



Elevators, Fire, and Accessibility

***Papers presented at:* The 2nd Symposium on Elevators, Fire, and Accessibility
Baltimore, Maryland
April 19 – 21, 1995**

Sponsored by:

American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Accessibility Equipment Manufacturers Association
American Hotel and Motel Association
US Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board
Building Officials and Code Administrators International, Inc.
Building Owners and Managers Association International
Council of American Building Officials
Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association
International Conference of Building Officials
National Association of Elevator Contractors
National Association of Elevator Safety Authorities
National Association of Vertical Transportation Professionals
National Elevator Industry, Inc.
National Easter Seal Society
National Fire Protection Association
National Institute of Standards and Technology Building and Fire Research Laboratory
Paralyzed Veterans of America
Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc.

**IN CONSIDERATION OF
ELEVATORS
AS PART OF
A BUILDING EVACUATION SCHEME**

by Philip C. Favro

Use elevators in a fire? **Never!** The very thought has been anathema among fire professionals; its utterance, blasphemy. Elevators are death traps in a fire. Everybody knows that. The notion of using them for evacuation is ridiculous. Take for example what one fire expert **says** in a pamphlet on high-rise fire **safety**: "Most people know only one way to get out of a building, the way they came in. If that was the elevator, they're in big trouble. If there's smoke in the building they should avoid the elevator like the plague."

Firefighters have almost routinely refused to trust **elevators** for access to fires on the upper stories of buildings. Stories of fires in high-rise buildings are rife with accounts of firefighters lugging hose, tools, and other equipment up flights and flights of stairs to **attack** fires above the reach of their ladders. And elevator experts have added to this lore by making flat-out statements that **elevators** are not **safe** in fire emergencies.

And there have been good **reasons** for discouraging elevator use in these situations. For example, a person may push a call button and wait for the elevator which, because of automatic **recall**, will never come, thus costing that person valuable minutes that could otherwise mean survival. Since elevators **respond** to car and corridor calls, these calls may originate at the fire floor, bringing the car and its occupants to the **seat** of the problem rather than to **safety**. Fear and irrational behavior may lead to overcrowding which in turn can cause blockage of the doors rendering the elevator inoperative **and** the car immovable. During a fire a power failure can occur, trapping occupants in a potentially **smoke-filled shaft** with no means of **escape**. Finally, water from sprinklers or even firefighter hoses can **short-out** motors and cause brakes to dip or fail.

Certainly history tends to **support** this concern for

elevator reliability. Civilians and firefighters have been trapped, injured, and even killed when elevators malfunctioned or failed in a fire. For instance, five guests in a New Orleans hotel attempted to leave the building after being warned of a fire on a higher floor by the **front** desk. They took the elevator. It started down, went two floors, reversed itself, and went to the fire floor where the doors opened and the passengers **died**. And in New York *City*, firefighters responding to a fire on an upper floor of an office building, tried to take an **elevator** under manual control to the 18th floor, two floors **below** the fire floor. The elevator passed the 18th, went to the 20th where the doors opened long enough to kill **all** of the firefighters, then **closed** and returned to the lobby.

Nevertheless, elevators and their presence in multi-story buildings are a fact of **life**. Literally thousands of new high-rise buildings have been designed and built throughout the United **States** in the **last** 30 years. What was once a phenomena **reserved** for major cities is now common **even** in suburbs and out-of-the-way rural **areas**.

Despite the **spotty** past performance of elevators in fires, **everyone** will agree that they remain the most efficient and effective **mode** of vertical movement in **multi-story** buildings, buildings which house thousands of people in their vertical interiors who depend almost totally upon elevators **as** their means **of** daily transportation from floor to floor. And elevators have saved occupants in real fires, the most notable of which was the tragic **Joelma** fire in Sao Paulo, Brazil in 1974 during which **300** of the **422 survivors escaped** by elevator.

Today, virtually all buildings containing elevators have signs **at** each floor, near each elevator, which **warn** against the use of the those elevators in a fire emergency. Nevertheless, most will concede that their use under emergency conditions may be vital

if firefighters and occupants in ultra high-rise buildings are to have a reasonable chance of survival during fires or other emergencies.

The notion that elevators can enhance exiting and thus, building safety is supported by studies from the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) where researchers have developed a computer program called "ELVAC" which can calculate elevator evacuation times. These studies show that in very tall high-rise buildings, those over about 30 stories, evacuation time can be greatly enhanced by use of the elevators. For example in the 36-story Jackson Federal Office Building in Seattle, evacuation time dropped from 26 to 13 minutes when elevators were factored into the evacuation scheme, a reduction of 50 percent.

But still, a hesitancy persists on the part of many fire professionals, as well as many in the elevator industry, to "sanction" the use of elevators—even under the control of trained firefighters—for use in emergency evacuations even though it may well be that in some fires in multistory buildings, the chances of death in an elevator are not any different from those in stairs. At the Inn at the Park fire in Toronto in 1981, for instance, of the six victims, four died in the stairwells. And in the MGM Grand fire in Las Vegas, nine of the victims were found in stairwells, while five perished in the elevators.

While this hesitancy is understandable, given some of the tragic experiences that have occurred with elevator use in fires, it once again points out the reliance that is placed on the sanctity of specific code requirements without the payment of equal attention to occupant behavior and how people tend to act in real fires.

Studies in human behavior show clearly that people in emergency situations will tend to do what they are familiar with. And in tall buildings, where elevators are the normal mode of travel—the familiar means of transportation, if you will—persons tend to gravitate toward them, even when warned not to. Keating and Loftus have found that under heightened anxiety, people's attention becomes narrowly focused and they are aware of only the most obvious aspects of their environment. Peripheral cues, which are usually easily processed, remain unobserved. For example, people who regularly enter and leave a building by elevator cannot be expected to abandon their habitual route during emergency evacuation. Studies conducted

in England have found that if an emergency escape route is **not part** of the normal circulation pattern, it may well have significant negative consequences on an occupant's ability to reach safety. In fact there may be fundamental problems with the whole concept of emergency escape routes that are designed to be used **only** in an emergency, e.g. stairs in a high-rise building, because of a person's reluctance, unwillingness, ignorance, and fear in using them.

To add to this dilemma, something new has been added to the equation. Over the last quarter century, a social phenomena has occurred that has forced many well-meaning professionals and others to rethink their position on building evacuation. Culminating with the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, great strides have been taken towards eliminating the barriers that have hindered and prevented access to public buildings by millions of Americans who are physically and intellectually challenged or disabled. Now, these citizens, who make up about three percent of the general population, are able to access buildings as never before. In the future, virtually all new public buildings will be accessible to persons with disabilities. That means that if a building is more than one story, it is likely to have an elevator. And if it has an elevator, that elevator will be used. Not as a special tool for those who are confined to wheel chairs or who are otherwise unable to negotiate stairs, but by just about everyone who enters and leaves the upper floors of those buildings.

And once individuals with mobility limitations are present in buildings, how will they get out if there's a fire or other emergency that requires evacuation? At last fall's NFPA meeting in Toronto, a speaker related how one woman figured she would do it. Confined to a wheel chair and working on the 14th story of an office building, she knew not to use the elevator. But she **said she** was not concerned because she would **go to** her office window where firefighters could use ladders to carry her to safety. Silly? Maybe, but probably not too far from the norm among people who know there are limitations on what they can **do** for their own **safety** in an emergency if the elevator is unavailable.

There has been much **written** and much spoken about in the **last** several years that in today's modern sprinklered buildings, evacuation, or even relocation, is unnecessary. **This** assumption that in

sprinklered buildings smoke is **not** hazardous and therefore movement of occupants is not required (because there is no specific threat) is naive and not supported by empirical evidence or scientific research. People, disabled or not, when faced with a threat, real or perceived, will attempt to flee. And it will likely be impossible to convince them that they are not in danger when they **see** what they consider to be an obvious problem such as smoke. Witness what happened at a 1975 fire in the World Trade Center in New York, a fire that involved a waste basket confined to a single room. The occupants of eleven floors, 9 through 22, evacuated even though the smoke was light, was not lethal, and the occupants were told that evacuation was unnecessary.

One thing is certain in all this, and that is that with the current move throughout North America to performance-based codes, it is **even** more critical that the way people actually behave in real fire situations be considered as part of a building's overall performance evaluation. And there is a need to start integrating elevator evacuation into the general evacuation or relocation scheme. The model building codes and NFPA's Life Safety Code **seem** to have moved in this direction. The creators of these documents have worked diligently to address the challenge of providing access **and** egress for persons with disabilities.

Technologically, however, there is still a way to go. All of the potential elevator failure eventualities cited above and more were taken into consideration when the so-called "Firemen's elevator" was designed, making **at least** those elevators with their three-phase operational switch more **safe** and reliable. And while the knowledge and technology is there to **solve** the recognized problems with elevators in fire situations, there persists a pervasive problem that continues to plague designers and theoreticians alike, and that is how to maintain a clean environment, one free of water **and** smoke, so that the elevator can function **as** intended.

In efforts to **deal** with this **and** other problems, much work has been done in North America **and** abroad which explores objectively, and in **detail**, the use of elevators for emergency evacuation. Studies dealing with smoke control, smoke movement, and evacuation have been done at NIST and there is currently a test project **underway** which **deals** with the very issue of water protection for elevator shafts. And, in fact, a recent NIST study sponsored by the

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to look **at** the feasibility of elevator emergency evacuation at air traffic control towers concludes that such evacuation is feasible for new construction. This conclusion has **led** NIST to make a formal proposal to the NFPA's Life Safety Code to integrate elevators **as** part of the means of egress system.

Elsewhere, the United States Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board commissioned a study, Egress Procedures and Technologies For People With Disabilities, which recommends the use of elevators **as** part of the means of egress for disabled persons. Abroad, the British have adopted, **as** part of their Standard on Fire Precautions in the Design and Construction of Buildings, a Code of Practice for People with Disabilities, in which protected elevators are accepted **as** part of the means of vertical **escape**. The **result** of this kind of work has been a recognition of the concept by the code-making bodies, and the establishment, within the codes, of accessible means of egress provisions which include the elevator **as** part of that accessible path.

But that's only half the answer. More than simple elevator improvements must be made. Beyond its compliance with standards for automatic retrieval and firefighter override, the elevator must be protected, along with its shaft, from the rest of the building. And this is true even in sprinklered buildings. That is, it must be contained in a separate compartment, perhaps an elevator lobby, which encloses the elevators **at** every floor, creating **an** area that is protected from fire and smoke; or, conversely, which protects the rest of the building from fire and smoke which may be contained within the compartment. Further, the elevator should be **sewed** by a protected route, and should **lead** **to an** area that provides level evacuation through a protected route. Finally, accessible stairways are essential even in buildings which rely on elevators for evacuation, **as a last** resort if all else fails.

when viewed objectively, this concept is **neither as** radical nor **as** risky **as** it may first appear. Nor is it anything that is overwhelmingly innovative. The concept of **compartmentation** and horizontal evacuation upon which it is based has been **an** integral part of fire **safety** in health care occupancies for more than **30** years. In these occupancies, building and fire/life **safety** experts have long agreed that the patient room floors on acute care

hospitals, nursing homes, and similar facilities—even with supervision and control of these patients by nurses and other staff—are virtually impossible to evacuate in any conventional manner because the patients may be totally incapable of any form of self-evacuation, and many may be unable to be removed from their beds without grave risk.

To deal with this reality, the evacuation strategy has been simply to sub-divide each floor into at least two compartments with sufficient protection between those compartments (smoke barriers or horizontal exits) to allow movement of patients across the barrier from an unsafe to a safe area where they can be adequately cared for; or, if necessary, evacuated via elevators from the building without removal from their beds.

It is this concept, and variations of it, that is the basis for all the work that has been done regarding effective use of elevators in fire emergencies. Taking a page from this philosophy, buildings and their evacuation capability, must be judged as "use specific" rather than occupancy specific. That is, they must be judged individually and not as some anonymous entity lumped into an occupancy chapter of the building code. A departure from the norm perhaps but a critical element in performance based codes and in rational and reasonable judgements by the authorities having jurisdiction.

Separation of the elevators from the fire threat is the surest way to make them effective. It is a practical solution that can provide safe egress for persons with disabilities, as well as others, by acknowledging their behavior rather than trying to modify it, and by taking advantage of their natural tendency to use a familiar route. And it meets the challenge of behavioral experts to incorporate into all of our buildings the predictable changes in people's normal behavior that can be expected during emergencies.

Do elevators have a role in this scheme of emergency evacuation? Most certainly they do. Unquestionably not as the sole means of egress from multi-storied buildings, but as a viable part of that egress system to allow for safe evacuation of those who are disabled, injured, stricken, or ill—as long as they are separated from the remainder of the building by barriers that render smoke and fire a less threatening foe.

REFERENCES

Alvord, D.M., Groner, N.E., Klote, J.H. and Levin, B.M. FEASIBILITY AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS OF EMERGENCY EVACUATION BY ELEVATORS. NISTIR 4870, September 1992.

Aikman, A.J.M. INTERIM REPORT OF THE JOINT TASK GROUP ON BARRIER FREE ACCESS. The Standing Committee on Barrier Free Design and the Standing Committee on Occupancy, March 1993.

American Society of Mechanical Engineers. SAFETY CODE FOR ELEVATORS AND ESCALATORS, ANSI ASME A17.1-1993. ASME, New York, 1993.

British Standards Institution. BRITISH STANDARD FOR FIRE PRECAUTIONS IN THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS: CODE OF PRACTICE FOR MEANS OF ESCAPE FOR DISABLED PEOPLE, BS 5588: PART 8. BSI, London, 1988.

Bryan, J.L. HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND FIRE. NFPA Handbook, 17th Edition, 1991

Bryan, J.L. CONVERGENCE CLUSTERS: A PHENOMENON OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR SEEN IN SELECTED HIGH RISE BUILDING FIRES. Fire Journal, Vol. 79 No. 6, 1985.

Building Officials and Code Administrators International. BOCA NATIONAL BUILDING CODE, 1993 Ed., Country Club Hills, IL, 1993.

Groner, N.E., Klote, J.H. and Levin, B.M. FEASIBILITY OF FIRE EVACUATION BY ELEVATORS AT FAA CONTROL TOWERS. NISTIR 5445, May 1994.

Groner, N.E. and Levin, B.M. HUMAN BEHAVIOR ASPECTS OF STAGING AREAS FOR FIRE SAFETY IN GSA BUILDINGS. NIST-GCR-92-606, April 1992.

International Conference of Building Officials. UNIFORM BUILDING CODE, 1994 Ed., Whittier, CA, 1994.

Jones, J.C. A BRIEF LOOK AT THE HOTEL FIRE RECORD. Fire Journal, May 1981.

Juillet, E. EVACUATING PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES. Fire Engineering, Vol. 146 No. 42, December 1993.

Kaufman, R.H. WARNING: HOTELS COULD BE DANGEROUS TO YOUR HEALTH. *IFSTA*, Winter 1980.

Keating, J.P. THE MYTH OF PANIC. *Fire Journal*, Vol. 76, No.3, 1982.

Keating, J.P. and Loftus, E.F. THE LOGIC OF FIRE ESCAPE. *Psychology Today*, June 1981.

Note, J.H. and Tamura, G.T. SMOKE CONTROL AND FIRE EVACUATION BY ELEVATORS. *ASHRAE*, Winter Meeting, Vol.92 No.14, 1986.

Klote, J.H. SMOKE CONTROL FOR ELEVATORS. Center for Fire Research, NBS, NBSIR 83-2715, June 1983.

National Fire Protection Association. PRELIMINARY REPORT ON MGM GRAND HOTEL FIRE, LAS VEGAS, NV, December, 1980.

National Fire Protection Association. LIFE SAFETY CODE. NFPA-101 1994. Quincy, MA, 1994.

Parrish, R.L. THE MGM GRAND HOTEL FIRE. *International Fire Chief*, January 1981.

Pauls, J. EGRESS PROCEDURES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES. U.S. ATBCB, October 1988.

Paulsen, R.L. HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND FIRE EMERGENCIES: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY. Center for Fire Research, NBS, NBSIR 81-2438, 1981.

Sharry, J.A. REAL-WORLD PROBLEMS WITH ZONED EVACUATION. *Fire Journal*, March 1983.

Sime, J.D. HUMAN BEHAVIOUR IN FIRES. BUSRU, School of Architecture, Portsmouth Polytechnic, 1992.

Southern Building Code Congress International. STANDARD BUILDING CODE, 1994 Ed., Birmingham, AL, 1994.

Sumka, E.H. PRESENTLY, ELEVATORS ARE NOT SAFE IN FIRE EMERGENCIES. *ASHRAE Transactions*, Vol. 93 Part II, 1987.

White, D. TOWERING TEXAS TERROR. *Firehouse*, May 1982.

Phillip C. Favro currently operates his own fire protection consulting firm in California. He chairs the National Fire Protection Association Technical Committee on Board and Care Facilities, and is a member of NFPA's Technical Coordinating Committee on Safety to Life and the Technical Committee on Means of Egress. Mr. Favro is also a member of ASTM's E-5 Committee on Fire Standards. He has been a member of the National Task Force on Life Safety and the Disabled since 1978. Prior to establishing his consulting business, Mr. Favro served as California State Fire Marshal for eight years and as a line fire officer in the San Francisco Fire Department for 74 years.