AN EVALUATION OF PRESENTATION ATTACK DETECTION OF FINGERPRINT BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS APPLYING ISO/IEC 30107-3

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Outline

- Why, how, what was done?
- Experiment
- Applying ISO/IEC JTC1 30107-3 to the experiment
- Results reporting
- Lessons learned


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Why, how, what was done?

iPhone 5S fingerprint sensor hacked by Germany's Chaos Computer Club

Biometrics are not safe, says famous hacker team who provide video showing how they could use a fake fingerprint to bypass phone's security lockscreen



HOW?

WHY?

Security evaluations (PAD) ISO/IEC 30107-3 + Common Criteria

WHAT? Find vulnerabilities → experiment
Apply ISO/IEC 30107-3

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


Experiment


- 4 sensors: 1 thermal, 2 capacitive, 1 optical
- 330 + 126 artefacts
- 36 real fingers, 6 capture subjects
- 4672 images
- Cooperative and non-cooperative attacks
- 10 artefact species: Play-Doh (x2), gelatine, latex, silicone, white glue, latex with graphite (x2), silicone with graphite (x2)

Experiment Acquisition process

• If sensors respond \rightarrow more artefacts



Experiment Classification of artefact species



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Before



After

Applying ISO/IEC JTC1 – 30107-3 Artefacts

- Biometric impostor attacks
- Artefacts appear natural
- Extractable features

Select adequate materials for artefact species


- Separation cooperative/non-cooperative attacks
- Attacker's expertise

Applying ISO/IEC JTC1 – 30107-3 Process-dependent evaluation factors


Enrolment

- Quality thresholds
- Presentation policy (operator oversight)
- Verification
- Usually no operator oversight
- In this case -> no quality threshold


Applying ISO/IEC JTC1 – 30107-3 Attack Potential



Applying ISO/IEC JTC1 – 30107-3 Attack Potential




Applying ISO/IEC JTC1 – 30107-3 Level of evaluator's access





Applying ISO/IEC JTC1 – 30107-3 Metrics



total AP

Applying ISO/IEC JTC1 – 30107-3 Required reporting metrics

System	Metric	Presentation type	Reported?					
	APCER	Attack	× - no access to PAD subsystem					
Data capture	BPCER	Bona fide	× - no access					
subsystem	APNRR	Attack	\checkmark					
	BPNRR	Bona fide	× – no access					
	APNCR	Attack	\checkmark					
	FNMR/FMR	Bona fide	× - no access					
Comparison	APMR	Attack	\checkmark					
subsystem (verification)	Full system processing duration	Attack or bona fide	X – capture and verification done separately					

Applying ISO/IEC JTC1 – 30107-3 Other reporting metrics


Item		Va	lue		Comments				
Capture subjects			6		4 male, 2 female				
Sources for artefacts	36				Index, middle finger and thumb from both hands				
Artefacts	330 + 126				Not included in 30107-3, addition by the evaluator. Thermal and capacitive + optical.				
Artefact species	10				Silicone, silicone with graphite (mixed and on surface), latex, latex with graphite (mixed and on surface), Play-Doh (fresh and a bit dry), gelatine, latex and white glue				
Artefact series			-		Out of each mold one artefact was made for each species				
Detected AP (total, by capture subject, by artefact species, by artefact series)	* _ * _			-	* Reported later				
Non-detected AP (total, by capture subject, by artefact species, by artefact series)	*	-	*	-	* Reported later				
Detected normal presentations			-		Not reported – additional evaluation needed				
Non-detected normal presentations			-		Not reported – additional evaluation needed				
Alterations/modifications to artefact creation			-		There were no alterations to artefact creation. A different evaluation should be performed for this end.				
Configuration of PAD systems under test	NBIS, threshold = 25				Set from previous performance evaluation, same sensors				
Presentation attack resistance	F	Reporte	ed befor	e					
Attack potential	I	Reporte	ed befor	e					
Description of IUT (sensors)	1 th	erm., 2	2 cap., 1	. opt.	Manufacturers and models are confidential				

Outline


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Results reporting


Attack Presentations = rejected artefacts + accepted artefacts



Results reporting Cooperative attacks




Results reporting (All) Cooperative attacks




Results reporting Cooperative attacks


		Sili	cone		Gelatine				Latex			Latex + graphite				Latex + graphite surface				
Sensor	Ther	Cap1	Cap2	Opt	Ther	Cap1	Cap2	Opt	Ther	Cap1	Cap2	Opt	Ther	Cap1	Cap2	Opt	Ther	Cap1	Cap2	Opt
Artef		6		6		36		30		12		30		12		6		36		12
AP	25	36	36	6	114	130	102	32	47	72	72	31	52	72	72	6	108	214	190	36
Resp	25	24	0	6	114	130	62	28	47	66	0	29	52	72	0	6	101	156	4	0
NFIQ>3	17	36	36	1	95	120	82	7	29	72	72	2	39	72	72	3	59	212	189	36
APNRR	0%	33%	100%	0%	0%	0%	39%	13%	0%	8%	100%	6%	0%	0%	100%	0%	6%	27%	98%	100%
APNCR	68%	67%	0%	17%	83%	92%	41%	9%	62%	92%	0%	0%	75%	100%	0%	50%	48%	72%	2%	0%
APNMR	24%	0%	0%	50%	15%	8%	16%	50%	32%	0%	0%	94%	25%	0%	0%	33%	41%	1%	1%	0%
APMR	8%	0%	0%	33%	2%	0%	4%	28%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	17%	5%	0%	0%	0%
	c	iliaana	I stranda		Silicone + graphite surface		Play-Doh			Play-Doh after 30 minutes				White glue						
	0	nicone	+ graphi	te	SIIICO	ne + gra	ipnite st	unace		Play	-Don		Play-l	Jon arte	er 30 mil	nutes		White	egiue	
Sensor	Ther	Cap1	+ graph	Opt	Ther	Cap1	Cap2	Opt	Ther	Cap1	-Don Cap2	Opt	Ther	Cap1	Cap2	Opt	Ther	Cap1	cap2	Opt
Sensor Artef									Ther			Opt 30				_	Ther			Opt O
		Cap1		Opt		Cap1		Opt	Ther 126	Cap1		-		Cap1		Opt	Ther 20	Cap1		-
Artef	Ther	Cap1 12	Cap2	Opt 6	Ther	Cap1 12	Cap2	Opt 6		Cap1 42	Cap2	30	Ther	Cap1 12	Cap2	Opt		Cap1 6	Cap2	-
Artef AP	Ther 37	Cap1 12 66	Cap2 96	Opt 6 36	Ther 24	Cap1 12 34	Cap2 33	Opt 6 36	126	Cap1 42 247	Cap2 181	30 30	Ther 27	Cap1 12 97	Cap2 56	Opt	20	Cap1 6 33	Cap2 36	-
Artef AP Resp	Ther 37 23	Cap1 12 66 60	Cap2 96 0	Opt 6 36 5	Ther 24 24	Cap1 12 34 24	Cap2 33 0	Opt 6 36 0	126 124	Cap1 42 247 205	Cap2 181 110	30 30 21	Ther 27 27	Cap1 12 97 65	Cap2 56 26	Opt 0 - -	20 20	Cap1 6 33 33	Cap2 36 0	-
Artef AP Resp NFIQ>3	Ther 37 23 22	Cap1 12 66 60 66	Cap2 96 0 96	Opt 6 36 5 31	Ther 24 24 17	Cap1 12 34 24 33	Cap2 33 0 33	Opt 6 36 0 36	126 124 72	Cap1 42 247 205 239	Cap2 181 110 161	30 30 21 10	Ther 27 27 4	Cap1 12 97 65 95	Cap2 56 26 39	Opt 0 - -	20 20 10	Cap1 6 33 33 33 30	Cap2 36 0 36	-
Artef AP Resp NFIQ>3 APNRR	Ther 37 23 22 38%	Cap1 12 66 60 66 9%	Cap2 96 0 96 100%	Opt 6 36 5 31 86%	Ther 24 24 17 0%	Cap1 12 34 24 33 29%	Cap2 33 0 33 33 100%	Opt 6 36 0 36 100%	126 124 72 2%	Cap1 42 247 205 239 17%	Cap2 181 110 161 39%	30 30 21 10 30%	Ther 27 27 4 0%	Cap1 12 97 65 95 33%	Cap2 56 26 39 54%	Opt 0 - -	20 20 10 0%	Cap1 6 33 33 30 0%	Cap2 36 0 36 100%	-


Results reporting Non-cooperative attacks





Results reporting (All) Non-cooperative attacks





Results reporting Non-cooperative attacks

	Silicone			Gelatine				Latex		Lat	tex + grapl	nite	Latex + graphite surface		
Sensor	Ther	Cap1	Cap2	Ther	Cap1	Cap2	Ther	Cap1	Cap2	Ther	Cap1	Cap2	Ther	Cap1	Cap2
Artef.		24			30			24			6			6	
AP	110	138	174	161	218	196	104	142	144	36	32	36	36	36	36
Resp.	106	138	0	136	206	73	100	142	0	0	32	0	0	36	0
NFIQ > 3	90	138	174	123	209	179	79	141	144	36	30	36	36	36	36
APNRR	4%	0%	100%	16%	6%	63%	4%	0%	100%	100%	0%	100%	100%	0%	100%
APNCR	78%	100%	0%	61%	90%	29%	72%	99%	0%	0%	94%	0%	0%	100%	0%
APNMR	17%	0%	0%	24%	4%	9%	22%	1%	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
APMR	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	Silicone + graphite Silicone + gra		+ graphite	phite surface Play-Doh			White glue								
Sensor	Ther	Cap1	Cap2	Ther	Cap1	Cap2	Ther	Cap1	Cap2	Ther	Cap1	Cap2			
Artef.		6			24			18			6				
AP	36	36	36	139	144	144	77	107	107	23	36	36			
Resp.	0	36	0	124	132	0	77	93	7	19	36	0			
NFIQ > 3	36	36	36	135	143	144	60	101	107	17	35	36			
APNRR	100%	0%	100%	11%	8%	100%	0%	13%	93%	17%	0%	100%			
APNCR	0%	100%	0%	86%	91%	0%	78%	81%	7%	57%	97%	0%			
APNMR	0%	0%	0%	3%	1%	0%	21%	6%	0%	26%	3%	0%			
APMR	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%			

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Lessons learned

- Compare security evaluations
- Attack Potential difficult to measure, should be more specific
- 2 side-by-side graphs (rates, quantities)
- Environmental conditions should be reported
- Give image examples of artefacts and captured samples

References

- ISO / IECJTC 1 / SC37, "CD 30107-3, Biometric presentation attack detection Part 3: Testing and reporting," 2016.
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- J. Galbally, J. Fierrez, J. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, F. Alonso-Fernández, J. Ortega-Garcia, and M. Tapiador, "On the Vulnerability of Fingerprint Verification Systems to Fake Fingerprints Attacks," 2006.
- A. Choiniere and T. Lubysheva, Novetta Protecting against Fingerprint Vulnerabilities when Deploying Biometric Systems. 2015.

Thank you!

Extra info

Material	Elapsed time	Specialist Expertise	Knowledge of TOE	Window of opportunity	Equipment	Total	Attack potential	Attack resistance
Play-Doh	0	0	0	1	4	5	Basic	No rating
Play-Doh 30'	0	0	0	1	4	5	Basic	No rating
Gelatin	0	0	0	1	4	5	Basic	No rating
Silicone mixed with graphite	0	0	0	1	4	5	Basic	No rating
Silicone with graphite on surface	0	0	0	1	4	5	Basic	No rating
Latex mixed with graphite	1	0	0	1	4	6	Basic	No rating
Latex with graphite on surface	1	0	0	1	4	6	Basic	No rating
Latex	1	0	0	1	4	6	Basic	No rating
White glue	1	0	0	1	4	6	Basic	No rating
Silicone	0	0	0	1	4	5	Basic	No rating

Extra info Enrolment process

