A DOE Research Laboratories' View on Time Synchronization Needs & Challenges

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NIST/IEEE Timing Challenges In The Smart Grid Workshop





Talk Outline

- Why do we need Improved Time Synchronization in the Grid?
- Where are we insufficient?
 - Performance Factors
 - Security Concerns
 - Resiliency Aspects
 - Business Considerations
- Conclusions and Discussion







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Motivation - Rapid Change



The Future









Motivation 2 – Climate Change

Number of Events



source: The Quadrennial Energy Review: First Installment



Motivation 2 (cont.) – Storm Surge Exposure



source: The Quadrennial Energy Review: First Installment



How Has This Administration Responded?

GMI Goal for 2020: Provide real-time information of solar and wind generation and building loads at high spatial and temporal resolution.







What Can The DOE do?

- DOE is able to assess regional and national grid modernization efforts, technology and market developments, and institutional barriers affecting generation, transmission, distribution, and end-use technologies.
- DOE is also the most qualified to conduct foundational work to identify gaps in fundamental knowledge and technology.
- Finally, DOE is able to convene stakeholders to develop consensus roadmaps, deliver new platforms of tools and analytics to catalyze innovation in industry, and accelerate adoption of new technologies.
- In summary, DOE's technical expertise, past accomplishments, and current activities provide the basis for new grid leadership.



What Can The DOE do?

- to assess regional and national grid modernization DOE is able ket developments, and institutional barriers efforts, t Government Leadership, in affectind n and end-use technol
- the form of Technical DOE is identify Guidance; provide an gaps
- unbiased appraisal of rapidly Final ensus changing technologies road alyze ologies. inno
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Talk Outline

Motivation for Improved Time Synchronization in the Smart Grid

≻Areas of Concern

- Performance Factors
- Security Concerns
- Resiliency Aspects
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Performance Factors (defining the need) Distributed Situational Awareness Demands Coordination



The Valley Falls, Rhode Island train wreck of the Providence and Worcester Railroad, August 12, 1853 The North American Electric Reliability Council cited a lack of situational awareness as a contributing factor leading to the 2003 blackout.

Among their recommendations was the installation of time-synchronized data recording and reporting devices.

Phasor Measurement Units (PMU)s allow for both a forensic analysis of grid events and real-time grid monitoring.

Accurate measurement of synchrophasors across the grid requires stable and synchronized clock sources.

More than 800 phasor measurement units were deployed under the Recovery Act smart grid projects overseen by DOE for a nationwide total of more than 1,700 as of 2014 (mostly at the transmission level).



Picture from: https://selinc.com/products/2240/



Performance Factors (quantifying success) ...Better Time Agreement → Better Understanding

- According to some work by Zhao et al., angle error as low as ±0.1° can cause a failure, and an angle error of ±0.6° will have an even greater impact.¹
- From a study of the Northeast Power Coordinating Council model, an angle error as small as ±0.15° is able to change the first responding PMU.
- There is an important standards and testing component to ensuring we employ devices that meet the need. (Not surprising that NIST is hosting this event.) Most PMUs fail the 2011 standards

¹ Jiecheng Zhao, Jin Tan, Ling Wu, Lingwei Zhan, Yilu Liu, Jose R. Gracia, Paul D. Ewing. Impact of Measurement Error on Synchrophasor Applications. ORNL Technical Report



Security Factors (defining the need)

- Requirements for robustness in the presence of directed attacks on the distributed precision time service.
 - Physical or cyber-attack,
 - Exploit storms & earthquakes,
 - Electro-magnetic pulse (EMP),
 - Exploit geo-magnetic disturbances (GMD)





Security Factors (cont.)

- In fiscal year 2012, some 198 cyber incidents were reported across all critical infrastructure sectors. Forty-one percent of these incidents involved the energy sector, particularly the electric power sector.*
- Broader picture, this is seen as part of the overarching "unifying the grid communications network"



*Source: Bipartisan Policy Center, *Cybersecurity and the North American Electric Grid: New Policy Approaches to Address an Evolving Threat*, February, 2014.





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Security Factors (quantifying success)

- Strategy based on the NIST cybersecurity framework¹
- Establishment of three Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs)
 - Disseminate information on actionable data
- National Level Exercises such as the Cyber Storm series and CyberGuard
- DOE's Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) Program



Energy Sector-Specific Plan

¹ National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity," February 12, 2014, http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf .



Resiliency (defining the need)

- Requirements for achieving resilient operation in the face of losing any given timing source. Emphasis on low-cost, lightweight (man portable), and secure devices capable of functioning without external power other than their connection to the grid. Robust (Superstorm Sandy).
- GMI 2020 Goal: Synchrophasor technology that is reliable during transient events:
 - Physical or cyber-attack,
 - Storms & earthquakes,
 - Electro-magnetic pulse (EMP),
 - Geo-magnetic disturbances (GMD)









Resile Subject:CGSIC: FW: Official Press Release - GPS Ground System Anomaly Date:Thu, 28 Jan 2016 01:11:27 +0000 Reply-To:cgsic@cgls.uscg.mil

To:cgsic@cgls.uscg.mil <cgsic@cgls.uscg.mil>

From:Civil Global Positioning System Service Interface Committee (CGSIC) <cgsic@cgls.use.mg3 Microseconds Off for a period of over 5 hours!

The Nation' almost exclu Global Posi

All CGSIC:

Air Force Official Press Release - GPS Ground System Anomaly

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On 26 January at 12:49 a.m. MST, the 2nd Space Operations Squadron at the 50th Space Wing, Schriever Air Force Base, Colo., verified users were experiencing GPS timing issues. Further investigation revealed an issue in the Global Positioning System ground software which only affected the time on legacy L-band signals. This change occurred when the oldest vehicle, SVN 23, was removed from the constellation. While the core navigation systems were working normally, the coordinated universal time timing signal was off by 13 microseconds which exceeded the design specifications. The issue was resolved at 6:10 a.m. MST, however global users may have experienced GPS timing issues for several hours. U.S. Strategic Command's Commercial Integration Cell, operating out of the Joint Space Operations Center, effectively served as the portal to determine the scope of commercial user impacts. Additionally, the Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg AFB has not received any reports of issues with GPS-aided munitions, and has determined that the timing error is not attributable to any type of outside interference such as jamming or spoofing. Operator procedures were modified to preclude a repeat of this issue until the ground system software is corrected, and the 50th Space Wing will conduct an Operational Review Board to review procedures and impacts on users. Commercial and Civil users who experienced impacts can contact the U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center at (703) 313-5900. V/R

Rick Hamilton CGSIC Executive Secretariat GPS Information Analysis Team Lead (intention: U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center 703-313-5930

> V/r, ROLAND RAINEY, JR., Major, USAF Director of Operations 2d Space Operations Squadron (GPS) Schriever AFB, CO DSN: 560-2523; Comm: 719-567-2523 Cell: 719-209-8740 Work BB: 719-440-6110



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Picture from www.gakinineenNational Laboratory MANAGED BY UT-BATTELLE FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Business Challenges (part 1)

- Affordable
 - The average overall cost per phasor measurement unit or PMU (procurement, installation, and commissioning) ranged from \$40,000 to \$180,000.^A For industrial applications, the average cost of a sensor is \$1,800.^B These costs are, in part, dependent on the parameter being measured along with complexity of installation.^C 2020 goals are \$10 for end user sensor, \$100 for multi-purpose distribution sensor.
- Flexible
 - Coordination: DOE, linking key programs within the Office of Science (SC), Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE), Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE), Office of Fossil Energy (FE), Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Advanced Research Projects Agency - Energy (ARPA-E), Office of Energy Policy and Systems Analysis (EPSA), and others.
- Sustainable
 - For example, growth in Photovoltaic (PV): there are now more than 600,000 homes and businesses with on-site solar PV. In 2014, PV installations reached 6,200 MW, up 30 percent over 2013 and more than 12 times the amount installed five years earlier.^D



sources:

^A Synchrophasor Technologies & their Deployment in the Recovery Act Smart Grid Programs, August 2013;

^B "Agile Prognostics and Diagnostics for Power Transmission Reliability and Asset Management" White paper, Peter Fuhr, Alex Melin

^c D. Lineweber , S. McNulty, "Cost of Power Disturbances to Industrial & Digital Economy Companies," *EPRI Report: 3002000476, CEIDS,* 2001.

^D GTM Research and Solar Energy Industries Association, U.S. Solar Market Insight Report: 2014 Year in Review, 2015.

Business Challenges (part 2)



- Life with Experimental and Observational Data...
 - What about the long-term QA aspects of maintaining data?
 - What about the logistics of very large data?
 - Staging / Retrieving huge files (can't be on disk)
- Department of Redundancy Department



Business Challenges (part 3)

- Room for Simulation & Data Analytics?
 - Most sciences have moved to incorporating simulation as a first-class citizen in the process of scientific discovery
 - What best-practices can the rapidly evolving power grid take?
- Next-generation power grid applications should seek to develop new methods that maximally leverage the power of parallel computing and cloud computing -- GMIC report



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Business Challenges (part 4) ...The Data Deluge

• Key Challenge: Make Sense of So Much Data



- If "many hands make light work," how can we enable more people to make sense of the data?
- We'll Need Better Tools





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Summary

- DOE is actively addressing grid modernization and climate change
- We see potential in helping to understand barriers & gaps, and in working with stakeholders to derive a path forward
- Among today's shortcomings:
 - Insufficient precision
 - Insufficient security
 - Insufficient RAS
 - Too Many Business Challenges To Needed Technology
- Multiple Initiatives are intended to address these concerns.





Acknowledgements

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Questions?

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