#	Organization	Commentor	Туре	Page #	Line #	Section	Comment (Include rationale for comment)	Suggested change
	1			1 or 11	95-99 or 409-436		*There are several important steps missing for companies to Get Started (bolded). *The concept of Scope is important identify what assets the Framework applies to, specifically reference the use of a risk management approach and development of a list of risks (risk register). *Developing a roadmap and investment strategy, obtaining executive-level buy- in and funding, and ensuring Continuous Improvement are also important steps to Get Started.	Apply simple approach to Get Started. *Missing critical steps- Page 1 (bolded) Step 1: Identify - Determine [scope] what critical infrastructure to protect; Step 2: Self-Assessment - Assess current cybersecurity posture (using Security Index or ES-C2M2); Step 3: Conduct a Risk Assessment - Use one of the mentioned risk management approaches (ISO 31000, NIST 800-39, etc.) or the simple risk management process Phil lists in the Risk Management process suggestion below to develop a Risk Register); Step 4: Create Targets - Identify and prioritize opportunities for improvement utilizing risk management approach above and associate risks with Target objectives next to each of the 5 Framework Functions; Step 5: Planning and Alignment - Assess progress toward the target state. Develop roadmap and investment strategy and foster communications among [and buy in from] internal and external stakeholders (senior executives and Board).; Step 7: Ensure Continuous Improvement

			3	174-179	* The listed risk management	Provide simple risk management process to
					approaches (NIST 800-39, ISO 31000,	Get Started in the Framework document.
					etc.) are not trivial and providing a	Suggested entry 5 Step Risk Management
					simple risk management approach will	Process:
					help many Get Started.	Step 1 - Identify risks
					* The 5 Step Risk Management Process	Step 2 - Prioritize list of risk findings (Risk
					is a very basic, but common approach	Register) and determine if you need to
					to risk management that will help	Remove, Reduce, Transfer, or Accept the risk
					progress security decision making and	Step 3 - Establish security roadmap towards
					help with prioritization.	addressing identified risks
						Step 4 - Obtain executive level approval and
						funding for roadmap
						Step 5 - Continuously assess program using
2	2					Security Index

		7-8, 9-	281-306,	*Aligned with most consultant/audit	*Offer options for a simple Self-Assessment
		10	321-389	security program assessments and uses	(e.g. Security (CMM) Index and ES-C2M2).
				CMM	*Use CMM/CMMI as a simple self-
				*Use constructive, non-regulatory	assessment methodology for the CSF 5
				language like Security Index where we	Functions and associated charts/graphs
				can set our own Goals or Targets	SCMMI Index 1 - Initial / Ad-hoc - Not
				*ES-C2M2 uses similar approach	Implemented
				(embedded to assess each MIL)Not	SCMMI Index 2 - Repeatable / Managed
				implemented, Partially implemented,	(Risk Informed) - Partially Implemented
				Largely implemented, Fully	SCMMI Index 3 - Defined - Largely
				implemented, and Achievedfound in	Implemented
				the ES-C2M2 Self-	SCMMI Index 4 - Quantitatively Managed -
				Evaluation Toolkit 2of2.zip in the ES-	Fully Implemented
				C2M2 Report Builder spreadsheet	SCMMI Index 5 - Optimizing - Achieved
				*Tiers and Profiles is a confusing and	* Set Goals or Targets associated with
				NEW construct. We can move to this in	Security Index
				CSF version 2.0, but let's not start here.	
				No one raised their hands in the Raleigh	
				workshop when we polled the group	
				"Do you know how to use Tiers and	
				Profiles?"	
				*Suggest that NIST use a	
				SurveyMonkey to continue to broadly	
				poll this question.	
				*Security [Capability Maturity Model]	
				Index is a simple construct and broadly	
				used already without people knowing	
3				they're using it, they just are.	

4		13-26	457-477	*Cross mapping allows each of the prominent, core security standards identified in the Information References to stand on its own merits and allows companies that have adopted at least one of the security standards apply the specific security standard. *H2Cross mapping allows each standard to clearly show what a company is doing to adopt/implement the Cybersecurity Framework with respect to the other security standards.	Cross map prominent security standards in the Informative References. 1: Use the Alternative View version of Appendix A. The consolidated view (or mash up view) in the Preliminary Framework Cybersecurity.pdf is confusing. 2: Also provide a spreadsheet version of Appendix A with the Alternative View similar to what you released prior to Raleigh for the consolidate/mash-up view of Appendix A / Framework Core.XLSX http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload/preliminary_cy bersecurity_framework-framework_core.xlsx
5		13-26	457-477	*Without a thorough cross mapping, NIST will have put into question the thoroughness of the existing security standard if a standard in the Informative References cannot fulfill a specific Subcategory element (row). *NIST will also have effectively created a new security standard without thoroughly performing the cross mappings. *Missing several controls that have been known to fail such as ISO\IEC 27001:2005 A.10.9.1, A.10.9.2, A.10.9.3, and A.8.2.2 that have been identified by HISPI as controls that have consistently failed in 2012 that led to compromised protected data.	1: Must ensure NIST, COBIT, CSC, and ISO cross mappings are thorough/complete mappings (there are too may "NA" entries). 2: Ensure ISO\IEC 27001:2005 A.10.9.1, A.10.9.2, A.10.9.3, and A.8.2.2 are listed in the controls listings.

		13-26	457-477	*The CSA CCM is open source	Use existing cross mappings such as the CSA
				material, where other cross mappings	ССМ
				cost money, and the CSA is willing to	
				work with NIST and US government to	
				keep this cross mapping up to date.	
				*The CSA CCM have been updated	
				frequently (every 6 to 18 months). The	
				CCM applies to single and to multi-	
				tenant entities and is based on ISO and	
				HITRUST.	
				*CSA CCM already covers cloud which	
				will become critical infrastructure.	
				*Phil and CSA are reconfiguring the	
				CSA CCM to resemble the Framework	
				by default. Release date is TBD but will	
				be available by the end of the year.	
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		New	New	*ExamplesSANS Quick Wins, Implement the Quick Wins approach. Identify
		Pages -	Lines	Australian Signals Directorate Sweet what controls failed the most from breach data
		Suggest		Spot, and HISPI Top 20 ISO\IEC and analysis reports.
		adding a		27001:2005 Annex A Mitigating Start Here (CSF Quick Wins):
		Quick		Controls 1. Patch Applications/Systems
		Wins		*Use breach analysis 2. OWASP 10 – SQL Injection/XSS
		Section		reports—Ponemon, VZ, Mandiant, 3. Look at your logs and detect signs of
		or a add		SANS, HISPI, Trustwave, and compromise/attacks
		a Get		Microsoft 4. Limit admin/privilege access
		Started		*Approach identifies priorities 5. Continuously scan for and remediate
		Section		*Cost benefit obtained through critical security vulnerabilities
		with		adoption of a small subset of controls
		Quick		known to fail
		Wins		*Can be different by Sector and Sub-
				sector, but believe that there are some
				universal truths on controls failures
				when it comes to technology controls
				- The Cybersecurity Framework
				released to date is missing controls that
				already have been known to fail
				according to the HISPI 20 ISO 27001
				top failures-A.10.9.1, A.10.9.3,
				A.10.9.3, and A.8.2.2 should be
				controls listed in the Informative
				References but are not. These controls
				have failed the most in 2012 and have
				led to protected personal data breaches
				that were reported.

				1. Patch Applications/Systems (cited by
				VZDBIR, SANS, AUS, HISPI,
				Microsoft, TW)
				2. OWASP 10 – SQL Injection/XSS
				(cited by OWASP, VZDBIR, HISPI,

7				Microsoft, TW) 3. Look at your logs and detect signs of compromise/attacks (cited by VZDBIR, Mandiant, HISPI, TW) 4. Limit admin/privilege access (cited by all) 5. Continuously scan for and remediate critical security vulnerabilities (cited by VZDBIR, SANS, AUS, HISPI, and Mandiant)
		New	New	NIST and/or DHS will need to do more leg work to determine what constitutes implementation, but can leverage the Security Index to help anser that question versus using Tiers and Profiles.