1: Get Public Safety Information into the Network






Lesson 2: Automate Everything Possible




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Lesson 3: You can't automate everything



PSCR's Path Forward in Local Control (2016)

PSCR and Local Control: Up to Now

- Investigation of Current Vender solutions and supporting technologies
 - Proprietary Implementations
 - REST
 - SOAP

API Creation

- Open the interface between a future dynamic controller function and PSAP based applications
- Use standard enterprise messaging formats
- Allow flow of Public Safety information into the dynamic controller so it can make intelligent QPP decisions
- Controlled Override State

PSCR and Local Control: What is Next?

Key Goals

- Messaging that allows Public Safety user information to be sent to the broadband network
- Make automatic and intelligent QPP decisions based on Public Safety user information

Achieving the Goal

- Expand API to include more Public Safety Information
- Provide input into 3GPP standards work
- Work closely with CRADA Partners
- Remain an objective technical advisor



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