Submitted by:	
Date:	

Comments template for Preliminary
Cybersecurity Framework

Submitted by:	
Date:	

2		3	174-179	* The listed risk management approaches (NIST 800-39, ISO 31000, etc.) are not trivial and providing a simple risk management approach will help many Get Started.  * The 5 Step Risk Management Process is a very basic, but common approach to risk management that will help progress security decision making and help with prioritization.	Provide simple risk management process to Get Started in the Framework document. Suggested entry 5 Step Risk Management Process: Step 1 - Identify risks Step 2 - Prioritize list of risk findings (Risk Register) and determine if you need to Remove, Reduce, Transfer, or Accept the risk Step 3 - Establish security roadmap towards addressing identified risks Step 4 - Obtain executive level approval and funding for roadmap Step 5 - Continuously assess program using Security Index
3		7-8	281- 306, 321-389	*Aligned with most consultant/audit security program assessments and uses CMM *Use constructive, non-regulatory language like Security Index where we can set our own Goals or Targets *ES-C2M2 uses similar approach (embedded to assess each MIL)Not implemented, Partially implemented, Largely implemented, Fully implemented, and Achievedfound in the ES-C2M2_Self-Evaluation_Toolkit_2of2.zip in the ES-C2M2 Report Builder spreadsheet *Tiers and Profiles is a confusing and NEW construct. We can move to this in CSF version 2.0, but let's not start here. No one raised their hands in the Raleigh workshop when we polled the group "Do you know how to use Tiers and Profiles?" *Suggest that NIST use a SurveyMonkey to continue to broadly poll this question. *Security [Capability Maturity Model] Index is a simple construct and broadly used already without people knowing they're using it, they just are.	*Offer options for a simple Self-Assessment (e.g. Security (CMM) Index and ES-C2M2). *Use CMM/CMMI as a simple self- assessment methodology for the CSF 5 Functions and associated charts/graphs SCMMI Index 1 - Initial / Ad-hoc - Not Implemented SCMMI Index 2 - Repeatable / Managed (Risk Informed) - Partially Implemented SCMMI Index 3 - Defined - Largely Implemented SCMMI Index 4 - Quantitatively Managed - Fully Implemented SCMMI Index 5 - Optimizing - Achieved * Set Goals or Targets associated with Security Index

Comments template for Preliminary
Cybersecurity Framework

Submitted by:	
Date:	

_						
			13-26	457-477	*Cross mapping allows each of the prominent,	
					core security standards identified in the	the Informative References.
					Information References to stand on its own	1: Use the Alternative View version of
					merits and allows companies that have	Appendix A. The consolidated view (or mash
					adopted at least one of the security standards	up view) in the Preliminary Framework
					apply the specific security standard.	Cybersecurity.pdf is confusing.
					*H2Cross mapping allows each standard to	2: Also provide a spreadsheet version of
					clearly show what a company is doing to	Appendix A with the Alternative View
					adopt/implement the Cybersecurity	similar to what you released prior to Raleigh
					Framework with respect to the other security	for the consolidate/mash-up view of
					standards.	Appendix A / Framework Core.XLSX
						http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload/preliminary c
						ybersecurity framework-
4						framework core.xlsx
			13-26	457-477	*Without a thorough cross mapping, NIST	1: Must ensure NIST, COBIT, CSC, and ISO
					will have put into question the thoroughness of	cross mappings are thorough/complete
					the existing security standard if a standard in	mappings (there are too may "NA" entries).
					the Informative References cannot fulfill a	2: Ensure ISO\IEC 27001:2005 A.10.9.1,
					specific Subcategory element (row).	A.10.9.2, A.10.9.3, and A.8.2.2 are listed in
					*NIST will also have effectively created a new	the controls listings.
					security standard without thoroughly	
					performing the cross mappings.	
					*Missing several controls that have been	
					known to fail such as ISO\IEC 27001:2005	
1					A.10.9.1, A.10.9.2, A.10.9.3, and A.8.2.2 that	
1					have been ideitified by HISPI as controls that	
1					have consistently failed in 2012 that led to	
5					compromised protected data.	

Comments template for Preliminary
Cybersecurity Framework

Submitted by: _	
Date: _	

			13-26	457-477	*The CSA CCM is open source material, Use existing cross mappings such as the CSA
					where other cross mappings cost money, and CCM
					the CSA is willing to work with NIST and US
					government to keep this cross mapping up to
					date.
					*The CSA CCM have been updated frequently
					(every 6 to 18 months). The CCM applies to
					single and to multi-tenant entities and is based
					on ISO and HITRUST.
					*CSA CCM already covers cloud which will
					become critical infrastructure.
					*Phil and CSA is reconfiguring the CSA CCM
					to resemble the Framework by default.
					Release date is TBD but will be available by
1 6	5				the end of the year.

Comments template for Preliminary
Cybersecurity Framework

Submitted by: _	
Date: _	

		15.7	la r	1	ME 1 04310 0 1 1 77 4 1 1	1 1 (4 0 : 1 77" 1
		New	New		*ExamplesSANS Quick Wins, Australian	Implement the Quick Wins approach.
			Lines		Signals Directorate Sweet Spot, and HISPI	Identify what controls failed the most from
		Sugges	1		Top 20 ISO\IEC 27001:2005 Annex A	breach data and analysis reports.
		l t			Mitigating Controls	Start Here (CSF Quick Wins):
		adding			*Use breach analysis reports—Ponemon, VZ,	1. Patch Applications/Systems
		a			Mandiant, SANS, HISPI, Trustwave, and	2. OWASP 10 – SQL Injection/XSS
		Quick			Microsoft	3. Look at your logs and detect signs of
		Wins			*Approach identifies priorities	compromise/attacks
		Section	1		*Cost benefit obtained through adoption of a	4. Limit admin/privilege access
		or a			small subset of controls known to fail	5. Continuously scan for and remediate
		add a			*Can be different by Sector and Sub-sector,	critical security vulnerabilities
		Get			but believe that there are some universal truths	
		Started			on controls failures when it comes to	
		Section	n		technology controls	
		with			- The Cybersecurity Framework released to	
		Quick			date is missing controls that already have been	
		Wins			known to fail according to the HISPI 20 ISO	
					27001 top failures-A.10.9.1, A.10.9.3,	
					A.10.9.3, and A.8.2.2 should be controls listed	
					in the Informative References but are not.	
					These controls have failed the most in 2012	
					and have led to protected personal data	
					breaches that were reported.	
					*****	
					1. Patch Applications/Systems (cited by	
					VZDBIR, SANS, AUS, HISPI, Microsoft,	
					TW)	
					2. OWASP 10 – SQL Injection/XSS (cited by	
					OWASP, VZDBIR, HISPI, Microsoft, TW)	
					3. Look at your logs and detect signs of	
					compromise/attacks (cited by VZDBIR,	
					Mandiant, HISPI, TW)	
					4. Limit admin/privilege access (cited by all)	
7					5. Continuously scan for and remediate critical	
		New	New		NIST and/or DHS will need to do more leg	Framework "Adoption" should be
					work to determine what constitutes	Framework "Implementation"
					implementation, but can leverage the Security	*
					Index to help anser that question versus using	
					Tiers and Profiles.	
					1	

ents template for Preliminary ecurity Framework	Based on input from Phil Agcaoili	Submitted by: Date:
	Please consider supporting these suggestions by sending an email to:  Please copy:	adam.sedgewick@nist.gov csfcomments@nist.gov phil.agcaoili@gmail.com
	Subject line:	Preliminary Cybersecurity Framework Comments