



**NIST Response to the World Trade Center Disaster**

**Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation  
of  
the World Trade Center Disaster**


**NIBS/MMC  
WTC Recommendations Committee**

**October 24, 2005**


**Dr. S. Shyam Sunder  
Deputy Director and Lead Investigator  
Building and Fire Research Laboratory  
National Institute of Standards and Technology  
U.S. Department of Commerce**

# Investigation Objectives

- Determine:
  - why and how the WTC towers collapsed following the initial impact of the aircraft, and
  - why and how the 47-story WTC 7 collapsed
- Determine why numbers of injuries and fatalities were so low or high depending on location, including technical aspects of fire protection, occupant behavior, evacuation, and emergency response
- Determine procedures and practices used in the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the WTC buildings
- **Identify specific areas in current national building and fire model codes, standards, and practices that warrant revision**



**WTC 2:** Hit at 9:02:59 a.m.  
Collapsed after 56 minutes



**WTC 1:** Hit at 8:46:30 a.m.  
Collapsed after 102 minutes

View from the East

# Analysis of Probable Collapse Sequence

**NIST developed and used a series of rigorous and comprehensive models to determine the probable collapse sequence for the WTC towers.**

- ❑ Analyzed complete sequence of events:
  - aircraft impact damage to the buildings
  - spread of jet-fuel-ignited multi-floor fires
  - thermal weakening of structural components
  - progression of local structural failures until collapse initiation
  
- ❑ Combined:
  - mathematical modeling
  - well-established statistical and probability-based analysis methods
  - laboratory experiments
  - analysis of visual and physical evidence

**Significantly advanced current state-of-the-art;  
tested the limits of current computational capabilities.**

# WTC 1 Damage: Composite Summary for Floors 93 to 98

## Severe Floor Damage

Fireproofing and partitions 

Floor system structural damage 

Floor system removed 


## Column Damage

Severed 

Heavy Damage 

Moderate Damage 

Light Damage 




# WTC 2 Damage: Composite Summary for Floors 78 to 83

## Floor Damage

- Fireproofing and partitions
- Floor system structural damage
- Floor system removed

## Column Damage


- Severed
- Heavy Damage
- Moderate Damage
- Light Damage



## South Face of WTC1

- Time: 10:22 AM
- Measurements of inward bowing (inches)
- **Maximum = 55 inches**  
(uncertainty ~ +/- 6 inches)


- Floor locations approximate
- Blue tinted region digitally enhanced



## WTC2: East Face

Time: 9:21:29 AM  
~18 minutes post impact

Maximum inward bowing of  
columns approximately  
10 inches





## Inward Bowing of Perimeter Columns About 2 Minutes Prior to Collapse: WTC 2 East Face

9:58:56 a.m.

An aerial photograph of the World Trade Center 2 (WTC 2) East Face, showing the perimeter columns bowing inward. The image is taken from a high angle, looking down at the building's facade. The columns are visible as a series of vertical lines that curve inward towards the center of the building. A large plume of smoke or dust is visible at the top of the building, indicating a recent event. The background is dark, suggesting a night or low-light environment.

©2001. New York City Police Department. All rights reserved.

# Tilting of Building Sections

WTC 1 tilted to the south; WTC 2 tilted to the east and south.

© 2001 Dean Riviere



*Initiation of global collapse was first observed by the tilting of building sections above the impact regions of both WTC towers.*

# Fire Performance of Composite Floor System

- Fire-protection of a truss-supported floor system with spray-on fireproofing was *innovative* and *not consistent with then-prevailing practice*.
- **No evidence found of technical basis in the selection of fireproofing thickness** to meet 2 h fire rating for Class 1-B construction:
  - ❑ 1/2 in. specified when WTC towers were built to maintain Class 1-A (not 1-B) fire rating requirement of NYC Building Code
  - ❑ 1-1/2 in. specified for upgrades some years prior to 2001
- **No evidence that full-scale fire resistance test of the WTC floor system was conducted** to determine the required fireproofing thickness;
  - in 1966, the Architect of Record and,
  - in 1975, the Structural Engineer of Recordstated that the fire rating could not be determined without testing.

# Results From NIST Sponsored Tests at UL

Test	Description	Times to Reach End-Point Criteria (min)					Test Terminated (min)	Standard Fire Test Rating		
		Temperature on Unexposed Surface		Steel Temperatures		Failure to Support Load		ASTM E 119-61	ASTM E 119-00	
		Average (Ambient +250°F)	Maximum (Ambient +325°F)	Average (1100°F)	Maximum (1300°F)			Rating (hr)	Restrained Rating (hr)	Unrestrained Rating (hr)
1	35 ft, restrained, ¾ in fireproofing	---	111	66	62	(3)	116 <sup>(1)</sup>	1½	1½	1
2	35 ft, unrestrained, ¾ in fireproofing	---	---	76	62	(3)	146 <sup>(2)</sup>	2	---	2
3	17 ft, restrained, ¾ in fireproofing	180	157	86	76	(3)	210 <sup>(2)</sup>	2	2	1
4	17 ft, restrained, ½ in fireproofing	---	58	66	58	(3)	120 <sup>(1)</sup>	¾	¾	¾

- (1) Imminent collapse
- (2) Vertical displacement exceeded capability to measure accurately
- (3) Did not occur

The end-point criterion that determined the rating is shown in matching color.

## Wind Load Estimates for WTC 2

Source	Year	Base Shear 10 <sup>3</sup> kips			Base Moment 10 <sup>6</sup> kips-ft		
		N-S	E-W	Resultant	About N-S	About E-W	Resultant
NYC Building Code	Prior to 1968	5.3	5.3		4.2	4.2	
NYC Building Code	1968 - 2001	9.3	9.3		7.6	7.6	
RWDI / NYC Building Code	2002	9.7	11.1	12.3	10.1	9.2	11.3
<b>RWDI / ASCE 7-98</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>10.6</b>	<b>12.2</b>	<b>13.5</b>	<b>11.1</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>12.4</b>
CPP / NYC Building Code	2002	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
<b>CPP / ASCE 7-98*</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>15.1</b>	<b>15.3</b>	<b>17.1</b>	<b>15.5</b>	<b>14.0</b>	<b>17.0</b>
NIST / third-party SOM review / ASCE 7-02	2004	12.2	14.0	15.6	12.8	11.6	14.3
Original WTC Design (Clarified by designer in July 2004)	1960's	13.1	10.1	16.5	8.8	12.6	15.2

\* Using ASCE 7-98 sections 6.5.4.1 and 6.6

# Results and Findings of Drift Analysis

Loading Case	WTC 1				WTC 2			
	E-W		N-S		E-W		N-S	
	Total Drift (in.)	Drift Ratio	Total Drift (in.)	Drift Ratio	Total Drift (in.)	Drift Ratio	Total Drift (in.)	Drift Ratio
Original design case	56.6	H/304	55.7	H/309	51.2	H/335	65.3	H/263
SOP case	56.8	H/303	68.1	H/253	59.7	H/287	56.1	H/306
Refined NIST case	70.6	H/244	83.9	H/205	75.6	H/227	71.0	H/242

- ❑ The calculated drift ratios correspond to a **damping ratio of 2.5%** in estimated wind loads.
- ❑ **Typical drift ratios considered in practice (not required by building codes):**
  - H/500 (~ 32.9 in.)
- ❑ **Limiting drift enhances structural stability and safety in tall buildings;** this is already required to control damage in seismic regions.
- ❑ Acceleration limits used in current practice for occupant comfort (e.g., 15-20 mg) result in stricter control of drift.

# Evacuation and Emergency Response

Based on 1,056 interviews of surviving WTC occupants and 116 interviews of emergency responders.

- It is estimated that **17,400 occupants** ( $\pm 1,200$ ) were present in the WTC towers on the morning of **September 11, 2001**.
- The **initial population of each tower was similar**: 8,900 ( $\pm 750$ ) in WTC 1 and 8,500 ( $\pm 900$ ) in WTC 2.
  - **About 6 percent of the surviving occupants (about 1,000 people) reported a pre-existing limitation to their mobility.**
- Approximately **87 percent of the WTC tower occupants were able to evacuate successfully**, including more than **99 percent of those below the floors of impact**.

## Evacuation Rates in the WTC Towers

- **Roughly 3000 survivors self-evacuated WTC 2** using the **functioning elevators and stairwells** during the **16 minutes prior to aircraft impact**.
- The **egress capacity was adequate** to accommodate survivors who were seeking and able to reach the exits and stairways.
- **A full capacity evacuation with 20,000 people in each WTC tower—two to three times the occupancy on September 11, 2001—would have required about 3 hours.**
  - Under this scenario, it is estimated that **roughly 14,000 people may have lost their lives** and the **egress capacity would have been inadequate** for the time available.
  - The egress capacity required by current building codes is based on evacuating a single floor.



# Occupant Preparedness

- Occupants were often **unprepared for the physical challenge** of full building evacuation.
  - The average surviving occupant **moved slower down stairs and through stairwell exits** than previously reported for non-emergency evacuations.
  - In WTC 1, **the average surviving occupant spent 48 seconds per floor descending the stairwell.**
- After the collapse of WTC 2, emergency responders found **mobility impaired occupants** of WTC 1 still in the staircases going down.
  - Ambulatory mobility impaired occupants **blocked others behind them from moving more rapidly down the stairs.**
  - **FDNY and PAPD personnel found 40 to 60 mobility impaired occupants on the 12<sup>th</sup> floor of WTC 1.** They had been placed on this floor in an attempt to clear the stairways.

# Emergency Response in High-Rise Buildings

Example: Response to a 60 story high-rise building, occupants trapped above fires on the 58<sup>th</sup> floor and no operating elevators.


Firefighters:  
With equipment ~ 125 minutes  
Without equipment ~ 90 minutes

Estimated firefighter climbing rate  
(60 minute climbing period to max height)  
**2 min/floor with equipment**  
**1.4 min/floor without equipment**

Firefighters begin to climb 7-15 minutes  
Fire department arrival 4-10 minutes



# Radio Communications in High-Rise Buildings



Schematic of WTC Radio Repeater System

- **Intra-operability** within an emergency responder organization:
  - Buildings pose a challenging radio-frequency environment.
  - Capacity, protocols, and training for large-scale operations.
- **Interoperability** among different emergency responder organizations.

## Context for Recommendations

- The tragic consequences of the September 11, 2001, attacks were directly attributable to the fact that terrorists flew large jet-fuel laden commercial airliners into the WTC towers.
- **Buildings for use by the general population are not designed to withstand aircraft attacks;** building codes do not require consideration of aircraft impact.
- In our cities, there has been **no experience with evacuation and emergency response in a building disaster of this magnitude**, nor has there been any in which the total collapse of a high-rise building occurred so rapidly and with little warning.
- Documents suggest that **the WTC towers generally were designed and maintained consistent with the requirements of the 1968 New York City Building Code.**

## Context for Recommendations (2)

- NIST's recommendations for improvements to codes, standards, and practices are applicable under the **hazards and conditions recognized in *normal* building design.**
- Public officials and building owners will need to determine appropriate performance requirements for **buildings that are at *higher risk* due to their iconic status, critical function, or design.**
- **The recommendations are *performance-oriented*. They do not *prescribe* specific:**
  - **Systems, materials, or technologies.** NIST encourages competition among alternatives that can meet *performance requirements*.
  - **Threshold levels.** This responsibility falls within the purview of the public policy and standards and codes development process.

# WTC Recommendations

- NIST has made **30 recommendations** for improvements to codes, standards, and practices which fall into **8 major groups**:

- Increased Structural Integrity

- Enhanced Fire Resistance of Structures

- New Methods for Designing Structures to Resist Fires

- Improved Active Fire Protection

- Improved Building Evacuation

- Improved Emergency Response

- Improved Procedures and Practices

- Education and Training Programs

**Structural  
Design**

**Life  
Safety  
Systems**

**Practices &  
Development**

# Increased Structural Integrity

Consensus standards and code provisions for **preventing progressive collapse** be developed and adopted nationwide – along with tools and guidelines for their use...and a standard methodology be developed to reliably **predict the potential for complex failures** in structural systems subjected to multiple hazards. Rec. #1

Nationally accepted performance standards be developed for:

- **wind tunnel testing** of prototype structures based on sound technical methods that result in **repeatable and reproducible results**; and
- **estimating wind loads** and their effects on tall buildings, based on wind tunnel testing data and directional wind speed data. Rec. #2

Appropriate criterion be developed and implemented to enhance performance of tall buildings by **limiting how much they sway** under lateral load design conditions (e.g., winds and earthquakes). Rec. #3

# Enhanced Fire Resistance of Structures

Evaluate -- and where needed improve -- the technical basis for determining **construction classification and fire rating requirements (especially for tall buildings)**...and make related code changes now as much as possible by explicitly considering:

- **timely access** by emergency responders and **full evacuation** of occupants, or time required for **burnout without partial collapse**;
- extent to which **redundancy** in active fire protection (sprinkler and standpipe, fire alarm, and smoke management) systems *should be credited* for occupant life safety;
- need for **redundancy in fire protection systems** critical to structural integrity;
- ability of the structure and local floor systems to withstand **maximum credible fire scenario without collapse** -- recognizing that sprinklers could be compromised, not operational, or non-existent; (continued)



## Enhanced Fire Resistance of Structures (2)

- **compartmentation** requirements to protect the structure, including:
  - fire rated doors and automatic enclosures, and
  - limiting air supply (e.g., thermally resistant window assemblies) to retard fire spread in buildings with large, open floor plans,
- effect of spaces containing **unusually large fuel concentrations** for the expected occupancy of the building; and
- extent to which fire control systems -- including suppression by automatic or manual means -- should be credited as part of the prevention of fire spread. Rec. #4

## Enhanced Fire Resistance of Structures (3)

Improve the technical basis for century-old **standard for fire resistance testing** of components, assemblies, and systems and... develop **guidance for extrapolating results** of tested assemblies to prototypical building systems. A key step in fulfilling this recommendation is to establish a **capability for studying and testing** components, assemblies, and systems **under realistic fire and load conditions**. Rec. #5

Develop criteria, test methods, and standards:

- for **in-service performance of fireproofing** to protect structural components; and
- to ensure that **as-installed fireproofing** conforms to conditions in tests used to establish the fire resistance rating. Rec. #6

Adopt and use **“structural frame” approach** (structural members connected to the columns carry the high fire resistance rating of the columns). Rec. #7

# New Methods for Fire Resistance Design of Structures

Require that uncontrolled building fires result in ***burnout without partial or global (total) collapse***. Rec. #8

Develop:

- ***performance-based standards and code provisions*** -- as an alternative to current prescriptive design methods -- to enable ***design and retrofit of structures to resist real fire conditions***
- tools, guidelines, and test methods to ***evaluate fire performance of the structure as a whole system***. Rec. #9

# New Methods for Fire Resistance Design of Structures (2)

Develop and evaluate ***new fire resistive coating materials, systems, and technologies*** with significantly enhanced performance and durability to provide protection following major events. Rec. #10

Evaluate performance and suitability of ***advanced structural steel, reinforced and pre-stressed concrete, and other high-performance material systems*** for use under conditions expected in building fires. Rec. #11

## Improved Active Fire Protection

Enhance performance and possibly the **redundancy of active fire protection systems** to accommodate **higher risks associated with tall buildings**. Rec. #12

Develop **advanced fire alarm and communication systems** that provide **continuous, reliable, and accurate information on life safety conditions** to manage the evacuation process; all communication and control paths in buildings need to be designed and installed to have the same resistance to failure and increased survivability above that specified in present standards. Rec. #13

Adapt advanced fire/emergency control panels to accept and interpret more – and more reliable -- information from the active fire protection systems to provide **tactical decision aids**. Rec. #14

Develop and require systems for **improved transmission to emergency responders, and off-site or black-box storage, of information** from building monitoring systems. Rec. #15

# Improved Building Evacuation

Develop and carry out **public education and training campaigns** to improve building **occupants' preparedness for evacuation** in case of building emergencies. Rec. #16

Design tall buildings to accommodate **timely full building evacuation of occupants when required** in building-specific or large-scale emergencies such as widespread power outages, major earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, fires, explosions, and terrorist attack.

- Building size, population, function, and iconic status should be taken into account in designing the egress system.
- Stairwell capacity and stair discharge door width should be adequate to accommodate counterflow due to emergency access by responders. Rec. #17

## Improved Building Evacuation (2)

Design egress systems:

- to **maximize remoteness of egress components** (i.e., stairs, elevators, exits) without negatively impacting the average travel distance;
- to maintain their functional **integrity and survivability** under foreseeable building-specific or large-scale emergencies; and
- with consistent layouts, standard signage, and guidance so that systems become **intuitive and obvious** to building occupants during evacuations.

Rec. #18

## Improved Building Evacuation (3)

Building owners, managers, and emergency responders should develop a joint plan and ***ensure accurate emergency information is communicated*** in a timely manner ***to enhance awareness of occupants and emergency responders*** through:

- better coordination of information among different emergency responder groups,
- efficient sharing of that information among building occupants and emergency responders,
- more robust design of emergency public address systems,
- improved emergency responder communication systems, and
- use of the Emergency Broadcast System (the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System) and Community Emergency Alert Networks. Rec. #19



## Improved Building Evacuation (4)

Evaluate the full range of current and *next generation evacuation technologies* for future use, including:

- protected/hardened elevators,
- exterior escape devices, and
- stairwell descent devices,

which may allow all occupants an *equal opportunity for evacuation* and facilitate emergency response access. Rec. #20

# Improved Emergency Response Technologies and Procedures

Install ***fire-protected and structurally hardened elevators in tall buildings*** to provide timely emergency access to responders and allow evacuation of mobility impaired building occupants.

- Such elevators should be for exclusive use by emergency responders during emergencies.
- In tall buildings, consideration also should be given to installing such elevators for use by all occupants. Rec. #21

Install, inspect, and test ***emergency communications systems, radio communications, and associated operating protocols*** to ensure that the systems and protocols:

- are effective for ***large-scale emergencies*** in buildings with ***challenging radio frequency propagation environments***, and
- can be used to ***identify, locate, and track emergency responders*** within indoor building environments and in the field. Rec. #22

# Improved Emergency Response Technologies and Procedures (2)

Establish and implement detailed procedures and methods for gathering, processing, and delivering critical information through ***integration of relevant voice, video, graphical, and written data*** to enhance situational awareness of all emergency responders. Establish an ***information intelligence sector*** to coordinate each incident. Rec. #23

Establish and implement codes and protocols for ensuring ***effective and uninterrupted operation of the command and control system*** for large-scale building emergencies. Rec. #24

# Improved Procedures and Practices

***Nongovernmental and quasi-governmental entities*** that own or lease buildings -- and are not subject to building and fire safety code requirements of any governmental jurisdiction -- should be encouraged to provide a ***level of safety that equals or exceeds*** the level of safety that would be provided by ***strict compliance with the code requirements of an appropriate governmental jurisdiction.***

- As-designed and as-built safety should be ***certified by a qualified third party***, independent of the building owner(s).
- The process ***should not use self-approval*** for code enforcement in areas including:
  - interpretation of code provisions,
  - design approval,
  - product acceptance,
  - certification of the final construction, and
  - post-occupancy inspections over the life of the buildings. #25

## Improved Procedures and Practices (2)

State and local jurisdictions adopt and ***aggressively enforce building codes to ensure that egress and sprinkler requirements are met*** by existing buildings. Further, occupancy requirements should be modified where needed (such as when there are assembly use spaces within an office building) to meet the model building codes. Rec. #26

Building codes should require building owners to ***retain documents*** related to building design, construction, maintenance and modifications ***over the entire life of the building***. Means should be developed for ***offsite storage and maintenance of the documents***. Relevant information should be ***easily accessible by responders*** during emergencies. Rec. #27

## Improved Procedures and Practices (3)

The role of the “Design Professional in Responsible Charge” be clarified to ensure that ***all appropriate design professionals*** (including the fire protection and structural engineers) ***are part of the team*** designing ***buildings that employ innovative or unusual structural and fire safety systems.*** Rec. #28

# Education and Training

**Continuing education curricula** should be developed and programs be implemented for:

- training fire protection engineers and architects in **structural engineering principles and design**, and
- training structural engineers, architects, fire protection engineers, and code enforcement officials in **modern fire protection principles and technologies**, including **fire-resistance design of structures**.
- training building regulatory and fire service personnel to upgrade their understanding and skills to conduct the **review, inspection, and approval tasks** for which they are responsible. Rec. #29

Academic, professional **short-course**, and web-based **training materials** in the use of **computational fire dynamics and thermostructural analysis tools** be developed. Rec. #30

# Achieving “Real” Safety Improvements

- NIST believes that the **recommendations are realistic, appropriate, and achievable** within a reasonable period of time.
  - Aim of design is to anticipate rare design events in a rational manner
  - Unanticipated events have surprised the design community (e.g., Northridge earthquake)
  - Historical statistics do not adequately capture rare design events (tails of distributions)
- **Only a few of the recommendations call for new requirements in standards and codes.** Most of the recommendations deal with:
  - Improving an existing standard or code requirement
  - Establishing a standard for an existing practice without one
  - Establishing the technical basis for an existing requirement
  - Making a current requirement risk-consistent
  - Adopting or enforcing a current requirement
  - Establishing a performance-based alternative to a current prescriptive requirement
- **Implementation of the recommendations would make buildings, occupants, and emergency responders safer in future emergencies.**



# Call for Action

- NIST is assigning ***top priority to work vigorously with the building and fire safety communities*** to assure that there is a *complete understanding* of the recommendations and to provide needed *technical assistance*.
- NIST has:
  - identified ***specific*** codes, standards, and practices affected by each of the 30 recommendations in its final report, and
  - reached out to the responsible organizations to pave the way for a ***timely, expedited consideration*** of the recommendations.
- NIST held a **conference** September 13-15, 2005 attended by **over 200 people, including *all major standards and codes developers***.
- NIST has awarded a contract to the National Institute of Building Sciences—a Congressionally authorized non-profit, non-governmental organization—to **turn appropriate recommendations into code language suitable for submission** of code change proposals **to the two national model code developers**. NIBS is drawing upon building code experts to carry out this task.
- NIST will implement a web-based system so that the public can track progress on implementing the recommendations.

## Next Steps

- NIST plans to release final versions of the 43 reports on the WTC towers, totaling some 10,000 pages, on October 26, 2005.
- The summary WTC towers report is about 250 pages and contains the principal findings and recommendations from the investigation.
- Next spring, NIST plans to release an additional five reports on the investigation of WTC 7 as drafts for public comment.

**Web site <http://wtc.nist.gov>**

**Email to [wtc@nist.gov](mailto:wtc@nist.gov)**

**Facsimile to (301) 975-6122**

**Regular mail:**

**WTC Technical Information Repository, Stop 8610,  
100 Bureau Drive, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8610.**