

FVAP Update

Technical Guidelines Development Committee NIST-EAC Dec 15th 2011



- DoD required by law to conduct electronic absentee voting demonstration project
 - 42 USC 1073ff note; 2002 and 2005 NDAAs
 - Mandates
 - Cast Ballots through electronic voting system
 - Only Uniformed services voters specified
 - States must agree to participate
 - Report afterwards
 - o Statistically significant number of participants
- DoD allowed to wait for EAC certified guidelines
 - EAC establishes guidelines
 - $_{\odot}$ EAC also certifies it will assist in project
 - o Different requirement than MOVE Act
 - DoD may further delay implementation



2011 Research Efforts

Research Initiative	Status
Wounded Warrior-Disability Analysis	Complete
Wounded Warrior-Voting Assistance	Complete
Wounded Warrior-Operation VOTE	Complete
VSTL Testing-UPPTR	Complete
Penetration Testing	Complete
2012 Grant Programs-Pilot programs	<u>Ongoing</u>
Cyber Security Review Group-FED only	<u>Ongoing</u>
UOCAVA Solutions Summit-Public	<u>Ongoing</u>



Wounded Warrior Research Initiative-Disability Analysis

Purpose: To analyze voting assistance requirements for wounded and injured military voters

• Individual Interviews:

- Wounded Warrior
- Voting Assistance Officers
- Coordinated with EAC and Heroes Grant recipient

• 1st Phase:

- Over 100 interviews
- Assess current level of accessibility and engagement with Voting Assistance Program

• 2nd Phase:

- Execution of Operation VOTE
- Validate research findings
- Observe usability challenges with existing fvap.gov tools and EVSW implementation



Wounded Warrior Research Initiative-Disability Analysis

Results	Recommendations
Both IVS and EBDS platforms were highly rated for usability	Conduct additional testing of IVS and EBDS systems in both VSTL and operational testing environments
Some users had problems with complex log-in procedures, changing display features, instructions and warnings, navigation, and scrolling	 Share recommended changes with system vendors: Simplify log-in procedures Clarify instructions/warnings Minimize scrolling Label icons for navigation Create links to return to particular races from the verification screen Create built-in audio ballots and touch screen functionality
The UPPTR had inconsistent organization, redundant and vague requirements, and a lack of requirements related to cognitive disabilities	 Encourage EAC/NIST to adopt consistent Requirements numbering Condense redundant requirements Separate distinct requirements Add requirements for cognitive disabilities for systems designed for disability access





Purpose: Establish System Security Baseline

- Evaluate the quality of testing across VSTLs
- Evaluate the sufficiency of the UOCAVA Pilot Program Testing Requirements
- Identify common gaps across vendors
- Establish a baseline on how well vendors are complying
- Limitations
 - No source code or Technical Data Package Review
 - No remediation or retesting

Execution:

• FVAP Funded Testing at Wyle Laboratories, Inc. and SLI Global Solutions

EVSW Systems	Voting Systems
Credence	Dominion Voting
Democracy Live	ES&S
Everyone Counts	Scytl
Konnech	



VSTL Testing Results

Results	Recommendations
No systemic issues noted	
The VSTLs interpreted some of the requirements differently and used differing definitions for "Not Tested" and "Not Applicable"	Better define "Not Tested" and "Not Applicable" – reiterates need for central authority
Labs reported pass/fail at different levels (i.e., overall test vs. individual test elements)	Standardize VSTL reporting to ensure consistency across products and labs
Portions of the UPPTR can be applicable to web based solutions, but may need adjustment	Section 5 of the UPPTR can be used as a foundation for web based voting systems with modifications
VSTLs reports were widely different in formats	Standardize VSTL reporting to ensure consistency across products and labs



Penetration Testing

Purpose: Evaluate the sufficiency of the UOCAVA Pilot Program Testing Requirement, identify common vulnerabilities across vendors and evaluate methods of penetration testing

Methodology: Active Penetration Testing

- Conducted during "mock" election with votes being cast online
- Dominion Voting, Everyone Counts, and Scytl systems
- Two Red Teams:
 - Air Force Institute of Technology Center for Cyber Space Research
 - o RedPhone, LLC
- 72-hour testing period
- Limitations
 - No Denial of Service Attacks
 - No social engineering
 - No attacking of business systems on the same network



Penetration Testing Results

Testing Objective	Results
Identity common vulnerabilities across vendors	No successful penetrations
	Intrusion attempts were quickly identified
	Disable non-essential services & ports
	Isolate voting systems from other support and business systems
Evaluate methods of penetration testing	Future tests need to be > 72 hours
	Future efforts need to reflect actual threat environments





Electronic Absentee Systems for Elections (EASE) Grants

- Multiple competitive awards totaling \$16,200,000
- State and local governments
- Full Grant notice available from <u>www.Grants.gov</u>
 - Announcement Number
 BAA HQ0034-FVAP-11-BAA-0001
 - Or go to Grants.gov and search under "FVAP" keyword search
- Applications closed 13 July

Technical Criteria

- Significance: Addresses key problems
- **Sustainability**: Available beyond term of grant
- Impact: Number of UOCAVA voters served
- **Strategic Approach**: Well-defined hypothesis and plan to test validity of hypothesis
- Innovation: Discovery or implementation of new technologies
- **Scalability**: application across jurisdictions
- **Collaboration**: Involvement of other election jurisdictions/partners
- **Cost Benefit Analysis**: Anticipated ROI (Return on Investment)



EASE Grants Status

- 8 Grants Awarded
 - o NY, OH, MD, NJ, VA,
 - o King Co, Okaloosa Co, Santa Cruz Co
- 17 Grants in Process, possibility of more
- Emphasis was on technical innovation, enduring solutions, and population of voters affected
- No funding of voted ballots electronically in live elections



- Government-only Review Group
 - Provides independent review and advice on FVAP efforts
 - Reviews cyber security efforts in support of the remote electronic voting demonstration project

NIST	EAC
FVAP	FBI
Air Force Institute of	Defense Information
Technology	Systems Agency
Defense Intelligence	Defense Technical
Agency	Information Center
National Security Agency	Naval Research Laboratory
DoD Chief Information	Under Secretary of Defense
Officer	(Personnel & Readiness)

• Expect validation for FVAP-Demo Project CONOPS in early 2012



UOCAVA Solutions Summit

<u>Purpose:</u> Provides for an open dialogue and exchange of ideas on electronic voting properties and build out of risk matrix for current UOCAVA absentee voting environment

Invitees:

- Public advocates and critics
- Advocacy groups
- Service providers
- Government agencies

What's New:

- Last meeting San Francisco, 6-7 AUG 2011
 - Good discussion. Idea to create an open competition (similar to AES/SHA-3) could provide workable solutions at lower cost, with greater transparency and participation.
 - FVAP is investigation potential partnership with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to conduct competition.
- Meeting Aug 4-5, 2012 in Bellevue, WA (Prior to EVT/WOTE and USENIX)



Timeline for discussion only – not approved by DoD, EAC, or NIST



Public Competition Concept

Fully open competition

• Concepts and architectures are submitted

- Full public review and comment
- Source code disclosed
- Government review and selection to next phase

Competition Phases

- 1st phase (NOTIONAL): CONOPS/HLG serve as guidance
- o 2nd phase (NOTIONAL): Usability standards applied
- o 3rd phase (NOTIONAL): Demonstration Project Execution

• Multi-phase over 5 years

- Concept / architecture
- o Implementation
- o **Demonstration**



Notional FVAP Roadmap





Research Plans for 2012

Activity	Status
Technical/Non-Technical Broad Agency Announcement (BAA)	Research based acquisition strategies
Data Migration Tool	Currently revising and reviewing approach
NIPRNet Voting Feasibility Study	Requirements for kiosk & IV Demo implementation using DoD PKI/CAC
Comparative Risk Assessment	Quantify level of risk between existing and IV system
Software Assurance Tools and Forensic Suite Development	Define mitigation strategy and scope positive assurance mechanisms
Kiosk Operational Model	Review 2014 and 2016 models for final "Go/No-Go"
Data Standardization for Candidate/FVAP Survey	



Comparative Risk Assessment

- FVAP plans to conduct a Comparative Risk Analysis
 - o EAC Risk Assessment Tool and NIST Risk Management Framework
 - Initial Risk Assessment by MAR 2012 (?)
 - Comparative Risk Assessment by AUG 2012 (?)
 - Contingent upon contract support
- Assess risks associated with the current UOCAVA Voting Environment
- Compare to risks associated with remote electronic voting
- TGDC Support Needed
 - Review methodologies
 - Comment on preliminary results
 - Incorporate results into High Level Guidelines





- Complete the comparative risk assessment-incorporate TGDC/EAC assessments
- 2. Incorporate and Coordinate FVAP findings from FY 10 and FY 11 research into standards development
- 3. Formally revise Joint EAC-NIST-FVAP Roadmap to reflect 2018 implementation and synchronization



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