#	Organization	Commentor	Туре	Page #	Line #	Section	Comment (Include rationale for comment)	Suggested change
				1 or 11	95-99 or 409-436		identify what assets the Framework applies to, specifically reference the use of a risk management approach and development of a list of risks (risk register). *Developing a roadmap and investment strategy, obtaining executive-level buy-in and funding, and ensuring Continuous Improvement are also important steps to Get Started.	Apply simple approach to Get Started. *Missing critical steps- Page 1 (bolded) Step 1: Identify - Determine [scope] what critical infrastructure to protect; Step 2: Self-Assessment - Assess current cybersecurity posture (using Security Index or ES-C2M2); Step 3: Conduct a Risk Assessment - Use one of the mentioned risk management approaches (ISO 31000, NIST 800-39, etc.) or the simple risk management process Phil lists in the Risk Management process suggestion below to develop a Risk Register); Step 4: Create Targets - Identify and prioritize opportunities for improvement utilizing risk management approach above and associate risks with Target objectives next to each of the 5 Framework Functions; Step 5: Planning and Alignment - Assess progress toward the target state. Develop roadmap and investment strategy and foster communications among [and buy in from] internal and external stakeholders (senior executives and Board).; Step 7: Ensure Continuous Improvement
2				3	174-179		approach will help many Get Started. * The 5 Step Risk Management Process is a very basic, but common	Provide simple risk management process to Get Started in the Framework document. Suggested entry 5 Step Risk Management Process: Step 1 - Identify risks Step 2 - Prioritize list of risk findings (Risk Register) and determine if you need to Remove, Reduce, Transfer, or Accept the risk Step 3 - Establish security roadmap towards addressing identified risks Step 4 - Obtain executive level approval and funding for roadmap Step 5 - Continuously assess program using Security Index

Submitted by: _Brian Phillips_____ Date: __11/29/13_____

3		7-8, 9-10	281-306,	*Aligned with most consultant/audit	*Offer options for a simple Self-Assessment (e.g.
			321-389	security program assessments and	Security (CMM) Index and ES-C2M2).
				uses CMM	*Use CMM/CMMI as a simple self-assessment
				*Use constructive, non-regulatory	methodology for the CSF 5 Functions and
				language like Security Index where	associated charts/graphs
				we can set our own Goals or Targets	SCMMI Index 1 - Initial / Ad-hoc - Not
				*ES-C2M2 uses similar approach	Implemented
				(embedded to assess each MIL)Not	SCMMI Index 2 - Repeatable / Managed (Risk
				implemented, Partially implemented,	Informed) - Partially Implemented
				Largely implemented, Fully	SCMMI Index 3 - Defined - Largely Implemented
				implemented, and Achievedfound in	SCMMI Index 4 - Quantitatively Managed - Fully
					Implemented
				Evaluation Toolkit 2of2.zip in the	SCMMI Index 5 - Optimizing - Achieved
					* Set Goals or Targets associated with Security
				*Tiers and Profiles is a confusing and	
				NEW construct. We can move to this	
				in CSF version 2.0, but let's not start	
				here. No one raised their hands in the	
				Raleigh workshop when we polled the	
				group "Do you know how to use Tiers	
				and Profiles?"	
				*Suggest that NIST use a	
				SurveyMonkey to continue to broadly	
				poll this question.	
				*Security [Capability Maturity	
				Model] Index is a simple construct	
				and broadly used already without	
				people knowing they're using it, they	
				just are.	
				Just u.c.	

4		13-26	457-477	*Cross mapping allows each of the	Cross map prominent security standards in the
				prominent, core security standards	Informative References.
				identified in the Information	1: Use the Alternative View version of Appendix
				References to stand on its own merits	A. The consolidated view (or mash up view) in the
				and allows companies that have	Preliminary Framework Cybersecurity.pdf is
				adopted at least one of the security	confusing.
				standards apply the specific security	2: Also provide a spreadsheet version of
				standard.	Appendix A with the Alternative View similar to
				*H2Cross mapping allows each	what you released prior to Raleigh for the
				standard to clearly show what a	consolidate/mash-up view of Appendix A /
				company is doing to adopt/implement	Framework Core.XLSX
					http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload/preliminary_cybers
					ecurity framework-framework core.xlsx
				1 5	·
5		13-26	457-477	*Without a thorough cross mapping,	1: Must ensure NIST, COBIT, CSC, and ISO cross
				NIST will have put into question the	mappings are thorough/complete mappings (there
				thoroughness of the existing security	are too may "NA" entries).
				standard if a standard in the	2: Ensure ISO\IEC 27001:2005 A.10.9.1,
				Informative References cannot fulfill	A.10.9.2, A.10.9.3, and A.8.2.2 are listed in the
				a specific Subcategory element (row).	controls listings.
				*NIST will also have effectively	3.
				created a new security standard	
				without thoroughly performing the	
				cross mappings.	
				*Missing several controls that have	
				been known to fail such as ISO\IEC	
				27001:2005 A.10.9.1, A.10.9.2,	
				A.10.9.3, and A.8.2.2 that have been	
				ideitified by HISPI as controls that	
				have consistently failed in 2012 that	
				led to compromised protected data.	
				ied to compromised protected data.	

		12.20	457 477	*TI COA COM	
6		13-26	457-477		Use existing cross mappings such as the CSA
				material, where other cross mappings	
				cost money, and the CSA is willing to	
				work with NIST and US government	
				to keep this cross mapping up to date.	
				*The CSA CCM have been updated	
				frequently (every 6 to 18 months).	
				The CCM applies to single and to	
				multi-tenant entities and is based on	
				ISO and HITRUST.	
				*CSA CCM already covers cloud	
				which will become critical	
				infrastructure.	
				*Phil and CSA is reconfiguring the	
				CSA CCM to resemble the	
				Framework by default. Release date is	
				TBD but will be available by the end	
				of the year.	

	 				L
1 7			New	*ExamplesSANS Quick Wins,	Implement the Quick Wins approach. Identify
		Suggest adding	Lines	Australian Signals Directorate Sweet	what controls failed the most from breach data and
		a Quick Wins		Spot, and HISPI Top 20 ISO\IEC	analysis reports.
		Section or a		27001:2005 Annex A Mitigating	Start Here (CSF Quick Wins):
		add a Get		Controls	1. Patch Applications/Systems
		Started Section		*Use breach analysis	2. OWASP 10 – SQL Injection/XSS
		with Quick		reports—Ponemon, VZ, Mandiant,	3. Look at your logs and detect signs of
		Wins		SANS, HISPI, Trustwave, and	compromise/attacks
				Microsoft	4. Limit admin/privilege access
				*Approach identifies priorities	5. Continuously scan for and remediate critical
				*Cost benefit obtained through	security vulnerabilities
				adoption of a small subset of controls	
				known to fail	
				*Can be different by Sector and Sub-	
				sector, but believe that there are some	
1				universal truths on controls failures	
				when it comes to technology controls	
				- The Cybersecurity Framework	
				released to date is missing controls	
				that already have been known to fail	
				according to the HISPI 20 ISO 27001	
				top failures-A.10.9.1, A.10.9.3,	
				A.10.9.3, and A.8.2.2 should be	
				controls listed in the Informative	
				References but are not. These controls	
				have failed the most in 2012 and have	
				led to protected personal data	
1				breaches that were reported.	
				1. Patch Applications/Systems (cited	
1				by VZDBIR, SANS, AUS, HISPI,	
1				Microsoft, TW)	
				2. OWASP 10 – SQL Injection/XSS	
┣—		N	N	(cited by OWASP, VZDBIR, HISPI,	Energy and the density of sold her Energy 1
		New	New	NIST and/or DHS will need to do	Framework "Adoption" should be Framework
				more leg work to determine what	"Implementation"
				constitutes implementation, but can	
				leverage the Security Index to help	
				answer that question versus using	
				Tiers and Profiles.	