Based on input from Phil Agcaoili

Submitted by: _____

#	Organization	Commentor	Туре	Page #	Line #	Section	Comment (Include rationale for comment)	Suggested change
1					95-99 or 409-436		*There are several important steps missing for companies to Get Started (bolded). *The concept of Scope is importantidentify what assets the Framework applies to, specifically reference the use of a risk management approach and development of a list of risks (risk register). *Developing a roadmap and investment strategy, obtaining executive-level buy-in and funding, and ensuring Continuous Improvement are also important steps to Get Started.	Apply simple approach to Get Started. *Missing critical steps- Page 1 (bolded) Step 1: Identify - Determine [scope] what critical infrastructure to protect; Step 2: Self-Assessment - Assess current cybersecurity posture (using Security Index or ES-C2M2); Step 3: Conduct a Risk Assessment - you can use one of the mentioned risk management approaches (ISO 31000, NIST 800-39, etc.) or internal simple risk management process. Step 4: Create Targets - Identify and prioritize opportunities for improvement utilizing risk management approach above and associate risks with Target objectives next to each of the 5 Framework Functions; Step 5: Planning and Alignment - Assess progress toward the target state. Develop roadmap and investment strategy and foster communications among [and buy in from] internal and external stakeholders (senior executives and Board).; Step 7: Ensure Continuous Improvement
2				3	174-179		 * The listed risk management approaches (NIST 800-39, ISO 31000, etc.) are not trivial and providing a simple risk management approach will help many Get Started. * The 5 Step Risk Management Process is a very basic, but common approach to risk management that will help progress security decision making and help with prioritization. 	Provide simple risk management process to Get Started in the Framework document. Suggested entry 5 Step Risk Management Process: Step 1 - Identify risks Step 2 - Prioritize list of risk findings (Risk Register) and determine if you need to Remove, Reduce, Transfer, or Accept the risk Step 3 - Establish security roadmap towards addressing identified risks Step 4 - Obtain executive level approval and funding for roadmap Step 5 - Continuously assess program

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		7-8,9	0- 281- 306, 321-389	 *Aligned with most consultant/audit security program assessments and uses CMM *Use constructive, non-regulatory language like Security Index where we can set our own Goals or Targets *ES-C2M2 uses similar approach (embedded to assess each MIL)Not implemented, Partially implemented, Largely implemented, Fully implemented, and Achievedfound in the ES-C2M2_Self- Evaluation_Toolkit_2of2.zip in the ES-C2M2 Report Builder spreadsheet *Tiers and Profiles is a confusing and NEW construct. We can move to this in CSF version 2.0, but let's not start here. *Security [Capability Maturity Model] Index is a simple construct and broadly used already without people knowing they're using it, they *Offer options for a simple Self-Assessment (e.g. Security (CMM) Index and ES-C2M2). *Commodel and associated charts/graphs SCMMI Index 1 - Initial / Ad-hoc - Not Implemented SCMMI Index 2 - Repeatable / Managed (Risk Informed) - Partially Implemented SCMMI Index 3 - Defined - Largely Implemented SCMMI Index 4 - Quantitatively Managed - Fully Implemented Security [Capability Maturity Model] Index is a simple construct and broadly used already without people knowing they're using it, they
3		13-20	6 457-477	iust are.*Cross mapping allows each of the prominent, core security standards identified in the Information References to stand on its own merits and allows companies that have adopted at least one of the security standard apply the specific security standard.Cross map prominent security standards in the Informative References.*H2Cross mapping allows each standard to clearly show what a company is doing to adopt/implement the Cybersecurity Framework with respect to the other security standards.1: Use the Alternative View version of Appendix A. The consolidated view (or mash up view) in the Preliminary Framework Cybersecurity.pdf is confusing.2: Also provide a spreadsheet version of adopt/implement the Cybersecurity standards.Appendix A with the Alternative View similar to what you released prior to Raleigh for the consolidate/mash-up view of Appendix A / Framework Core.XLSX http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload/preliminary_cyb ersecurity framework.core.xlsx

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		13-26	457-477	*Without a thorough cross mapping, NIST 1: Must ensure NIST, COBIT, CSC, and ISO
				will have put into question the thoroughness of cross mappings are thorough/complete
				the existing security standard if a standard in mappings (there are too may "NA" entries).
				the Informative References cannot fulfill a 2: Ensure ISO\IEC 27001:2005 A.10.9.1,
				specific Subcategory element (row). A.10.9.2, A.10.9.3, and A.8.2.2 are listed in the
				*NIST will also have effectively created a new controls listings.
				security standard without thoroughly
				performing the cross mappings.
				*Missing several controls that have been
				known to fail such as ISO\IEC 27001:2005
				A.10.9.1, A.10.9.2, A.10.9.3, and A.8.2.2 that
				have been ideitified by HISPI as controls that
				have consistently failed in 2012 that led to
5				compromised protected data.
		13-26	457-477	*The CSA CCM is open source material, Use existing cross mappings such as the CSA
				where other cross mappings cost money, and CCM
				the CSA is willing to work with NIST and US
				government to keep this cross mapping up to
				date.
				*The CSA CCM have been updated frequently
				(every 6 to 18 months). The CCM applies to
				single and to multi-tenant entities and is based
				on ISO and HITRUST.
				*CSA CCM already covers cloud which will
				become critical infrastructure.
				*Phil and CSA is reconfiguring the CSA CCM
				to resemble the Framework by default.
				Release date is TBD but will be available by
6				the end of the year.

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Intervention Intervention Interventintervente Interventintentent </th <th>7</th> <th></th> <th>Pages - Sugges t adding a Quick Wins Section or a add a Get Started Section with Quick Wins</th> <th>Signals Directorate Sweet Spot, and HISPI Top 20 ISO/IEC 27001:2005 Annex A Mitigating Controls *Use breach analysis reports.—Ponemon, VZ, Mandiant, SANS, HISPI, Trustwave, and Microsoft *Approach identifies priorities *Cost benefit obtained through adoption of al small subset of controls known to fail *Can be different by Sector and Sub-sector, but believe that there are some universal truths on controls failures when it comes to technology controls - The Cybersecurity Framework released to date is missing controls that already have been known to fail according to the HISPI 20 ISO 27001 top failures-A. 10.9.1, A. 10.9.3, A. 10.9.3, and A.8.2.2 should be controls listed in the Informative References but are not. These controls have failed the most in 2012 and have led to protected personal data breaches that were reported. ****** 1. Patch Applications/Systems (cited by VZDBIR, SANS, AUS, HISPI, Microsoft, TW) 2. OWASP 10 – SQL Injection/XSS (cited by OWASP, VZDBIR, HISPI, Microsoft, TW) 3. Look at your logs and detect signs of compromise/attacks (cited by VZDBIR, Mandiant, HISPI, TW) 4. Limit admin/privilege access (cited by all) 5. Continuously scan for and remediate critical NIST and/or DHS will need to do more leg Framework "Adoption" should be Framework</th>	7		Pages - Sugges t adding a Quick Wins Section or a add a Get Started Section with Quick Wins	Signals Directorate Sweet Spot, and HISPI Top 20 ISO/IEC 27001:2005 Annex A Mitigating Controls *Use breach analysis reports.—Ponemon, VZ, Mandiant, SANS, HISPI, Trustwave, and Microsoft *Approach identifies priorities *Cost benefit obtained through adoption of al small subset of controls known to fail *Can be different by Sector and Sub-sector, but believe that there are some universal truths on controls failures when it comes to technology controls - The Cybersecurity Framework released to date is missing controls that already have been known to fail according to the HISPI 20 ISO 27001 top failures-A. 10.9.1, A. 10.9.3, A. 10.9.3, and A.8.2.2 should be controls listed in the Informative References but are not. These controls have failed the most in 2012 and have led to protected personal data breaches that were reported. ****** 1. Patch Applications/Systems (cited by VZDBIR, SANS, AUS, HISPI, Microsoft, TW) 2. OWASP 10 – SQL Injection/XSS (cited by OWASP, VZDBIR, HISPI, Microsoft, TW) 3. Look at your logs and detect signs of compromise/attacks (cited by VZDBIR, Mandiant, HISPI, TW) 4. Limit admin/privilege access (cited by all) 5. Continuously scan for and remediate critical NIST and/or DHS will need to do more leg Framework "Adoption" should be Framework
			INCW	work to determine what constitutes implementation, but can leverage the Security Index to help anser that question versus using

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				Preliminary Cybersecurity Framework
			Subject line:	Comments